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Abstract 
The first paper, "Interest rate pass-through and financial crises: do switching regimes 
matter? The case of Argentina", analyses the dynamic relationship between a money 
market (interbank) rate and different short-term lending rates by measuring their pass- 
through. Neither linear single-equation modelling nor linear multi-equation systems 
capture efficiently this relationship. Several financial crises alter the speed and degree 
of response to interbank rate shocks. Hence, a Markov switching VAR model shows the 
pass-through increases considerably for all market interest rates in a high-volatility 
scenario. The model identifies correctly the periods in which regime shifts occur, and 
associates them to financial crises. 
The second paper, "Modelling interest rate pass-through with endogenous switching 
regimes in Argentina", extends the scope of the Markov switching modelling by 
including time-varying transition probabilities. Interest rate spreads are used as leading 
indicators. The model allows devaluation expectations and country risks, (measured by 
rate spreads) to signal regime switching. Estimation results suggest that the pass- 
through tends to overshoot with financial instability, but to decrease if that condition is 
sufficiently large and long-lived. Likewise, results show a quite heterogeneous credit 
market, with a highly efficient transmission mechanism in the corporate segment, but 
considerably less in the consumer segment. 
The final paper, "Regime switching in interest rate pass-through and dynamic bank 
modelling with risks", builds a theoretical model of dynamic bank optimisation, which 
provides rationale to a regime-switching behaviour in the interest rate pass-through. It is 
shown that a regime-switching interbank rate induces a nonlinear behaviour in lending 
and deposit rates and (by further introducing interbank-alike regime-switching risk 
premiums) in the pass-through. Thus, the pass-through process is consistent with a 
nonlinear behaviour even if there are no asymmetric adjustment costs in the response to 
interbank rate shocks. An empirical application to France and Germany provide results 
that support these conclusions. 
CHAPTER 1 
12 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The interest rate pass-through could display nonlinearities of different kinds. The 
relationship between money market rates and bank rates might be subject to regime 
switching due to, among other factors, nonlinear monetary policies, to financial crises, 
to business cycle stances, or to nonlinear adjustment costs. If the pass-through were 
switching, the relationship parameters would be regime-dependent and no linear model 
would capture accurately the relationship. The objective of this thesis is to study in 
detail the application of Markov switching models to represent the pass-through from 
money market rates to lending and deposit interest rates. The stochastic nature of the 
regime shifts in this type of modelling accommodates appropriately the unknown timing 
of the alteration in speed and magnitude of the pass-through. 
In order to study these feasible nonlinearities in the pass-through, the thesis follows first 
an empirical approach. The econometric model infers regime switches from data on the 
Argentinean financial system. Shifts in the pass-through parameters are clearly 
associated to financial crises. Estimation results from a Markov switching vector 
autoregression (MS-VAR) model are superior to those from linear representations of the 
pass-through. Fixed and time-varying transition probabilities explain alternatively the 
transition between regimes in the system. 
Firmly establishing the presence of regime switching behaviour in the pass-through, the 
thesis follows then a theoretical approach to give rationale to such nonlinearities in a 
dynamic banking optimisation framework. Explicitly recognizing the possibility of a 
regime-switching pattern in the interbank rate, the dynamic model captures similar 
13 
nonlinearities in bank interest rates. By further introducing risk premiums, which switch 
between regimes in a similar fashion than the interbank rate, the bank optimisation 
generates nonlinearities in the pass-through. There is no need for adjustment costs to be 
asymmetric to support this regime switching behaviour. The nonlinearity prevailing in 
the money market rate induces regime switching in risks premiums and, hence, in the 
interest rate pass-through. 
The transmission of official rate impulses (or of money market conditions) to bank 
interest rates is usually sluggish and incomplete in the short-term but rather complete in 
the medium- and long-term. The speed of response is usually associated to the 
efficiency of the transmission mechanism, so it is crucial to measure the pass-through to 
enhance understanding of the whole process. Most standard literature has done so by 
using linear models, usually derived from a static industrial organisation approach. A 
sound theoretical start for the link among these interest rates is the expectations model 
of the term structure of interest rates. Of course, if there were nonlinearities in this 
structure then, a linear representation for the pass-through would feasibly over- or 
under-estimate the relationship parameter. 
Linear models could include dynamics in the estimation by considering the time series 
properties of the interest rates under study. Hence, error correction models (either 
single- or multi-equation systems) usually provide the measure for the pass-through. 
Yet, most empirical studies concentrate on the linear nature of this transmission process. 
When nonlinearities are considered, it is often in the form of asymmetric adjustments. 
14 
The first two papers of this thesis are empirical in essence. The last paper is of a 
theoretical nature instead, although it also contains an empirical application to support 
the modelling. Each of these papers separately supports different aspects of the Markov 
switching modelling of the interest rate pass-through. All three together represent a 
detailed account of feasible nonlinearities in the transmission of money market rate 
impulses to bank interest rates. 
The first paper analyses the dynamic relationship between the money market (interbank) 
rate and different short-term lending rates in Argentina. In order to capture the effects of 
financial crises over this transmission mechanism, a Markov switching-regime system 
models the interest rate pass-through. This paper addresses the issue of whether the 
banking system adjusts its pricing behaviour to highly volatile market conditions or 
remains unaffected by them. Since no a priory assumption of nonlinearity is made, the 
research first discusses and estimates linear models (both single-equation and multi- 
equation) to measure the pass-through. Nevertheless, as description of estimation results 
progresses, it becomes clear the need for a nonlinear modelling of the transmission 
process for the Argentinean interest rates. 
The main econometric results support indeed the Markov switching estimation of the 
pas-through. In Argentina, from June 1993 to December 2000, the interest rate pass- 
through from the interbank rate to rates on overdrafts, bills, and personal loans show a 
notorious regime-switching behaviour. Regime shifts coincide with the international 
financial crises that hit Argentina and with the building up of the currency board 
collapse. In general, under turbulent times in the banking system, the pass-through 
15 
accelerates substantially for all lending rates. Besides, not only the short-term pass- 
through is regime switching, but also the long-term pass-through. 
Although including only domestic interest rates in the MS-VAR represents an advance 
from the linear modelling for this particular economy, there seems to be room for taking 
advantage of further market information. In particular, additional data could provide 
evidence of whether exogenous or endogenous factors explain a regime-dependent pass- 
through. Constant transition probabilities (CTP) are usually associated to the first 
possibility, while time-varying transition probabilities (TVTP) suggest endogenous 
switching. Thus, the second paper of this thesis postulates and estimates a Markov- 
switching model with TVTP (as opposed to the CTP used in the first paper). 
The second paper studies the interest rate pass-through for Argentina including the 
period that preceded and followed the collapse of the currency board by the end of 
2001. Interest rate spreads are used as leading indicators for TVTP, since they contain 
enough exploitable information about the risks bank faced in their optimisation process. 
Considering only interest rates in local currency might not be enough to capture banks' 
optimising behaviour in such a dual currency system. Hence, this paper also considers 
the relevance of lending interest rates in the foreign currency (US dollars); of 
depreciation expectations (as measured by interest rate differentials); and of country risk 
measures. Markov switching models have alternatively considered these variables as 
exogenous (MS-VARX) or as information variables in the TVTP. 
The pass-through might change when greater volatility and unusual uncertain conditions 
in the financial markets make banks change their expectations of future adjustments in 
16 
interest rates. It is relevant then to discuss and explore what are the possible sources of 
those changes. As some empirical papers have already shown for Argentina (as well as 
for the euro area), there could be nonlinearities in devaluation expectations which in 
turn would induce nonlinearities in interest rate differentials (through uncovered interest 
parity). This regime switching in money market rates might induce nonlinear behaviour 
into lending interest rates. Feasibly then, the interest rate pass-through might reflect this 
nonlinear pattern too. 
The main econometric results from the Markov switching estimation of the VAR with 
TVTP indicates that the pass-through decreases when financial conditions become 
highly unstable for a long period. Furthermore, the use of information about devaluation 
expectations, country risk, and credit risk, indeed signal the occurrence of those regime 
switches. Therefore, in light of these results, further research should explain the 
seemingly contradictory behaviour in the pass-through found in these two first papers. 
Does the pass-through increase or decrease in volatile conditions?. In order to tackle this 
question, there is a need to turn into a more theoretical explanation of the transmission 
mechanism among interest rates in the bank optimisation process. 
Interest rates reflect a banking system's features on market structure, operating costs, 
and risk management as well as loan demand and deposit supply characteristics. These 
microeconomic factors explain differences both in interest rates (lending and deposit) 
and in the corresponding pass-through (from money market rates to retail rates). 
Although banks consider these factors in the market segments in which they operate, 
they set their interest rates based on the information contents of the short-term money 
market rate they take as reference. 
17 
In particular, when a nonlinear pass-through is considered, the regime-switching 
behaviour is not necessarily linked to those factors but to the money market rate instead. 
Hence, if the interest rate pass-through were indeed regime switching then exploring 
where this nonlinearity comes from and how it affects banking optimisation would 
enrich the transmission mechanism analysis. Thus, the objective of the third paper is to 
build a theoretical model of dynamic bank optimisation that provides rationale to a 
regime-switching behaviour in the interest rate pass-through. 
Two main sources of nonlinearity in the interest rate pass-through are considered. The 
first one operates through a nonlinear money market rate. A regime-switching behaviour 
in this interbank rate will induce a nonlinear pattern in the pass-through by prompting 
regime switches in the risk premiums considered in bank optimisation. As already 
pointed out, the data generating process for the interbank rate could be nonlinear if there 
is a regime-switching behaviour in monetary policy (interest rate smoothing vs. 
inflation fighting), in devaluation expectations (financial crises affecting agents' belief 
through uncovered interest parity), or in the term structure of interest rate (associated to 
business cycle stances). The second mechanism operates through asymmetric 
adjustment costs, which could induce a nonlinear pass-through even if the interbank rate 
is a linear stochastic process. Since this latter mechanism has been studied somewhere 
else, this study discusses it briefly as an extension to the main model. 
The research presented in the last paper tries to answer two main questions. On one 
hand, it tries to analyse what kind of nonlinearity the pass-through displays. The goal is 
to derive a theoretical model of bank optimisation that could accommodate both a 
(Markov) switching regime process in the interbank rate and a nonlinear interest rate 
18 
pass-through. The model should clarify the transmission mechanism by which a regime 
shifting nature of the interbank rate induces regime switching behaviour in the pass- 
through. On the other hand, the paper discusses why the interest rate pass-through is 
quite heterogeneous by market segments despite feasibly sharing the same initial 
impulse (the nonlinearity in the interbank rate). 
The theoretical approach starts with a simple static model of banking optimisation, 
which has been widely used as theoretical support for linearity in the interest rate pass- 
through. Then, the paper introduces a nonlinear specification of the interbank rate into a 
dynamic banking model, thus incorporating the basis for a regime-switching pass- 
through. Yet, an actual nonlinear pass-through is only obtained once the model 
considers the risks premiums banks charge in their optimisation process. Most 
importantly, the model clearly shows a regime switching pass-through once feasible 
nonlinearities in those risk premiums are linked to those in the money market rate. 
Furthermore, this mechanism makes possible for the pass-through to either increase or 
decrease when market conditions become highly unstable. In order to support these 
theoretical derivations, an empirical application to French and German interest rates is 
conducted. Once again, Markov switching models appropriately establish the existence 
or not of regime shifts. The data for these cases indeed support the main theoretical 
suggestions of the model. 
19 
CHAPTER 2 
20 
2 INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH AND FINANCIAL 
CRISES: DO SWITCHING REGIMES MATTER? THE 
CASE OF ARGENTINA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyses the dynamic relationship between the money market (interbank) 
rate and different short-term lending rates by measuring the pass-through process 
between these interest rates in the banking system of Argentina. In order to capture the 
effects of international or national financial crises over this transmission mechanism, 
the interest rate pass-through is modelled using an endogenous (Markov) switching- 
regime system. This type of model allows for non-linearities in the adjustment process 
of lending rates to changes in the interbank rate. 
The transmission mechanism of monetary policy (or of money market conditions) is 
usually sluggish and incomplete in the short term but rather complete in the medium 
and long-term. Thus, for example, changes in the interbank rate induced by monetary 
policy decisions or by changing conditions in the money market are transmitted to bank 
lending rates but only with lags. The speed of response is usually associated to the 
efficiency of the transmission mechanism, so it is crucial to measure the pass-through to 
enhance understanding of the whole process. 
Although Argentina, due to her currency board regime, did not have an independent 
monetary policy for most of the 1990's, sound banking system reforms improved the 
signal transmission of short-term financial conditions. Liberalisation and opening of 
capital markets had fostered financial integration but it had also had the side effect of 
exposing the banking system to waves of international financial distress. On this 
21 
context, this paper addresses the issue of whether the banking system adjusts its pricing 
behaviour to highly volatile market conditions or remains unaffected by them. 
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents an overview of the 
interest rate pass-through literature. Section 3 summarizes the expectations model of the 
term structure of interest rates and an industrial organisation approach to the market 
structure of interest rate. Section 4 deals with the main econometric techniques used 
here to measure the pass-through process. Section 5 briefly describes the Argentinean 
banking system while that Section 6 introduces data description and preliminary time 
series analysis. Section 7 presents and discussed the econometric estimates. Finally, 
Section 8 reviews the main empirical findings and discusses further research topics. 
22 
2.2 BANK INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH 
The pass-through mechanism involves the process by which impulses on interest rates 
administered by monetary authorities or on money market interest rates are transmitted 
to short-term bank lending rates. The pass-through measuring would involve assessing 
the extent of the impact (the short-term and the long-term effects) and the speed of the 
transmission (the adjustment process from the initial impact to its final effect). 
The pass-through mechanism is usually suggested to be sluggish in the short-term but 
less so in the long-term. Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) refer to the degree of stickiness 
of bank lending rates as the speed at which these rates adjust to their long-run 
equilibrium values after monetary shocks hit money market rates. Interest rates 
stickiness is associated to structural characteristics of the financial system such as the 
degree of competition, the stage of financial market development, and the ownership 
structure of the banking system. ' Besides, there could be asymmetry in the speed of 
adjustment so that, for example, the interest rate pass-through would be lower when 
interest rates are falling than when they are increasing. 
A bank will change its loan pricing in response to a monetary shock but only if it sees 
the change as permanent. In the short-run, the bank will take into consideration the 
adjustment costs involved (against the cost of being in disequilibrium). Generally, the 
more interest rate-sensitive (elastic) the demand for loans, the higher the cost of keeping 
misaligned interest rates. 
1 Ehrmann et al. (2001 a) find, for the euro area, that credit market features are relevant to determine the 
extent of the response of bank loans supply to monetary policy actions. Bank lending falls significantly 
after a monetary contraction, with bank liquidity playing a prominent role. 
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The seminal contribution by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) focuses on the speed of 
response of bank lending rates to shocks in money market rates, assuming implicitly the 
existence of one long-run equilibrium relationship. With the more recent experiences of 
financial reforms as well as of hazardous episodes of international financial (currency) 
crises, the possibility of more than one equilibrium relationship or the absence of one at 
all needs to be addressed when modelling interest rate pass-through. 
As Bondt (2002) remarks, a quicker and fuller interest rate pass-through strengthens 
monetary policy transmission. Following Cottarelli and Kourelis' argument that the 
financial structure is relevant in determining the interest rate pass-through, he suggests 
that the transmission mechanism of monetary policy could be enhanced by sound 
financial policies and reforms. Since bank pricing behaviour influences bank profits, 
monetary policy shocks on lending rates might also affect economic growth in the short 
run. Besides, this pricing behaviour would depend much upon market characteristics 
such as the degree of competition; demand features (interest rate elasticity); market 
risks; and cost structures, both at the market level and at every market segment. 2 
The financial structure might influence the pass-through mechanism in a number of 
ways. A monopolistic or oligopolistic banking sector would be more able to obtain 
larger interest rate margins so that pricing in such market structures might not transmit 
monetary impulses as smoothly as, for example, in a competitive banking system. 3 In 
2 Haan (2001) shows for The Netherlands that the lending channel of monetary transmission is active but 
not affecting lending to households as much as it is affecting lending to firms. Whereas Kakes and Sturm 
(2002) find for Germany that big banks are able to shield their loans portfolio against monetary 
contractions. Their analysis, nonetheless, is focused on the effects of monetary shocks in loan supply 
rather than in loan interest rates. In a study for interest rates, Heffernan (2002) shows that financial 
institutions exhibit indeed different pricing behaviour depending on the bank product. 
A seminal empirical research on the relationship between bank pricing and market concentration is 
found in Berger and Hannan (1989). A more recent contribution from Heffernan (2002) shows for the UK 
banking system that during the 1990's the presence of perfect competition is largely ruled out. 
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some emerging markets, for instance, such structures might be present in some credit 
segments (if not in the banking system as a whole), where financial development is at 
its initial stages. For the euro area, Lensink and Sterken (2002) recall the important 
differences in banking structures and suggest that they might explain the differential 
impact of monetary policy across countries. In particular, they argue, smaller banks 
might reduce more their lending in response to a monetary shock due to their deposit 
dependence. Nevertheless, this might not necessarily be the case for emerging markets, 
where small banks are also subsidiaries of international banks and only work in well 
developed market segments. 
Along with market structure and demand features (such as interest rate elasticity), 
banks' costs and risk behaviour could influence interest rate levels. As Bean, Larsen, 
and Nikolov (2002) point out, the presence of financial frictions such as asymmetric 
information and moral hazard would increase uncertainty in the system and therefore 
might amplify the effects of monetary shocks to the market structure of interest rates. 
Empirical evidence indeed suggests the importance of financial structure and frictions 
for the transmission mechanism. See, for example, Altunbas, Fazylov, and Molyneux 
(2002); Bondt (2002); and Mojon (2000) for a revision of this evidence in Europe. For 
North America, see Moazzami (1999), and Morris and Sellon (1995). 4 Other references 
are Scholnick (1996) for Malaysia and Singapore; and Alfaro et al. (2002) for Chile. 
Furthermore, financial disturbances such as international financial crises might further 
influence the speed and extent by which interest rates respond to monetary shocks. In 
this sense, the idea of a bank-lending channel for the transmission mechanism (in 
'' Nevertheless, they argue in the latter case that structural changes in the banking system might not affect 
the transmission mechanism. 
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addition to a more conventional interest rate channel) emphasises the importance of 
bank behaviour in intensifying the effects from monetary policy. It is an empirical issue 
whether this behaviour is altered under a financial crisis or remains unchanged with it. 
This paper emphasises the short-term interbank rate as the one transmitting financial 
conditions impulses to the rest of the spectrum of interest rates. This approach is 
compatible with the marginal cost pricing models of banking behaviour. 5 Thus, 
interbank rate changes lead the dynamics of all other interest rates, assuming that there 
is a long-term relationship between them. Winker (1999), for instance, adds credit 
rationing due to asymmetric information to explain bank pricing and sluggishness of 
interest rates in following interbank rate movements. A bank will adjust its interest rates 
after a shock in the interbank rate since otherwise its returns will be reduced. 
Nevertheless, in adjusting the rate it will also incur costs due to adverse selection. It 
might then choose to adjust rates with lags (expecting more information as to the nature 
of the interbank rate movement) but following the long-term trend. 
5 For an application of these models to the euro area, see Corvoisier and Gropp (2001). 
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2.3 MARKET STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES 
The expectations model of the term structure of interest rates is a theoretical appealing 
description of the relationship among interest rates with different terms to maturity but 
with similar credit characteristics. In a broader context, the market structure of interest 
rate (which involves both different terms to maturity and credit characteristics) is better 
modelled through an industrial organization approach that considers banks' optimising 
behaviour. In this sense, measuring the interest rate pass-through, from an interbank rate 
to various lending rates (with different risk and credit characteristics), could be seen as 
an attempt to model the market structure of interest rates assuming that all other factors 
remain unchanged. How persistent changes induced in lending rates are would 
importantly determine the dynamics of the process. Thus, in both the term structure and 
the market structure of interest rates it would be crucial to determine the stationarity (or 
non-stationarity) properties of the interest rates (time series) involved. 
2.3.1 The term structure of interest rates 
The term structure of interest rates refers to the relationship among interest rates with 
different terms to maturity but with similar or equal credit characteristics. 6 The 
expectations model considers short-term and long-term debt instruments perfect 
substitutes so that a long-term rate is a weighted average of the current and expected 
short rates plus a term premium. ' Thus, the following expression applies to such rates: 
i =(I/ n) Y, ý- 
n-I 
Er, 
+i 
+ y(n 
i=1 
(3.1) 
6 The concept has been generally applied to a very short-term money market interest rate and rates for 
government-issued securities (such as bonds). But this does not need to be the only case. 
7 Alternatively, the segmented market hypothesis considers them highly imperfect substitutes and so 
interest rates spreads are determined by demand and supply in each end of the term structure. 
27 
where r, " is the long term rate (over a n-period of time), r, is the current short term rate, 
E, is the rational expectations operator conditional on information at time t, and y(n) is 
the term premium on the longer rate. The term premium could be a stationary stochastic 
process (possibly a constant, usually zero) or a nonstationary process, depending on its 
distributional properties being time independent or not. If interest rates are integrated of 
order one but the term premium is stationary then those rates would be cointegrated. 8 In 
particular, it is usually argued that if the expectations hypothesis holds then a 
cointegrating vector such as (1, -1) will relate any pair of rates from the term structure. 
Indeed, there is usually strong empirical support for the term premium being a 
stationary process (if not constant at all). Thus, even if a financial system were 
undergoing periods of high volatility (such as those during financial crises) the term 
premium on any interest rate, although time-varying, could still be stationary. 
Establishing the stationarity or non-stationarity of the interest rate series is an important 
empirical issue since it would determine the dynamic properties of the model employed 
to represent the term structure. Besides, the non-stationarity of interest rates is an 
empirical common result, especially for developed countries. 9 This fact allows 
modelling the term structure by, for instance, a Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM). The VECM would represent the long-term equilibrium relationship as well as 
the short-term dynamics relating the rates on the term structure. 
8A stationary term premium under the expectations hypothesis is usually associated to the degree of 
efficiency of the relevant financial market. 
9 In discussing the testing of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure Brooks (2002) asserts that 
"there is a general acceptance that interest rates, Treasury Bill yields, etc. are well described as 1(1) 
processes... 
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In financial theory, however, many interest rate models assume stationarity. Thus, they 
are more consistent with representing the interest rates in levels (rather than first 
differences), such as for instance in a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) system. As James 
and Webber (2000) argue, stationary models are mathematically simpler to deal with 
and they can accommodate behaviour at extreme values too (without having to rely 
upon non-stationarity). Nonetheless, there are some desirable consequences from having 
non-stationary models such as to allow them to be calibrated exactly to the yield curve. 
James and Webber discuss also the difference between the basic Vasicek1° model that 
includes mean-reverting interest rates and the extended Vasicek model that allows for 
time-dependent reversion levels and, thus, contains non-stationary variables. " 
2.3.2 The risk structure of interest rates 
The risk structure of interest rates refers to the relationship among rates with the same 
term to maturity but with different credit characteristics (Mishkin (1986)). In this case, 
the factor connecting those interest rates would be a risk premium (different to the term 
premium): 
gr =it+0 (3.2) 
where g, is the riskier interest rate, i, is the less risky interest rate, and 0 is the risk 
premium that the credit market determines for different risk categories. Similar to the 
term structure case, under the assumption that this risk premium is a stationary process, 
it would still be possible to postulate a long-term equilibrium relationship among non- 
stationary interest rate series and, thus, use a VECM. The cointegrating vector would 
also be of the kind (1, -1) for every pair of rates. Again, the non-stationarity of the time 
10 The Vasicek model assumes a Ornstein-Ulhenbeck stochastic process: dry =a(, l - r, 
) dt + adz, 
where the last term captures the volatility component of the interest rate dynamics. 
For an extended discussion on the Vasicek models and other interest rate models and their stochastic 
properties see James and Webber (2000). 
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series should be established first, otherwise a VAR system should be more appropriate 
to model the risk structure of interest rates. 
2.3.3 The market structure of interest rates 
What economic agents will observe at any given point of time in a financial market is a 
whole set of interest rates, spanning from very short-term to very long-term horizons 
and from low-risk to high-risk characteristics. Therefore, more generally, the market 
structure of interest rates would refer to the relationship among these interest rates with 
different terms to maturity and different risk characteristics. The spread between any 
pair of interest rates on the market could then be represented by: 
Y =dl+r+o (3.3) 
where r, is the riskier, longer-term interest rate; i, is the less risky, shorter-term interest 
rate; y is the term premium, and 0 is the risk premium. Again, stationarity of both the 
term premium and the risk premium would allow non-stationary interest rates to be 
cointegrated. Establishing the time series properties of interest rates would help to 
determine the existence and nature of a long-term relationship between them. 
Nonetheless, these term and risk premium should not be taken as exhausting all possible 
relationships in the market structure of interest rates. Apart from the interest rates, banks 
consider some other factors in their profit maximising behaviour. For instance, banks 
might divide markets in customer segments and specialise on some of them to enhance 
efficiency, incurring probably in different costs. 
Market equilibrium would reflect optimal behaviour from many competing banks that 
adapt themselves to changing financial conditions. For example, an oligopolistic 
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model12 of the banking industry would help to understand equilibrium relationships in 
the credit market and, thus, it will assess better the responses of market interest rates to 
shocks on the money market rate. Factors such as marginal cost of providing loans, 
market structure (market power), and loan demand's characteristics (demand elasticity) 
will also have, along with money market rate, term and risk premiums, a role to play in 
the determination of credit market rates. 
Then, once more, if those additional factors are stationary processes, then cointegration 
could still be established if interest rates are nonstationary. Yet, being aware of those 
other factors might help us to understand the limitations of modelling structures of 
interest rates by including only interest rates in the system. If interest rate series are 
stationary then omitting the other factors in modelling the market structure of interest 
rates might distort, for instance, any impulse response analysis derived from a VAR. 13 
The usual approach to measure the pass-through assumes that the relationship between 
the bank rate and the interbank rate would not be affected by those other factors, but 
they will help to explain the differences in pass-through between different bank rates or 
between countries. Thus, using time series econometrics at a macroeconomic level, the 
pass-through is measure in bivariate systems of the bank rate and the money market 
rate. Thereafter, using panel data at the microeconomic level, all the other factors are 
considered to explain a particular value of that pass-through. 
12 See, for example, Freixas and Rochet (1997), Chapter 3, for a description of such a model. A basic 
oligopolistic model of the banking industry will exclude initially any mention of risk, so that no term or 
risk premium is considered. Here it is also excluded the theoretical extreme cases of perfect competition 
and monopoly. 
13 Even if no other factors but interest rates are included, in a dual-currency financial system, leaving 
aside interest rates in the alternative currency might mislead the analysis. 
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There is no a priori or theoretical reason for the pass-through relationship to be linear. A 
broad market structure of interest rates might be subject to non-linear or unstable 
relationships if the optimising behaviour from banks changes under different regimes 
(regime switching) such as those derived from low-volatility and high-volatility periods 
in the financial markets. Furthermore, asymmetries in the pass-through and time- 
varying term premium should also be possible. 
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2.4 ECONOMETRIC APPROACH 
Generally, economic theory has more to offer on the determination of equilibrium than 
on the nature of dynamic adjustments (which is more of an empirical nature). In 
measuring interest rate pass-through Bondt (2002), for instance, justifies using 
asymmetric adjustment by arguing "the pass-through depends on whether money 
market rates are rising or falling or whether bank interest rates are below or above 
equilibrium levels as determined by cointegration relations". Furthermore, in analysing 
the behaviour of the residuals in an error correction model (ECM), he argues that 
irregularities are due to misspecification coming from omitted variables. Other factors 
other than the money market rates might help to determine retail bank rates. 14 
Therefore, the exact nature of the empirical econometric approach to measure the 
interest rate pass-through will depend entirely on the particular set of interest rates 
under analysis. Whether it is bivariate or multivariate, single or multiple equations, 
cointegrated or non-cointegrated, linear or non-linear model, will depend on a thorough 
data analysis (which should suggest the relevant model). Good in-sample fit would help 
us to understand the pass-through process and out-of-sample performance would 
enhance our confidence on a particular model. 15 
2.4.1 Single equations 
A fairly standard approach (Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994)) for measuring interest rate 
pass-trough is to regress the lending rate on a distributed lag of money market rate 
multipliers for a single country. Thereafter, the cross-country differences in speed 
'' Such as those mention earlier from the oligopolistic models for the banking industry. 
15 James and Webber (2000) point out that any interest rate model should also allow pricing derivatives 
instruments consistently. Such an objective is not attempted here, since the goal is to measure the interest 
rate pass-through and not to model all the distributional properties on individual rates. 
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responses are explained by regressing them on a set of variables representing the 
financial system features. 
Another simple approach to measure the response of short-term lending interest rates to 
changes in money market rates (or central bank rates) is to use a bivariate ECM that 
allows interest rates to be cointegrated. Mojon (2000), 16 for instance, analyses the 
interest rate channel of the monetary transmission mechanism in the European 
Community by using the following ECM equation: 
j max k max 
Ar, =c+Ia. Arr_j +I 
ßkAt-k +Y(rt-1 - lt-1 
j=1 k=0 
(4.1) 
where r, is a retail bank rate and it is the money market rate. The number of lags is 
chosen according to a general-to-specific approach. The coefficient ßo reflects the 
impact or short-term pass-through, while y stands for any feasible cointegration 
relationship. It is implicitly assumed that the final pass-through is 1, given a (1, -1) 
cointegrating vector. Results show that retail bank rates respond sluggishly to changes 
in the money market rates and that interest rates exhibit more downward stickiness than 
upward stickiness (asymmetry in the responses). 17 
Similarly, Bondt (2002) uses an ECM of the interest rate pass-through process based on 
a marginal cost pricing framework, including switching price costs and asymmetric 
information costs. '8 Robustness of his results is found through an impulse-response 
analysis from a bivariate VAR. He finds, in line with previous empirical works for the 
16 Mojon computes the response, after three months, of 25 credit rates and 17 deposit rates to changes in 
the money market rate for euro area countries and links these responses to differences in financial 
structures (using panel data analyses). 
17 For consistency, Mojon estimates additionally the pass-through in two interest rate cycles and (dividing 
the sample set) in sub periods in which the rates increase or decrease. 
18 Bondt allows though the cointegrating vector to be generally determined as (1, ß), being 0 the final or 
long-term pass-through. 
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euro area, that the immediate pass-through of money market rates to retail bank rates is 
incomplete, especially on short-term interest rates. Besides, each lending rate and a 
comparable money market rate share a long-term equilibrium relationship. 
On the other hand, if interest rate series are stationary, a single equation could be run on 
the level of the retail rate and the money market rate. See, among others, Cottarelli and 
Kourelis (1994) for a set of 31 developed and developing countries; Moazzami (1999) 
for Canada and US; and Berstein and Fuentes (2002) for Chile. The following single 
equation (autoregressive distributed lag model) is specified for several pairs of retail 
banking rates and the interbank rate: 
np 
Yf = (S+ 8jYr-l + akl! 
-k 
+E V MPR, (4.2) j=1 k=0 1=0 
where the last term stands for the change in monetary policy interest rate (as in Berstein 
and Fuentes (2002)). This equation could also include some dummy variables to 
account, for instance, for highly volatile periods. The retail rate (re) and the money 
market rate (ii) are expressed in levels (rather than in first differences). Under this 
specification, the short run response from the bank rate to the money market rate is thus 
given by the parameter M and the long run effect is capture by the coefficient 
2=Iak1(1-1ß1). 
This long-term effect parameter is expected to be positive and close to one. Usually, a 
general-to-specific approach is followed to determine the number of lags and the 
relevant coefficients left in the final equation. Again, the short-term response is 
expected to be sluggish, especially if there is some inefficiency in the transmission of 
information in the banking sector (as it could be thought of developing countries). 
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Nevertheless, in the case of Chile, Berstein and Fuentes (2002) found that there is a high 
speed of response from some bank rates to the interbank rate on impact. 
2.4.2 Linear VAR/VECM models 
The interest rate pass-through could also be assessed taking advantage of the 
simultaneous estimation of a multi-equation system. In the case of a K-variable system 
of non-stationary interest rate series, it is possible to determine up to K-1 cointegrating 
vectors. Thus, the spread between any bank interest rate and the money market 
(interbank) rate would be stationary. If those interest rates are indeed cointegrated, then, 
a VECM should be estimated to reveal the short-term dynamics for the pass-through. 
The following is a general specification of a VECM, which considers variables in level 
as to include any long-term relationship and variables in differences as to model the 
short-term dynamics: 
Ay, = Hy, -, + roy, _, + e, 
(4.3) 
The left-hand side term is a vector of first-differenced variables, 11 is the cointegrating 
matrix, and F is the coefficient matrix for the short-run dynamics. 
Conversely, if interest rates were rather stationary then a specification that represents 
their dynamics could be the following general VAR system: 
p 
y, =v+LAjY, -; 
+u, 
i=l 
(4.4) 
where the left-hand side term is a vector of variables in levels, v is a vector of intercepts, 
and Aj is the matrix of autoregressive coefficients. Notice out that the short-term pass- 
through, the coefficient on the current interbank rate in the equation for the lending rate, 
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is not obtained directly from this standard form of the system. The original (primitive) 
form of the system needs to be obtained first, usually by assuming a Choleski 
decomposition. Thence, the short-term pass-through could be estimated as the ratio of 
the covariance between the respective lending rate and the interbank rate over the 
variance of the interbank rate. The long-term pass-through could be estimated with the 
corresponding autoregressive parameters. 
The dynamic responses in each case (whether a VAR or a VECM) are quite different. 
Therefore, it is crucially important to address first the stationary condition of every 
interest rate series. The choice of lags to be considered, in both cases, is an empirical 
issue that depends upon the data set. 
In either case, VECM or VAR, modelling interest rates into a multivariate, rather than 
bivariate, system would provide a better approach to the interrelationships among them. 
This specification will allow simultaneous determination of bank interest rates. It 
assumes no further ordering than the interbank rate coming first in the system. All the 
same, it could be the case that the segmented characteristic of the credit market would 
be better captured by estimating only bivariate systems (VAR or VECM) and not 
multivariate models. 
Take, for example, the analysis of Winker (1999) for German interest rates. Using a 
three-variable system (the interbank, one lending, and one deposit rates), he finds 
cointegration among the variables and, correspondingly, estimates a VECM to explain 
the dynamics. Although he cannot reject the hypothesis that the cointegrating vectors, as 
expected, were of the kind (-1,0,1) and (0, -11), he warns that the adjustment 
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coefficients are not so straightforward interpretable as in the case of single bivariate 
error correction models. 
It is particularly interesting to look at the response of lending rates to an impulse in the 
interbank rate. In a VAR, the ordering of the Choleski transformation is relevant since it 
will assume shocks in the money market rate affecting the bank rates and not the other 
way round (interbank rate comes first in ordering). Thus, it is possible to trace out the 
effect of an assumed exogenous shock19 to the interbank rate on all the other variables 
in the system for some time (and assuming no further shocks occur). This multiplier 
analysis will reveal the impact response dynamics and the long-run effect. 
The pattern of impulse responses will help to confirm the analysis of the stochastic 
characteristics of the data. If impulse responses die out after some time, then the series 
are stationary; otherwise, they are consistent with non-stationary processes. Still, as 
Lütkepohl (1991) indicates, given that all effects of omitted variables in the system are 
assumed to be in the innovations, if those variables being omitted are important, 
impulse responses might be distorted and their interpretation would be harder. 
2.4.3 Non-linear VAR/VECM models 
The presence of important discrete economic events (the so-called peso problems), as 
Ahrens (1999) argues, would distort econometric inference if it were not captured in 
nonlinear models (i. e. regime switching) of the short-term interest rates. Indeed, some 
authors have used non-linear regime-switching models for the term structure of interest 
rates, with usually good forecasting results. Ahrens himself finds that forecasts were 
19 Exogenous in the sense that they come from innovations to financial conditions on the short-term 
money market, which are independent from other bank optimising variables. 
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improved substantially (for German money market rates) by using univariate and 
bivariate (including the term spread) regime-switching frameworks. 
More recently, using a multivariate approach, Clarida et al. (2002) estimate a non-linear 
VECM that allows for Markov switching regimes (MS-VECM) in the term structure of 
interest rates in US, Germany and Japan. Based on the expectations model of the term 
structure, they find that in-sample and out-of-sample performance of their model is 
superior to that of conventional linear VECMs. Forecasting interest rates is derived 
from the rational behaviour of utility-maximising individuals in informational efficient 
markets. Nonlinearities in interest rates are suggested to be the result of non-zero or 
asymmetric transaction costs, infrequent trading and the existence of regime shifts. 
Following Krolzig (1997) notation, their model corresponds to an MSIH-VECM. 
Working with Swedish interest rates, Erlandsson (2002) similarly finds good forecasting 
performance of an endogenous switching regime model that includes a GARCH- 
effect. 20 Nonetheless, as he also points out, for the use of a switching regime model to 
be valid, it needs to have some kind of economic intuition that helps to explain the data 
generating process. 
Whether it is appropriate to use a regime switching approach to model the market 
structure (rather than the term structure) of interest rates is an empirical issue. Thus, for 
example, Ang and Bekaert (1998) use regime-switching models trying to accommodate 
short-term patterns of interest rates for US, Germany and UK. They try to explain why 
the moments of interest rates vary across the business cycle; why the spread increases 
20 He recognizes that if the MS-VAR reduces autocorrelation in the residuals to non-significant levels it 
would be an indication that there is no need for introducing a GARCH effect in the system. 
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during expansions; and why mean reversion is significantly different across the business 
cycle. They too find that regime switching models forecast out of sample better than 
single-regime models. 21 
In Argentina, the presence of international financial crises might have made agents 
believe the currency board was about to collapse, although it did not actually fail until 
December 2001. This peso problem would provide evidence against the expectations 
theory if short-term interest rates were modelled lineally. If bank interest rates respond 
differently to money market interest rate, for instance, under financial crises, then 
modelling these time series with a stable linear VAR model would surely be 
inappropriate. Suitability of modelling should be assessed by comparing the results 
from the non-linear model to those from a linear one and the results from the bivariate 
case to those from a multivariate approach. 
Boinet, Napolitano, and Spagnolo (2002) have recently tested a Markov-switching 
model of devaluation expectations for Argentina and found indeed strong evidence of 
nonlinearities in a data set comprise of devaluation expectations (interest rate 
differential), growth rate, deficit to GDP, real exchange rate, and trade balance to GDP. 
Switching regimes match jumps between multiple equilibriums explained by abrupt 
changes in devaluation expectations. Thus, they conclude, along the reasoning of the 
second-generation models of currency crisis, self-fulfilling prophecies might have 
played an important role in the currency crisis of 2001-2002. 
21 Conventionally, they assess their forecasting performance against single-regime models using the root 
mean squared error and the mean absolute deviation criteria. 
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In an interestingly revealing study for the European monetary system, Dahlquist and 
Gray (2000), using a regime-switching approach, find that the volatility, the level, and 
the speed of adjustment for short-term interest rates are all higher during speculative 
attacks and currency crises. The nonlinearities are suggested to come from reactions to 
different realignment expectations on the interest rates of a currency under stress. Using 
uncovered interest parity, it is argued that if there were nonlinearities (such as regime- 
switching) in exchange rates then they should also be present for interest rates. 
For Japan, Girardin and Horsewood (2001) estimate a Markov switching VAR (MS- 
VAR) with 3 regimes to analyse the monetary transmission mechanism during the 
1990s and the effect of near-zero interest rates (after the collapse of the bubble in asset 
prices). The model indeed differentiates the post-bubble period (after 1992) as a regime. 
Yet, in order to evaluate the pass-through from money market rates to bank loan rates, 
they do not use the estimated MS-VAR but rather assessed the impulse responses from 
a linear VAR estimated only for the post-bubble regime. Thus, they find that there is 
short-term stickiness in bank loan rates to shocks in money market rates. 
Krolzig (2002) argues that regime-switching models represent a very general class 
which encompasses some alternative non-linear and time-varying models. The class of 
MS-VAR models is part of these non-linear econometric representations, where the 
non-linearity comes from the existence of switching regimes that account for time- 
varying parameters. Gray (1996) argues that, although a regime-switching 
representation might be complex, it is flexible enough as to model data generated by 
different economic mechanisms (regime-dependent) within a single unified model. For 
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interest rate adjustments, for example, this might involve incorporating different speed 
of reversion to a different long-run mean and to a different degree of volatility. 
In broad terms, as suggested by Franses and van Dijk (2000), regime-switching models 
could be classified in two main groups, depending on the nature of the underlying 
process that governs the regimes. In the first group, the regimes can be represented by 
an observable variable (usually an indicator function) such as that the regimes that have 
occurred in the past and present are known with certainty (although they have to be 
statistically determined). Models such as the Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) model; 
its variant, the Self-Exciting TAR (SETAR) model; and the Smooth Transition AR 
(STAR) are all in this group. 22 
In the second type of models, the regime the economy is at in any particular time cannot 
actually be observed. It is rather determined by an underlying unobservable stochastic 
process. Therefore, the researcher can only assign probabilities to the occurrence of the 
different regimes based upon the data set at hand. The class of Markov Switching VAR 
models (MS-VAR) falls withing this cathegory, in which the process governing the 
switch in regimes is stochastic and it is assumed to follow a Markov chain. 23 If the time 
series involved are non-stationary, the concept becomes a MS-VECM. 
Franses and van Dijk (2000), discussing on nonlinear modelling of financial time series, 
point out that although there might be a large amount of feasible regime-switching 
models, the model selected for a particular data set should provide a clear interpretation 
22 See Krolzig (2002) for a detailed account on the assumptions and estimation techniques for these 
models. 
`; Alternatively, as Kim and Nelson (1999) remark, if the discrete variable that represent the unobservable 
regimes evolves independently of its own past values, the model is of independent sww itching (rather than 
Markov switching). 
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from an economic perspective. In particular, for financial time series, the level of 
volatility can be regarded as the regime-determining process. Obviously, this level in 
the future is not known with certainty. Therefore, this market uncertainty creates a 
number of risks for which banks can only form expectations and assign probabilities of 
occurrence. 
In this sense, for the case of Argentina, if there were indeed some peso problems 
resulting from devaluation expectations switching between regimes (calm conditions 
and financial crises), then a regime switching modelling of interest rates and of the pass- 
through seems worth implementing. In order to select which type of regime switching 
model needs to be applied, the stochastic nature ("unknown timing") by which these 
crises affected the financial system is prioritised. 
All this considered, the Markov switching modelling is then selected for evaluating the 
presence of regime shifts in the interest rate pass-through. If banks actually alter they 
behaviour and adjust differently their interest rates under increased market volatility, 
then the pass-through will show a non-linear, time-varying, pattern that should be 
captured by a model that infers those shifts from the data itself. The unknown time- 
ocurrence and durability features of financial crises and the feasible alterations of bank 
responses (actual and expected) to shocks on money market rates provide the economic 
rationale for estimating Markov switching models for the interest rate pass-through. 
A MS-VAR model of a K-dimensional time series vector yt is defined as a p-VAR 
model conditional upon an unobservable regime stE { 1... M}, as in: 
P 
y, =v(s, )+LAj(s, )y, -j+u, (4.5) j=l 
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where ut is assumed to be a Gaussian innovation process, conditional on the regime st: 
ut' NID(0, E(st)) , and the state st could take the values 0 or 1. Note that this would 
be a 
more general case than the linear VAR from equation (4.4). 
For this model to be complete, a crucial assumption is that the regime generating 
process is a discrete-state homogeneous Markov chain24 defined by the transition 
probabilities: 
p, = Pr(sr+1 =JIs, = i) (4.6) 
and the condition that: 
M 
p, 1=1'Vi, jE{1,..., 
M} (4.7) 
%_l 
These probabilities25 could also be represented in the transition matrix for an irreducible 
ergodic M state Markov process (st): 
AI P12 PIM 
p= P2' P22 ; .. 
P2M (4.8) 
PMI PM 2 PMYI 
where p; M=1 pi I-... p;, M_1 for i= 1,..., M. 
As Krolzig (1998) points out, the linear time-invariant VAR remains the basis for the 
analysis of the relationship among the variables represented in the system, of the 
dynamic propagation of innovations to the system, and of the effects of changes in 
regime. Still, since a MS-VAR allows for a great wide choice of specifications in the 
24 The evolution of regimes could be inferred from the data. 
25 If the probabilities were independent of the previous occurring regime, then the model would be a 
simple (rather than Markov) switching model. That is, there would not be persistence in the states. See 
Hansen (1992). 
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parameters of the model, it is important to assess which one might fit the data best. This 
class of MS-VAR models allows for changes in intercept, v(st); in the autoregressive 
coefficients, As(st); and in variance, E(st). Following Krolzig's notation for this class of 
models, a MSI-VAR will be used if only the intercept is regime-varying, a MSIH-VAR 
if additionally the variance is regime-dependent, and a MSIAH-VAR if the 
autoregressive parameters also change with regime. 26 
It is particular relevant, for example, to determine whether the autoregressive 
parameters are indeed subject to regime switching, because the long-term pass-through, 
A=I ak / (1- j /3 ), would depend on them. There is no a priori reason why the long 
term pass-through needs to be unique. 27 If banks adjust differently to money market 
shocks, depending on which regime the economy is at, then not only the impact effect 
will be regime-dependent but also the long-term effect. Of course, the number of times 
each regime occurs over a sample period would give the measure empirical support. 
Therefore, under a MSIAH-VAR specification, it will be sensible to refer to a regime- 
switching long-term pass-through. The measure of this pass-through would reflect the 
long term response from the bank interest rates as if the autoregressive parameters from 
any particular regime remain in place. The interpretation of such a measure, although 
slightly different to the linear VAR, 28 would mainly depend on the sum of 
autoregressive parameters on the money market rate (yak) being positive and on the 
bank rates (Eß1) being less than one. 
26 Erlandsson (2002) also includes some conditional heteroskedasticity for each regime (GARCH-effects) 
based on failure of a switching regime model to reduce autocorrelation in the standardized squared 
residual to non-significant levels. 
27 A unique long-term pass-through could be obtained from the regime-switching model by imposing the 
restriction that the autoregressive parameters being time-invariant. 
28 Since the rationale of the regime-switching modeling rests on the probabilities that the parameters 
switch indeed between regimes. 
45 
2.5 BANK CREDIT MARKET IN ARGENTINA 
During the 1990s, financial liberalisation, globalisation, and development of capital 
markets have reshaped the financial system in Argentina. Banks have adapted 
themselves to new environments in which mergers, acquisitions, and withdrawals from 
market increased substantially. Lending pricing has been confronted with new 
dimensions on banking risks and market imperfections (i. e. non-competitive structures 
challenged by foreign banking or large information asymmetries). Thus, the relationship 
between the bank optimising behaviour and the process of financial or monetary 
transmission has most likely changed in the last two decades in this economy. 
The number of banks in Argentina decreased, according to numbers reported by Delfino 
(2002), from 169 to 89 between 1993 and 2000, largely due to 28 failures and 65 
mergers and acquisitions in that period. Although fewer banks, the degree of 
monetization increased significantly, including a large jump in the number of accounts 
(loans and deposits). Performance indicators show a significant decreased in operating 
cost along with efficiency improvements. 
Most of these positive results in the banking system were prompted by economic 
reforms and financial liberalisation at the beginning of the 1990s. As Delfino (2002) 
also points out, regulatory reforms concerning capital adequacy, diversification of credit 
risks, provision of non-performing loans, and minimum auditing standards, all helped to 
build up a sound financial system. 
With the introduction of the currency board by the beginning of 1991, the banking 
system in Argentina started to accept assets and securities in both local and foreign 
currency (US dollars). Indeed, around 35 percent of total new loans to the non-financial 
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private sector by the banking system were denominated in dollars until 2000.29 Even 
more importantly, according to Kamin and Ericsson (2003), 30 dollar currency holdings 
for Argentines are quite an important monetary aggregate. The hyperinflation 
experience had induced economic agents to heavily rely upon local and foreign currency 
to conduct financial operations. In some market segments, they are preferred to the 
banking system at all. 
One important drawback from the financial reforms in the Argentinean banking system 
is that although interest rates on deposits have converged to international levels, lending 
rates remain quite high. There is also a relatively high spread between rates in local 
currency and those in foreign currency. 31 Catao (1998) argues that although financial 
reforms prompted a large increase in monetization of the economy, it remains low in 
international (developed-economy) levels. Thus, high administrative costs would partly 
explain large interest rate spreads. 32 In addition, institutional barriers to the 
dissemination of information might have induced large non-performing loan ratios that 
in turn had implied large credit risk and high provisioning expenses, all of which were 
passed onto lending rates. 
With the opening of the financial system to international capital flows, the Mexican 
(1994), South East Asian (1997), and Russian (1998) episodes of financial crises might 
have had an important impact on lending market interest rates in Argentina. Also, the 
worsening of expectations about the validity of the currency board by the end of 2000 
29 See Table 2.1. 
30 Kamin and Ericsson (2003) estimate a measure of dollarization based on net currency flows between 
Argentina and US, according to US travelling information. It indicates that dollar currency holdings, up to 
1992, amount to as much as all dollar deposits and all peso money together. 
31 This feature is common in countries that allow banks to operate in local and foreign currencies (i. e. 
Peru and Uruguay). 
32 Catao bases his results on estimating a partial equilibrium model of the banking system in a dual 
currency economy with imperfect competition in the credit markets. 
47 
and during 2001 (that eventually ended up in the collapse of the regime in December 
2001) induced higher interest rate volatility. 
Edwards (1998), for example, using an augmented GARCH model, 33 finds that there 
was indeed volatility contagion on nominal interest rates during the Mexican financial 
crisis for Argentina (but not for Chile, possibly due to the presence of short-term capital 
controls). He recalls that interest rate volatility changed markedly during the 1990s and, 
in particular, in turbulent periods such as that of the Mexican crisis. 
3; His model includes a Mexico-specific volatility variable in the estimation of the conditional variance 
equation for Argentina and for Chile. 
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2.6 DATA DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
Data on interest rates for new loans (on any given period) has been selected from the 
Central Bank of Argentina's web page. Nominal monthly rates (express in annual 
percentage terms) in local currency are considered for the period June 1993 to 
December 2000.34 These interest rates correspond to weighted averages of rates charged 
under fixed-rate and renegotiable-rate contracts (unless otherwise stated) on the 
following type of loans: 
(i) Money market rate 
- Interbank rate, loans to local financial institutions up to 15-days (fixed rates) 
(ii) Short-term lending rates 
- Overdrafts on current accounts 
- Bills up to 89-day term 
- Personal loans (including credit card loans) up to 180-day term 
These rates were selected based on the relative importance of the corresponding loans in 
the total loans granted to the non-financial private sector in local currency. The 
interbank rate (on loans to local financial institutions) is taken as the rate representing 
liquidity conditions on the (short-term) money market. 
Real interest rate series were estimated based on nominal rates and the annual rate of 
inflation, as a proxy for inflation expectations. The analysis has also been conducted on 
these real interest rates but results are not shown here, since they are qualitatively 
similar to results from nominal rates. It should be noted here that for most of the sample 
period (1993 - 2000), the currency board regime was credible and help to keep inflation 
34 Although, there is data available on these interest rates after that period, the collapse of the currency 
board regime has made information on credits granted to the non-financial private sector by Argentinean 
banks not reliable. 
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under control. Consequently, dynamics on both real and nominal interest rates are not 
very much different. 
The period of analysis has been defined for the entire data sample, June 199335 up to 
December 2000. Given that this paper mainly deals with measuring the pass-through 
and that the sample size available is relatively small, no forecasting was conducted. 
More importantly, data available for later years (2001 and 2002) is not reliable since it 
is not yet accompanied by data on level of loans (most probably, economic agents stop 
using the banking system to intermediate funds). Extreme uncertain conditions about 
underlying economic rationale of the regime clearly induced a disruption of the 
optimising behaviour from banks, also reducing credit considerably. 
The interest rate series span a period of time that includes the Mexican financial crisis in 
1994, the East Asian financial turmoil of 1997, the Russian debt crisis of 1998, and the 
Brazilian crisis of 1999. The effects of the Mexican crisis over interest rates in 
Argentina are clearly stronger than those from the other crises. Nonetheless, as 
expectations of the collapse of the exchange rate regime grew stronger, the effects on 
the financial markets were even more serious during 2001 and 2002. 
2.6.1 Graphical analysis 
Lending interest rates seem to follow roughly the path marked by the interbank rate. 
Particularly, interest rate on bills, and to some extent on overdrafts, seem to follow more 
closely the path of the interbank rate during times of turbulence (such as the Mexican 
crisis) and rather less during less volatile periods. This suggests indeed the possibility of 
3s Unfortunately, there is no data available for previous years, especially those covering the hyperinflation 
period in Argentina. 
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(Markov) switching regimes based on interbank rate volatility. For the interest rate on 
personal loans, there was a rather large reaction to the interbank rate changes in 1995 
that took longer than for the other lending rates to fade away (see Figure 2.1 and Figure 
2.2). This might suggest asymmetry of response to money market rate shocks. 
Graphs of the autocorrelation function (ACF) and the partial autocorrelation function 
(PACF) indicate that they tend to zero; although with considerable lags (see Figure 2.3). 
This suggests stationarity of the series, but it might be difficult to determine it, since 
they seem to have a near-unit root. First differences' plots clearly show that they are 
mean reverting (see Figure 2.4). Yet, there is also clear indication of a higher mean and 
possibly time-varying variance in the series around the Mexican crisis. 
2.6.2 Descriptive statistics 
The interbank rate has the lowest average (7.3 percent), followed by the interest rate on 
bills (14.2 percent). Interest rates on overdrafts and personal loans are considerably 
higher on average (32.7 percent and 38.5 percent, respectively), probably showing a 
larger credit risk involved on those operations. In terms of relative variability (standard 
deviation over the mean), the least volatile rates are overdraft and personal. The 
interbank and bills rates more than double the others in that volatility coefficient. 36 
The null hypothesis of normality is rejected for all but the personal rate. The interbank 
rate shows the relative longest right tail and highest degree of leptokurtosis. Correlation 
between interbank and bills rates is the strongest during the sample period (0.62). A 
36 See all these descriptive statistics in Table 2.2. 
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moderate correlation is shown by the interbank and overdraft rates (0.43), while that the 
interbank and personal rates seem to be very little correlated (a mere 0.02). 
Pairwise Granger causality tests are conducted alternatively for 4,8 and 12 lags 
specifications . 
37 The null hypotheses that the interbank rate does not Granger cause any 
lending rate is rejected in all cases, therefore suggesting that the interbank rate might 
indeed Granger cause these rates. All the same, causality and weakly exogeneity should 
be better assessed in a multivariate system (such as a VAR). 
2.6.3 Time series preliminary analysis 
2.6.3.1 Unit root tests 
Preliminary standard unit root tests have been conducted for each interest rate series. 
The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test shows non-rejection of the null hypothesis of 
a unit root for all interest rates in levels and clearly rejection for those rates in first- 
differences. Therefore, evidence is consistent with interest rates being integrated of 
order one, 1(l ). 38 Table 2.4 reports results only for the relevant representation of the 
series (with a constant in the test equation). In all cases, residual correlation disappears 
at lag one of the testable equation. 
The Phillips-Perron test also shows that for interest rates on overdrafts, bills, and 
personal loans the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected (Table 2.5). For the 
interbank rate, on the contrary, the hypothesis of a unit root is rejected even in levels. 
This result is opposite to the one obtained from the ADF test. Therefore, no conclusive 
3' See details in Table 2.3. 
38 A study from the Banco Central de Argentina (1998) found that non-stationarity could not be rejected 
by Dickey Fuller tests for similar interest rates than in this paper. Yet, the study could not conclude that 
interest rates contain a unit root, since it seemed that DF test were not distinguishing bet een the 
presence of a unit root and long persistence in interest rates. 
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evidence of the nonstationarity of the interbank rate could be reported. Of course, this 
uncertainty will also pose doubts on the nonstationarity of the other interest rates. They 
might rather be consistent with stationary time series. 
Based on the results from the standard ADF test and on previous empirical work for 
developed countries, however, it is preliminary concluded and assumed that all four 
interest rates series are nonstationary. Therefore, the next obvious step is to test for the 
existence of cointegration among the variables. 
2.6.3.2 Cointegration tests 
The Johansen (1991) methodology is used to assess if there is any cointegrating vector 
among the four nonstationary interest rate series. Different specifications of the test and 
up to eleven lags in the first differenced terms of the VAR have been tried (Table 2.6). 
For parameter interpretability and for consistency with the series, the specification with 
an intercept in the cointegration relationships and no trends is preferred. With few lags 
included, the test suggests that there is no cointegration in the system. 39 When 
additional lags are included, test results tend to suggest that there is cointegration. Still, 
they are not conclusive enough as to the number of cointegrating vectors. Empirical 
evidence is, therefore, not clear as to the presence of cointegration among these interest 
rates. It rather suggests non-cointegration among the interest rates. 
In order to assess the validity of the Johansen test's results, the two-step Engle-Granger 
test for cointegration is applied to these interest rates in pairs (Table 2.7). Again, the 
results show no clear support to the existence of cointegration between these rates. The 
residuals from the cointegrating equations show no evidence of stationarity (Figure 
39 Applying standard information criteria, the suggested lags are rather low (I to 3). 
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2.5 ). 40 It is clear, though, that part of the nonstationarity on the residuals is due to the 
high volatility on the interest rates during the Mexican crisis. 
Consequently, at this stage there are two alternative scenarios. First, the interest rates 
are indeed nonstationary time series but they are just not cointegrated. The second 
option is that the interest rates are rather stationary but the volatility of the interest rates 
during the Mexican crisis distorted the unit root tests applied to the time series 
(presence of outliers). The reaction to the Mexican financial crisis in 1995 might make 
them look like being nonstationary when in fact they are stationary (but possibly with a 
root close to unity). Further testing on the stationarity of the series (including feasible 
outliers) is then needed before proceding with the econometric modeling of these 
interest rates. 
2.6.3.3 Unit root and cointegration tests: revisited 
The large increases in the level of the interbank rate (followed by the other interest 
rates) at the end of 1994 and during the first months of 1995 suggest indeed the 
presence of additive outliers in the series (in common dates for them all). In order to test 
for non-stationarity, three methods are considered to deal with these outliers: 41 
(i) Run standard tests eliminating the outliers from the series; 
(ii) Use robust tests (Ng-Perron, DF-GLS); 
(iii) Add dummy variables to the estimated regression to remove the influence of 
the outliers. 
40 Monte Carlo simulations, based on the properties of the original series, indicated no particular lack of 
power on the tests applied to each pair of interest rates. 
4' Following Maddala and In-Moo (1998) 
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For the first and the third method, the observation at March 1995, which corresponds to 
the largest effect on the rates from the Mexican crisis, is considered as an additive 
outlier. 42 For the second method, the Ng-Perron test is used since it is, as suggested by 
Vogelsang (1999), very robust to the presence of additive outliers, both in terms of size 
and of power. It is also used for this second approach, the modified Dickey Fuller test, 
DF-GLS, which detrends series before running the test regression. Thus, for the first 
method, the observation for March 1995 is dropped for each series and then the 
following tests are applied: standard ADF, DF-GLS, and Ng-Perron (the latter two for 
robustness to any remaining outliers in the series). For the third method, an approach by 
Vogelsang (1999) is followed, adding a dummy variable to remove the outlier's 
influence in the standard ADF test. Lags are selected according to the modified Akaike 
(M-AIC) criterion. 
In most of these tests, non-stationarity of the interbank rate is clearly rejected (Table 
2.8). For the overdraft and bills rate, a couple of the tests reject the null of a unit root, 
although none of them rejects it for the personal rate. Therefore, including the additive 
outlier in the search for a unit root, the empirical evidence is more supportive of these 
interest rates being stationary time series. 43 Correspondingly, it seems sensible to 
conclude and assume stationarity for these interest rates. 44 It would then be appropriate 
and sufficient to model them in levels in order to find out the dynamic relationships 
among them. Autoregressive models are then a natural specification to follow. 
42 For a discussion of a simple procedure for detecting additive outliers, that does not require full 
specification of the dynamic model and that does not require estimates of serial correlation parameters, 
but relies on the unit root null hypothesis, see Vogelsang (1999). 
43 Nelson, Piger, and Zivot (2001) show that not only the ADF test but also those tests designed to be 
robust to single structural breaks lack power to distinguish an 1(0) process with Markov-switching breaks 
in trend growth from an I(1) process. Notwithstanding it, no alternative test is suggested. 
4" No further testing for cointegration is then needed. For the sake of experimenting, however, the 
Johansen test was applied including a dummy variable in the testing equation, but no interpretable results 
were obtained (Table 2.9). 
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For example, in analysing uncovered interest parity differentials and convergence for 
Argentina, Edwards (1998) applied ADF and Phillips-Perron unit root tests to short- 
term deposit interest rates (30 days) and rejected the null hypothesis of a unit root for a 
series from January 1992 to June 1998. Indeed, he could not reject the alternative 
hypothesis that the series converge through time. Contrary to, Grubisic and Escude 
(1999), who using the ADF test with corrections for outliers (on the Mexican and East 
Asian crises)45, could not reject the nonstationarity hypothesis over a similar sample 
(April 1993 to July 1998) for short term (30 to 60 days) interest rate on time deposits. 
An interesting discussion of unit root test using economic theory, rather than just 
statistics, is found in Chumacero (2001). The statistical properties of interest rates 
coming from general equilibrium models are quite different if the argument variable 
(i. e, growth or consumption) is difference-stationary or trend-stationary. Clarida et al. 
(2002) mention the conflict between empirical literature finding nonstationary interest 
rates and most finance theory that considers them stationary processes. 
45 Correction was done including dummy variables for the outliers and estimating this equation through 
OLS. Then the unit root tests were conducted on the residuals of this regression. 
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2.7 ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
In the following specifications, when a pairwise equation is considered, it involves one 
lending interest rate (overdraft, bills, or personal) and the interbank rate. When a multi- 
variable system is estimated, it involves the interbank rate and the three bank rates 
overdraft, bills, and personal (in that ordering). 
2.7.1 Single equations 
A single equation is applied to every lending interest rate in combination with the 
interbank rate as main explanatory variable. No possible feedback into the interbank 
rate from the interest rates is considered. The estimated equation is of the form: 
mn 
I ßjYt-j +1 akll-k 
j=1 k=0 
(7.1) 
where r, stands for the bank lending rate and it for the interbank rate. Notice that the 
bank rate is affected by its own past values and by past and contemporaneous values of 
the interbank rate. It should be bear in mind, that although there are other variables that 
might be as much important as the interbank rate to explain bank rates, they are not 
considered at this stage. The short-run pass-through is given by the coefficient ao and 
the long-run pass through by the coefficient 2=I ak '(-I ßj) . 
A maximum of 6 lags is considered for each equation. This upper limit is set because of 
three reasons: to keep interpretability manageable, to save degrees of freedom, and 
because standard information criteria suggest the number of lags to be fairly low. 
The class PcGets for Ox (Hendry and Krolzig (2001), (2002)) provides an automatic 
general-to-specific approach to reach the most parsimonious and congruent 
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representation of each relationship, given the presence of only two variables. 46 Each 
equation is also estimated considering a dummy variable that accounts for effects from 
the currency crises, with PcGets selecting the dates automatically. 
The resulting equations show that the impact multiplier for overdrafts is 0.579, for bills 
1.3, and for personals a mere 0.228. Notice that the immediate pass-through for the rate 
on bills is more than complete (exceeds one hundred percent). This suggests an over 
reaction to changes in the interbank rate. The long-term impact on bills goes up to 1.8, 
accumulating further from the initial over impact. Surprisingly, the long-term effect for 
the overdraft and the personal rates is well in excess of completeness (4 hundred percent 
for the former and 5 hundred percent for the latter). 47 
The short-term pass-through for the overdraft rate reduces to 0.388 when outliers are 
considered, but the long-term effect is still in the region of four hundred percent. 
Meanwhile, for bills, both the short-term impact and the longer pass-through are 
reduced when outliers are considered (PcGets selects in this case, dummy variables for 
December 1994 and March 1995). Still, the long-term impact emphasizes the over 
reaction on impact for bills. For the personal rate, adjusting the equation for the 
presence of outliers does not change qualitatively or quantitatively the results. In fact, 
the automatic procedure from PcGets includes a dummy variable for January 1999 and 
fails to spot the large movement in early 1995 (March, for the other two cases). 
46 Detail results are shown in Table 2.10. 
47 See Table 2.11 for a summary of the pass-through results from the PcGets estimation. 
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2.7.2 Linear VAR models 
Following the conclusion that interest rate series are stationary, a multivariate linear 
VAR in levels is estimated for the interest rates interbank, overdraft, bills, and personal. 
As in the single equation approach, the system is estimated with and without dummy 
variables (outliers) that capture the currency crises. 48 Still, dummy variables were 
considered only for the Mexican crisis in the VAR. 49 Test analysis is discussed here to 
draw some attention to data characteristics. In addition, description of impulse 
responses functions is presented to assess dynamic relationships among these rates. 
A 4-variable first-order linear VAR is estimated (Table 2.12). All equations show 
significant parameters on their own lags (the autoregressive part of each variable). In all 
of them, but in bills, the interbank rate parameter is significant. 50 While that for the 
interbank rate, only its own lag and the constant term are significant. Thus, the data is 
consistent with the hypothesis that each lending interest rate is explained by its own lags 
and the interbank rate, while that the interbank rate is only explained by its own lags. 
A more formal test for the weak exogeneity of the interbank rate, the Wald test for 
Granger causality and block exogeneity, is applied. In the equation for the interbank 
rate, all variables but the interbank rate itself should be excluded. In the equations for 
overdraft and personal rates, their own lags and the interbank rate should be maintained, 
while all other variables should be excluded. With just one lag, this result is not shown 
for bills, but if a 3-order VAR is considered, then the interbank rate becomes relevant 
48 Standard packages, PcGive and Eviews, have been used for all estimations in this section. Although 
PcGets could estimate each equation in a VAR, it does not do it simultaneously. 
49 Different dates for one single dummy were tried, from December 1994 up to May 1995. However, the 
largest change to all rates (but for the personal rate) corresponds to March 1995. The alternative of using 
one dummy variable for this date against using several for all the possible months was preferred, since the 
latter option does not improve upon the results, neither quantitatively nor qualitatively. 
50 If another lag is added, then the equation for bills shows a significant interbank parameter too. 
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for this equation too. These empirical results suggest, and support, the fact that the 
money market rate influences bank interest rates (proving this rate exogenous to the 
system). Therefore, the Choleski decomposition is applicable validly to derive the pass- 
through and the impulse responses to shocks on the money market rate. 
The stability condition of the VAR is checked out and, although it seems to have some 
roots of the characteristic polynomial close to 1 (interest rates nearly integrated), the 
system is stable. Since, any VAR of a higher order could always be reformulated as a 
first order system (by representing it by its companion form), 51 it could be concluded 
indeed that the system is stable and take this as a further proof that the interest rate 
series are indeed stationary. 
A Wald test for lag exclusion in the system shows that it should only be considered up 
to 2 lags. If standard information criteria are applied, with a maximum of 12 lags, then 
the suggested number of lags is one (Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn criteria). As 
Lütkepohl (1991) argues, if the correct VAR order is a priority, it is reliable to choose a 
consistent criterion for the lag order and this is the case of these two estimators. 
Despite these features, the first-order system does not seem to be congruent. 52 
Autocorrelation functions show that residuals are indeed autocorrelated. Besides, 
residuals fail the normality test and the no-heteroskedasticity test in all cases. 
Nonetheless, since our main interest would be in identifying impulse responses to 
shocks in the interbank rate, we stick to the first-order VAR to estimate them, rather 
than increasing the VAR order pursuing a more parsimonious model. 
51 See Patterson (2000). 
52 Criteria for the estimated model to be congruent are the residuals not being serially correlated; no 
residuals heteroskedasticity; and, innovations normally distributed (Patterson (2000)). 
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Applying a Choleski decomposition, responses to a one standard deviation shock to the 
interbank rate are estimated and plotted (Figure 2.6). Interest rates on bills show the 
more similar pattern of response to the interbank rate itself. It takes its response exactly 
a year to come to zero, but a further 2-year period to completely die out, changing from 
a positive effect during the first year to a slightly negative effect during the latter two. 
This might be consistent with the overshooting that the single equation estimation 
captured for the bills rate. 
The overdraft and personal rates show between them a relatively similar shape for the 
impulse response function and somewhat different to the bills rate and to the interbank 
rate. The response from the overdraft rate comes to zero after 16 months (first at an 
increasing rate and then at a decreasing one); then it switches to a negative effect for a 
relatively long period of up to 3 years to finally die out. Although the personal rate's 
response changes in the same pattern, it does it with a different timing and degree. The 
response increases up to month 7 and then decreases till zero in month 32. Notice that 
the largest two standard error bounds correspond to the personal rate. 
The relevant cumulated impulse responses are also estimated and plotted (Figure 2.7) 
Corresponding to stationary variables, the accumulated responses asymptotically 
approach its final non-zero long-term effect, although this level is different for each 
lending rate. Note the large two standard error bounds for all cases. 
Next, the cumulated responses from each rate as a percentage of the cumulated response 
from the interbank rate are estimated so that completeness of the effect could be 
assessed (Figure 2.8). The final effect is reached after 20 months for bills and overdrafts 
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(although it slightly increases further for both rates during two more years and, then, 
return to the previous level). For the personal rate, the final effect is reached after some 
30 months. In all cases the long-term effect is, surprisingly and unconvincingly, much 
larger than one hundred percent of the shock to the interbank rate. 
Interpretation of these impulse responses could be misleading if some important 
variables in the determination of the interest rates were excluded. Including a dummy 
variable that accounts for the outlier in March 1995 might help to reduce this effect. 
When a dummy variable is included, the coefficient for it is highly significant in every 
equation in the system (Table 2.13). The significance of the interbank coefficient in the 
equations for overdraft and for personal rates disappears though. Besides, a significant 
negative coefficient for the interbank rate appears in the equation for bills. Most of other 
characteristics from the linear VAR without the dummy are also present in this case: 
stability of the system and incongruence of the final model. 
Impulse responses are quite similar to the case without a dummy variable. Although in 
this case, the presence of the outlier adds to the interpretability of the percentage share 
of the cumulated responses to the shock on the interbank rate (see Figure 2.9). 
Surprisingly, the accumulated effect on bills as a percentage of the accumulated 
response on the interbank rate is decreasing and it finally reaches zero after a couple of 
years. The initial effect is, however, rather close to one hundred percent. For overdrafts, 
the long-term effect of the shock on the interbank rate is practically complete. After the 
initial five months, the shock on the interbank rate is transmitted entirely to the 
overdraft rate, but it continues increasing further on till month 24. After that 
overshooting effect, it comes down to just a hundred percent response. The personal 
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rate's response is different. It reflects a hundred percent pass-through after around 10 
months. The effect continues increasing up till two and a half years and then 
asymptotically approaches two hundred percent long-term pass-through. 
Given the clear different responses and the fact that for each rate only past values of the 
interbank and the rate itself are significant, modelling all variables together might be 
inappropriate. It could be distorting impulse response's analysis. Therefore, first-order 
bivariate VAR models are estimated in order to improve estimation of the relationships 
between the interbank rate and each lending rate. 
Impulse responses from the bivariate VAR models do not seem to change or to improve 
upon those from the multivariate ones. For the overdraft and personal rates, the 
percentage share of the accumulated response is well beyond a hundred percent in the 
long run. Yet, it shows a more interpretable pass-through for the rate on bills (when a 
dummy is included) since the effect, although slightly decreasing remains above 70 
percent in the long run. 
The interest rate pass-through for each lending rate that can be derived from the 
bivariate VAR estimation is somewhat similar to the single-equation estimation (see 
Table 2.14 for a comparison). For the overdraft rate, the impact pass-through is 0.577; 
and for the bills rate, it shows the overshooting with a short-term pass-through of 1.228. 
For the personal rate, the pass-through is 0.16, somewhat lower than in the single- 
equation case. For the long-term, the pass-through for each lending rate is 
unconvincingly much larger than previously. 53 
53 Details on all other coefficients derived from the standard VAR to identify the original form of the 
system could be seen in Table 2.15. Details on both forms of the system are given in the Appendix. 
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Summarising, the data show different behaviour from lending interest rates to shocks in 
the money market rate. Indeed, there is stickiness in the short-run, but apparently, it is 
not relevant (bills and overdraft) since the response is quite high from the start. 
Although for the personal rate, the degree of stickiness in the short-run is quite high, the 
long-run effect seems to be extremely large to be credible. It seems that neither the 
single-equation approach, nor the multi-equation models (both bivariate and 
multivariate) capture accurately the dynamic relationships among these interest rates 
over the period of analysis. 
2.7.3 Markov switching VAR 
In the case of the linear VAR, it seemed relevant to include one (or more) dummy 
variable(s) to account for the presence of outliers in early (March) 1995. Although, in 
doing so, some valuable information about the pass-through in highly volatile periods is 
discarded. In a linear model, given the invariance of dynamic multipliers with regard to 
the history of the system, the size and sign of the shocks (Krolzig (1998)) is not really a 
good description of the market rate responses to changes in the interbank rate. 
Therefore, a MS-VAR representation seems more suitable to model the interest rate 
pass-through, with the level of volatility being the regime-determining process (Franses 
and van Dijk (2000)). The MS-VAR model is an alternative to a deterministic approach 
to structural change and to the presence of outliers (i. e. including dummy variables). 54 
Non-linearity in the VAR system is first tested in order to see the adequacy of the MS- 
VAR model for the market structure of interest rates. Log-likelihood ratios are used here 
sa The non-normality of the errors in the linear VAR is most likely due to the presence of various 
"outliers". 
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to test against the alternative of a linear specification in the VAR. 55 Regime switching 
has been kept to only two possible states: normal market and turbulent (as in a financial 
crisis) market; the difference between the two regimes being the degree of interest rate 
volatility. The MS-VAR models are all of order one (to save degrees of freedom). All 
estimations have been made with the class MSVAR for Ox. 56 
Switching parameters are allowed alternatively for the intercept (MSI-VAR)57; the 
intercept and the covariance matrix (MSIH-VAR); and for the intercept, the covariance 
matrix, and the autoregressive parameters (MSIAH-VAR). Although these 
specifications are considered for both the multivariate and the bivariate cases, results 
that are more efficient are found with the latter. Thus, following the results from the 
linear modelling, here are presented the results from the pairwise MS-VAR models. 
The log-likelihood test for linearity is shown in Table 2.16 for each bivariate system. In 
all cases, there is clear indication that linearity is rejected in favour of an unrestricted 
non-linear MS-VAR. Results show that not only the intercept is subject to changes 
under each regime but also the variance matrix and the autoregressive coefficients. 
Thus, the chosen Markov switching VAR specification for each case is the MSIAH(2)- 
VAR(1). The data supports modelling all parameters being regime switching. 
Standard log-likelihood ratio tests, nonetheless, are not completely appropriate because 
of the presence of nuisance parameters (the regime transitional probabilities) in the null 
55 Notice that a MS-VAR could be seen as a generalization of a VAR model. Thus, the linear VAR could 
be treated as the restricted model. 
56 For an introduction to Ox see Doornik and Ooms (2001). For a review of Markov switching VAR using 
MSVAR for Ox see Krolzig (1997). 
57 Models with shifts in the intercept are consistent with a smooth adjustment of the time series after the 
change in regime (as it might be the case for interest rates), while that models with shifts in the mean are 
more consistent with a once-and-for-all jump in the time series (Krolzig (1997)). 
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hypothesis. Hansen (1992), (1996) suggested a generalized log-likelihood test, although 
its complexity has made it difficult to find it in empirical works. Ang and Bekaert 
(1998) applied it to a Markov-switching model of the term structure of interest rate for 
US, Germany and UK. More recently, Boinet, Napolitano, and Spagnolo (2002) have 
also applied it to test regime-switching modelling for devaluation expectations in 
Argentina. Although not entirely appropriate, the log-likelihood testing is taken at this 
stage as indication of regime shifting in the data. A more formal Hansen test is reserved 
for next chapter to confirm results. 
The rationale for using a MS-VAR type of model rather than a linear VAR rests in the 
fact that the former captures the different responses from interest rate to the money 
market rate under different market stances. Thus, it is indeed expected than the pass- 
through would be different under normal market conditions than under a high-volatility 
context (such as those of a financial crisis). Therefore, assessing the validity of the MS- 
VAR representation focuses on its ability to distinguish periods of high volatility from 
those of stable financial conditions and to have more interpretable impulse responses. 58 
The transition matrix that defines the Markov switching regimes shows interestingly 
that there is a higher chance to remain in a "normal" credit market if that were the 
current state of the economy than in a more volatile environment once a financial crisis 
arises (Table 17). Therefore, the duration of a high-volatility episode is considerably 
less than that of a normal state. The personal rate has the highest probability of 
remaining in both regimes and, correspondingly, the lowest chance of changing from 
one regime to another. This is consistent with the fact that, once the toughest months of 
58 For a step-by-step estimation of regime-dependent impulse response functions for Markov switching 
models see Ehrmann, Ellison, and Valla (2001b). 
66 
the Mexican crisis were over for the other two rates, the level of the personal rate slowly 
came down and, thus, the effects took longer to fade away. 
Thus far, results seem to indicate that there is indeed a gain in modelling the interest 
rates including regime shifts. Still, when those rates are considered in a 4-variable 
system, the model fails to distinguish the period before the Mexican crisis as a different 
regime to that during the crisis itself. Meanwhile when bivariate MS-VAR models are 
considered, these periods are indeed classified in different regimes: a normal situation 
followed by a turbulent scenario. Once again then, results for bivariate Markov 
switching VAR models are presented here (see Table 2.18). Similarly to the linear 
method, assuming a Choleski decomposition, the short-term and long-term pass-through 
can be derived from the Markov switching estimation. 
The MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) clearly shows very different behaviour for the lending rates 
under each regime. The Markov switching modelling reveals indeed a higher pass- 
through for interest rates under a financial turmoil than in calm conditions in credit 
markets (Table 2.19). The pass-through for the overdraft rate is 0.2 under the calm 
regime and rises to 0.62 for the volatile regime. If a linear method is used to estimate 
this pass-through, the value is 0.57, so that it will be overestimated in the first regime 
and underestimate in the volatile conditions. For the rate on bills, the pass-through rises 
from 0.89 in normal conditions to 1.5 under unstable financial markets, while that the 
linear methods states a 1.3 overall pass-through. Finally, for the personal rate, the 
Markov switching estimation reveals a very low pass-through, 0.06, in the normal 
regime that increases to a moderate pass-through in the second regime. It could be seen, 
that for this period in the Argentinean credit market, the pass-through for different 
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lending rates switches in regime according to volatility in money market rates 
(associated to uncertain financial conditions). Under such characteristics, linear methods 
of estimating the pass-through could prove to be inaccurate. 
Relevant conclusions can also be drawn from the contemporaneous correlation matrix 
(Table 2.20). Correlation between the overdraft and the interbank rates in a normal 
credit market is around 28 percent. It increases to 77 percent in a high-volatility 
environment. This suggests that for the overdraft rate, the role of the interbank rate is far 
more important in a volatile context (as that of an international financial crisis) than in 
times that are more normal. Even though the role of the interbank rate is important, 
there is room for other variables to influence the overdraft rate in normal market 
situations. 
The rate on bills is highly correlated with the interbank rate in both regimes (increases 
from 73 to 75 percent). This shows that although there might be some other variables 
influencing this rate, its evolution is mostly determined by the interbank rate. 
Correlation between personal and interbank rate is very little in the calm regime, but it 
increases substantially (to around 94 percent), when there is turbulence in the credit 
market. In normal times, there might be other variables affecting the personal rate, but 
mainly the interbank rate influences its path in financial crises. 
The relevance of the MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) is judged by its ability to identify the periods 
falling into each regime. That is indeed the case for every pairwise model. The regime 
probability occurrences clearly identify the volatile periods for each rate (Table 2.21). 
For all lending rates, the Mexican crisis and the period of November-December 2000 
68 
are undoubtedly identified as being on regime 2 (high-volatility). The effects of the 
Russian crisis are recognized as well on this regime for the rates on overdraft and bills. 
Additionally, the South East Asian crisis is recognized as a turbulent period for the 
overdraft rate. Regime probabilities (Figure 2.10, Figure 2.11, and Figure 2.12) for each 
interest rate clearly indicate those periods of high volatility, where the pass-through 
process differs considerably from normal volatility conditions. 
The MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) specification firmly identifies for each interest rate those 
periods with higher volatility, assigning to them a close-to-one probability of being in 
the regime 2. There is no ambiguity as to the classification and, correspondingly, the 
coefficients representing the effects or pass-through from the money market rate to the 
lending rate are quite different in each regime. Moreover, the switch in regime seems to 
be associated to the spread of effects from international financial crises. Espinosa-Vega 
and Rebucci (2002), for example, have found evidence for Chile59, that neither changes 
in monetary policy targeting nor in exchange rate regime affects significantly the pass- 
through. Still, there is indeed some evidence that the South East Asian financial crisis 
affected the interest rate pass-through in Chile. 
Although all these results seem more plausible than those obtained from the previous 
econometric approaches, it yet seems that some other variables might be influencing 
interest rates' behaviour. 60 Nevertheless, insofar as only interest rates in local currency 
are considered, the Markov switching approach definitely improves upon other 
59 They estimate the interest rate pass-through using an auto-regressive distributed lag model re- 
parameterized as an error correction model. In order to assess the effects of changes in monetary policy 
targets, exchange rate regimes, and international financial crises they split their sample period and 
evaluate the stability of their parameters. 
60 The long-term pass-through with the Markov switching estimation is still inexplicable high. This 
feature will be discussed in the theoretical part of Chapter 4. 
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alternative models for estimating the interest rate pass-through in Argentina. Besides, 
another advantage of the Markov switching specification for each pair of interest rate is 
that the system is now more congruent and parsimonious. Residual autocorrelation is no 
longer present, nor is normality longer rejected. This seems to disregard the need for 
incorporating GARCH-effects inside each regime. 
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2.8 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Interest rate pass-through has been assessed by a series of models including single and 
multi-equation systems, bivariate and multivariate specifications, and linear and non- 
linear approaches. Preliminary time series analysis indicated that the set of interest rates 
from the Argentinean banking system are consistent with the hypothesis of stationarity. 
Therefore, systems in levels of the variables were estimated. 
Single equation systems show different pass-through for bank lending rates, with rates 
on higher credit-risk loans responding stickier to the interbank rate (from higher to 
lower pass-through: bills, overdraft and personal rates). However, long-term pass- 
through are implausible high (well above one hundred percent effect) under the single 
equation approach. 
Multivariate linear VAR models reveal the dynamics among these interest rates and 
clearly show that each bank lending rate is affected by its own past values (not from 
those of other lending rates) and those from the interbank rate. The interbank rate is 
weakly exogenous to the system and, so it seems, it is influenced by other factors 
affecting financial and liquidity conditions in the money market. Nevertheless, 
estimated first-order linear VAR models are not congruent apparently due to the 
presence of several financial crises affecting interest rates' evolution. Even if dummy 
variables are included, residuals remain autocorrelated, heteroskedastic and not 
normally distributed. 
Impulse responses show that there is indeed some degree of stickiness in the short-run, 
although the immediate effect is relatively high (especially for rates on overdrafts and 
bills). Again, the long-term effect is implausible high. There are significant differences 
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in the responses from each lending rate to shocks in the interbank rate. These 
differences are better captured, and are more interpretable, with bivariate linear VAR 
models. Notwithstanding this, congruency is still not achieved. 
Thus, it seems that neither single-equation modelling, nor multi-equation systems 
capture efficiently the dynamic relationships among lending rates and the money market 
rate. The presence of several episodes of financial crises alters the pass-through, 
affecting the speed and degree of response to shocks in the interbank rate. Discarding 
information over those periods (for example, by including dummy variables) reduces 
the ability of the models to explain the whole process over the study sample. 
The class of Markov switching models provides a better in-sample fit for the dynamics 
on the market structure of interest rates. Bivariate MSIAH(2)-VAR(l) models greatly 
improve upon modelling the responses from bank lending rates to the interbank rate. 
Markov switching models allow capturing the different behaviour from lending rates to 
financial markets conditions. In normal times, the stickiness in the short-run is higher 
for those rates on loans with higher credit risk. While that with highly volatile financial 
markets the pass-through increases considerably for all rates. The chances of remaining 
in those regimes are lower than returning to more stable scenarios though. 
Allowing parameters of the VAR model to be regime-dependent efficiently determines 
the periods in which regime switch occurs. The MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) identifies correctly 
periods of financial distress for lending rates. In particular, the Mexican crisis and the 
building up of the currency board's collapse are unambiguously spotted as high- 
volatility periods so that different parameters are assigned. 
72 
Furthermore, Markov switching assumptions on the regimes provide more congruent 
models than with linear approaches. All the same, it seems that although Markov 
switching models improve upon linear models to measure the pass-through, considering 
only interest rates in local currency might not be enough to capture rates' behaviour. 
Further research should address issues such as the inclusion of some other relevant 
variables in the pairwise MS-VAR. Variables such as interest rates in dollars, 
depreciation expectations, other assets' prices, and country or credit risk might need to 
be considered. In particular, it should be assessed if measures of interest rate pass- 
through change when these variables are included. On the econometric nature of the 
Markov switching modelling, a more comprehensive approach to the transition 
probabilities needs to be taken. Next chapter deals with these empirical extensions. 
Similarly, more in line with industrial organization models for banking behaviour, other 
microeconomic variables such as operating costs and credit risk should be considered in 
the determination of interest rates. Therefore, a more formal theoretical framework 
should be built to accommodate feasible nonlinear features in the pass-through. Short- 
term and long-term differences in the pass-through need a more precise approach as to 
enhance understanding on its dynamics. In the fourth chapter of this thesis such a 
theoretical approach to the pass-through is assessed. 
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Figures 
Figure 2.1 Lending Rates vis-ä-vis the Interbank Rate 
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Figure 2.2 Nominal Interest Rates on Loans in Argentina: 1993: 06 -2000: 12 
Percentage 
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Figure 2.4 Nominal Interest Rates in First Differences 
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Figure 2.6 Response to Choleski One S. D. Innovations ±2S. E. 
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Figure 2.8 Bank Lending Rate Pass-Through from VAR(1) 
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Figure 2.10 Regime Probabilities from MSVAR Interbank - Overdraft 
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Figure 2.12 Regime Probabilities from MSVAR Interbank - Personal 
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Tables 
Table 2.1 Loans to the Non-Financial Private Sector - Flows in Pesos 
In percentages 1/ 
End of 
year 
Overdraft 
on c/a 
Bills up 
to 89 days 
Personal up 
to 180 days 
Other 
loans 
Total in 
Pesos 
1993 69.6 14.6 7.0 8.8 100.0 
1994 68.4 18.0 7.2 6.4 100.0 
1995 67.9 17.7 8.2 6.2 100.0 
1996 68.2 15.4 9.1 7.3 100.0 
1997 65.6 17.7 8.7 7.9 100.0 
1998 65.1 17.8 11.4 5.7 100.0 
1999 60.3 23.6 10.6 5.4 100.0 
2000 60.7 22.4 11.7 5.3 100.0 
1/ Source: Monetary and Financial Statistics Department - Banco Central de Argentina 
Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics of Nominal Interest Rates in Argentina 
Interest rate Mean Std. Dev. (6) I (t) Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Prob. 
(µ) ((Y) 
Interbank 7.33 2.23 0.3 2.89 14.72 647.42 0 
Bills 14.23 4.57 0.14 1.76 8.61 166.25 0 
Overdraft 32.69 4.74 0.32 1.42 5.61 56.5 0 
Personal 38.5 4.92 0.13 0.35 2.35 3.41 0.18 
Table 2.3 Correlation and Causality in Nominal Interest Rates 
Correlation with Granger Causality Test (*) 
Interbank rate F-Statistic Probability 
Overdraft 0.62 4.772 0.0017 
Bills 0.43 10.75 5.40E-07 
Personal 0.023 6.639 0.00012 
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Table 2.4 Augmented Dickey Fuller Test 
Nominal Interest Test equation with constant 
Rates Level First 
1993: 06 - 2000: 12 Difference 
Interbank -2.769 -7.592 
Overdraft -2.047 -5.246 
Bills -2.547 -8.072 
Personal -1.054 -6.403 
Critical values: 1% -3.506 
5% -2.894 
10% -2.584 
Table 2.5 Phillips-Perron Test 
Nominal Lags With constant 
Interest Rates Level First 
1993: 06 - 2000: 12 Difference 
Interbank 4 -3.893 -12.544 
8 -3.746 -13.595 
12 -3.745 -13.941 
Overdraft 4 -1.919 -7.307 
8 -1.759 -7.093 
12 -1.728 -7.063 
Bills 4 -2.746 -12.322 
8 -2.770 -13.459 
12 -2.919 -13.922 
Personal 4 -1.158 -8.956 
8 -1.220 -8.958 
12 -1.186 -8.941 
Critical values 1% -3.505 
5% -2.894 
10% -2.584 
82 
Table 2.6 Johansen Cointegration Test Summary 
Test Specification for Interbank, Overdraft, Bills and Personal Rates* 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
CE(s): No intercept / Intercept / Intercept / Intercept / Intercept / 
no trend no trend no trend trend trend 
Lags* * Test Number of cointegrating vectors ( 5% level) 
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-------------------- 3 Trace --- ----------- 0 -------------------- 0 ------- 0 0 0 
----------- - -------- 
Max. Ei env. 
----- --------- 
0 
--------------- ------ --- - ---------- -------------- ------- --------- ------- ---------- 4 Trace 0 -- - 0 0 0 0 
----------- 
Max_Ei-env_- 
- 
0 
------------------------ --- 
0 
------ ---------- 
0. 
--- ------------- 
0 
------------------- 
0 
---------------------- 5 Trace 1 1 0 0 0 
---------- --- ------- 
Max_Ei-env. 
----- -----------1--- 
1 0 
------------- 
0 
6 Trace --------- 1 ----------- - --- ------ 1 ---------- -------------- 1 --- ------- - ----- 0 ---- -- 0 
------------- -------- 
Max_Ei env. 
----- ---- -- -----------1------------ ---------1---------- -----------1- --- ----------- - ---- 
0 
----------- -----0- ----- -------- 7 Trace 1 1 1 0 0 
------------- -------- 
Max_Eiy, env----- 
---- --- -----------1------------ ---------1----------- -----------1- -------------- ------- ----------- ----- ----------0--- Trace 1 2 4 1 2 
---- ------- ---- -- 
Max_Ei-env----- 
-----------1 ------------ 
0 
---------- ------------- ---------- 
0 
--------------- 
0 
------------------- 
0 
--------------------- 9 Trace 2 2 4 2 2 
----------- -- ------- 
Max_Ei--env. 
----- -----------1 -------- -- -- ---------- ---------- ------ - 
1----- 
------- ------0------- --- ---------------------- 
0 
10 Trace 2 2 2 2 2 
------------- -------- 
Max_Eiy, env_---- 
---- --- -----------2------------ -----------1- ---------- ------ 
2--------------- 
------- ----- 
2 
---------- ------- ---------2-- 11 Trace 2 1 1 2 2 
Max. Eigenv. 1 1 1 1 2 
* 1993: 06 - 2000: 12 
**In first differences 
Table 2.7 Engle-Granger Test for Cointegration with Interbank Rate 
Variable Coefficients ADF Null of 
c beta t-test on unit root in 
residuals residuals 
Overdraft 25.994 0.914 -1.485 Non-rejected 
(1.558) (0.203) 
Bills 4.911 1.272 -1.945 Non-rejected 
(1.306) (0.171) 
Personal 38.138 0.050 -1.041 Non-rejected 
(1.790) 0.234 
1993: 06 - 2000: 12 
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Table 2.8 Unit Root Tests and Additive Outliers 
Null Hypothesis of a Unit Root: 1993: 06 - 2000: 12 
Tests Interbank Overdraft Bills Personal 
Standard tests 
ADF -2.769 -2.047 -2.547 -1.054 
PP (4 lags) -3.893 ** -1.919 -2.746 -1.158 
Drop outliers 
ADF -5.235 ** -2.802 -5.598 ** -1.322 
DF-GLS -5.161 ** -2.127 * -3.182 ** -2.098 
Ng-Perron (Mza) -10.913 * -3.822 -4.409 -6.574 
Robust tests 
DF-GLS -2.625 ** -1.734 -1.864 -0.783 
Ng-Perron (Mza) -15.412 ** -6.148 -6.543 -1.902 
Add dummies 
Vogelsang -1.457 -2.802 -1.888 -1.287 
* Rejection at 5% 
** Rejection at 1% 
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Table 2.9 Johansen Cointegration Test Summary with Dummy for March 1995 
Test Specification for Interbank, Overdraft, Bills and Personal Rates* 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
CE(s): No intercept / Intercept / Intercept / Intercept / Intercept / 
no trend no trend no trend trend trend 
La ** Test Number of cointegrating vectors (5% level) 
1 Trace 0 1 1 1 2 
-------- --- - 
M ax_ E iýenv _ -------- 
0 1 
--------- 
1 
- --- - ----1---------- ---------1-------- 2 ---- Trace ----- - ----- ------------ 1 ---------------------- 1 - -- --------- 1 1 1 
- ----------- -------- 
Max_Eigenv. 
---- 
1 1 
---- 
1 
----------------------- 
0----------- 
------------- --- -----0--------- 3 - -- Trace ------------------------- 1 ------------------ 1 1 0 0 
------------ __-- 
Max. Ei-env-_____ 
---- ------- ------------ 
1 
------------- ------------ 
1 0 0 
4 Trace 1 1 1 0 0 
----- 
Max. Eiýenv. 
----- -1 
1 
-----1----- -------------------- ----------0-------- 5 Trace 1 1 1 0 0 
------------ 
Max_Ei-env. 
----- ----- ---- --- -----------1 ------------ - ------- 
1- 
-- ---------- --------1---------- --- ----- - ---- 
1 
--------- -- - - ---------- ----------i Trace 1 1 1 1 0 
Max. Eigenv. 1 1 
- - --- 
1 
---------------------- 
1 
------------------------ 
1 
--------------------- ------------ 7 -------- ---- Trace - ------------- 1 -------------- - -- 1 1 0 0 
-- --------- -- 
Max_Ei env------ 
------ ---- -- -----------1 ------------ ----------1 ---------- 
1---- 
-- ------------- --- -----0--------- ----------0------- -- - 8 Trace 2 3 4 3 2 
------------ --------- 
Max_Eigenv 
---- -----------0 ------------- _0 -------- ---------- 
0 
---------------------- 
0 
----------------------- 
0 
--------------------- 9 Trace 2 4 4 2 2 
- ----------- -------- 
Max_Ei env . ----- ---- -- ----------- 
2 
------------- ---- ---------- ---- 
4 
---- 
2 
------ ------ 
1 
------------------------ ----------------- 10 Trace 2 2 2 2 2 
- 
Max_Ei env------ 
- 
2 
- ----- - -- ----- --------- 
2 
--------- ----- -- 
2 
--------- - ---------- 
2 
------------------------ -------------- 
1 
----- --- ----- 1I - -- - Trace 2 2 2 3 2 
Max. Eigenv. 2 2 1 1 1 
*1993.06 - 2000: 12 
**In first differences 
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Table 2.10 Interest Rate Pass-Through: Estimation with PcGets (up to 3 lags) 
No outliers Include s dummy variables for outliers 
Coeff. Std. Dev. t-value t-prob. Coeff. Std. Dev. t-value t-prob. 
Overd raft 
is-, 0.9072 0.0142 64.0610 0.0000 0.9572 0.0139 68.8520 0.0000 
Mt 0.5788 0.0502 11.5290 0.0000 0.3882 0.0424 9.1460 0.0000 
mt-2 -0.1770 0.0638 -2.7740 0.0068 
me-3 -0.2139 0.0487 -4.3920 0.0000 
11995: 3 6.8339 0.9165 7.4560 0.0000 
Bills 
i, 
-1 
0.8661 0.0431 20.1170 0.0000 0.7929 0.0486 16.3140 0.0000 
it-3 0.1183 0.0356 3.3290 0.0013 
Mt 1.3065 0.0870 15.0140 0.0000 1.1946 0.0823 14.5220 0.0000 
Mt-1 -0.8425 0.1203 -7.0010 0.0000 -0.6997 0.1015 -6.8970 0.0000 
Mt-2 -0.4202 0.1067 -3.9390 0.0002 -0.3480 0.0700 -4.9730 0.0000 
Mt-3 0.2002 0.0877 2.2830 0.0250 
11994: 12 -4.9735 1.1711 -4.2470 0.0001 
11995: 3 7.5879 1.2067 6.2880 0.0000 
Personal 
it-1 0.9547 0.0105 91.3650 0.0000 0.9533 0.0100 95.5800 0.0000 
Mt 0.2275 0.0528 4.3110 0.0000 0.2342 0.0504 4.6400 0.0000 
11999: 1 -3.6633 1.1841 -3.0940 0.0020 
Table 2.11 Interest Rate Pass-Through: Single Equation 
Lending Equations in levels 
Rate No outliers With outliers 
ax ax 
Overdraft 
Bills 
Personal 
0.579 4.331 
1.306 1.821 
0.228 5.018 
0.388 4.072 
1.195 1.654 
0.234 5.019 
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Table 2.12 Interest Rate Pass-Through: Linear VAR 
Multivariate, Linear VAR(1) in levels 1/ 2/ 
Interbank Overdraft Bills Personal 
Interbank(-1) 0.7179 * 0.2058 * 0.0064 0.1998 
0.11 0.09 0.17 0.08 
6.55 2.31 0.04 2.49 
Overdraft(-1) 0.0356 0.8353 * 0.0336 0.0257 
0.08 0.07 0.13 0.06 
0.43 12.44 0.26 0.43 
Bills(-1) -0.0472 0.1076 0.8179 * 0.0208 
0.08 0.07 0.13 0.06 
-0.58 1.63 6.54 0.35 
Personal(-1) -0.0670 -0.0263 -0.0746 0.9424 
0.05 0.04 0.08 0.04 
-1.35 -0.65 -0.98 26.01 
C 4.2172 * 3.3281 * 4.2969 -0.4686 
1.72 1.40 2.65 1.26 
2.45 2.38 1.62 -0.37 
1/ For each rate is shown: coefficient, standard deviation, and t-value (in that order). 
2/ The * indicates the coefficient is significant. 
Table 2.13 Interest Rate Pass-Through: Linear VAR with Dummy 
Multivariate, Linear VAR(1) in levels 1/ 2/ 
Interbank Overdraft Bills Personal 
Interbank(-1) 0.5702 * 0.0515 -0.2805 * 0.1286 
0.09 0.06 0.11 0.08 
6.30 0.88 -2.47 1.69 
Overdraft(-1) -0.0086 0.7891 * -0.0523 0.0044 
0.07 0.04 0.08 0.06 
-0.13 18.39 -0.63 0.08 
Bills(-1) -0.0055 0.1511 * 0.8988 * 0.0409 
0.07 0.04 0.08 0.06 
-0.08 3.59 10.94 0.74 
Personal(-1) -0.0636 -0.0228 -0.0680 0.9440 
0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 
-1.60 -0.89 -1.36 28.22 
C 5.9042 * 5.0903 * 7.5723 * 0.3447 
1.40 0.90 1.76 1.18 
4.21 5.64 4.30 0.29 
1993: 3 9.9671 * 10.4109 * 19.3506 * 4.8047 
1.44 0.93 1.81 1.21 
6.92 11.22 10.70 3.97 
1/ For each rate is shown: coefficient, standard deviation, and t-value (in that order). 
2/ The * indicates the coefficient is significant. 
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Table 2.14 Interest Rate Pass-Through: Single Equation and Linear VAR 
Rate Short-term Lon g-term 
Single Linear Single Linear 
Equation VAR Equation VAR 
Overdraft 0.579 0.577 4.331 5.115 
Bills 1.306 1.228 1.821 2.710 
Personal 0.228 0.160 5.018 10.805 
Table 2.15 Interest Rate Pass-Through: Bivariate Linear VAR 
Standard form Primitive form (assumin Choleslcy decom osition) 
Coeff. Overdraft Bills Personal Coeff equal to: Overdraft Bills Personal 
A10 3.5294 2.6222 4.6590 b1 A10 3.5294 2.6222 4.6590 
A20 1.5474 2.3926 -0.4790 b20 A20 - (012/a11 )*A1o -0.4903 -0.8277 -1.2243 
All 0.7260 0.7472 0.6901 b1 =0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
A12 -0.0446 -0.0497 -0.0603 bei (5121(y 11 0.5774 1.2281 0.1600 
A21 0.2940 0.0402 0.2503 711 All 0.7260 0.7472 0.6901 
A22 0.8858 0.8096 0.9626 y12 A12 -0.0446 -0.0497 -0.0603 
ßi1 2.7977 2.8018 2.7472 721 A21 - ((Y12/CFI)*Aii -0.1252 -0.8774 0.1399 
a12 1.6153 3.4409 0.4395 y22 A22 - ((512/(511 )*A12 0.9116 0.8706 0.9722 
022 1.8883 6.5804 1.4854 a 2), Gil 2.7977 2.8018 2.7472 
62 G22 -b221ß11 0.9557 2.3547 1.4150 
Table 2.16 Log-Likelihood Test for Linearity 
System Overdraft - Interbank Bills - Interbank Personal - Interbank 
Log - LR linearity Log - LR linearity Log - LR linearity 
likelihood Test likelihood Test likelihood Test 
Linear VAR(l) -299.663 -340.309 -316.506 
MSI(2)-VAR(1) -278.478 42.370 -325.250 30.118 -295.755 41.501 
MSIH(2)-VAR(l) -247.336 104.653 -273.838 132.942 -276.618 79.775 
MSIAH 2 -VAR 1 -244.896 109.534 -271.121 138.377 -267.597 97.817 
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Table 2.17 MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) Transition Matrix 
Pairwise Systems Regime 1 Regime 2 
Overdraft - Interbank 
Regime 1 0.9360 0.0640 
Regime 2----------------- 
- 
0.3225 0.6775 
Bills - Interbank 
--- ------- -------- 
Regime 1 0.9560 0.0440 
0.2343 0 7657 
Personal - Interbank 
Regime 1 0.9762 0.0238 
Regime 2 0.1956 0.8044 
Table 2.18 MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) Interests Rate Pass-Through 
Pairwise Systems Regime 1 Regime 2 
Interbank Overdraft Interbank Overdraft 
C 3.7238 1.2657 9.3902 7.4462 
Interbank-1 0.5627 0.0440 0.5924 0.3898 
Overdraft_1 -0.0240 0.9420 -0.1345 0.7213 
SE 
----------- -------------------- 
0.8374 
---------------------- 
0.5937 
---------------------- 
3.2200 
---------------------- 
2.6698 
---------------------- Interbank Bills Interbank Bills 
C 3.2193 1.4854 8.7017 12.7181 
Interbank_1 0.5984 -0.0613 0.8767 0.3987 
Bills-1 -0.0371 0.9071 -0.3534 0.1975 
SE 
-------------------------------- 
0.8399 
------------------------ 
1.1210 
--------------------- 
3.0850 
---------------------- 
4.7838 
---------------------- Interbank Personal Interbank Personal 
C 4.7429 2.2716 4.0608 -14.2644 
Interbank- 1 0.5122 -0.0365 -0.6123 -0.1790 
Personal_1 -0.0365 0.9408 0.4422 1.4736 
SE 0.9086 1.0969 2.6437 1.1035 
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Table 2.19 Interest Rate Pass-Through: Linear Models vs. Markov Switching model 
Rate Short-term Lon g-term 
Single Linear MSIAH(2)-VAR(l) Single Linear MSIAH(2 )-VAR(l) 
Equation VAR Regime 0 Regime I Equation VAR Regime 0 Regime I 
Overdraft 0.579 0.577 0.205 0.617 4.331 5.115 1.537 7.130 
Bills 1.306 1.228 0.887 1.547 1.821 2.710 0.238 -3.373 
Personal 0.228 0.160 0.059 0.444 5.018 10.805 2.333 6.493 
Table 2.20 MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) Contemporaneous Correlation 
Pairwise Systems Regime 1 Regime 2 
Interbank Overdraft Interbank Overdraft 
Interbank 1 0.2878 1 0.7739 
Overdraft 
--------------- 
0.2878 
--- 
1 0.7739 
-------------- 
1 
Interbank Interbank Bills -------- Interbank ---------------------- Bills 
Interbank 1 0.7317 1 0.7511 
Bills 
----------------------------- 
0.7317 
---------------------- 
1 
---------------------- 
0.7511 
-- - - 
1 
Interbank Personal - -- ---------------- Interbank ---------------------- Personal 
Interbank 1 -0.0196 1 0.9379 
Personal -0.0196 1 0.9379 1 
Table 2.21 MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) Regime Classification 
Regime 2: Volatility Periods in 1993: 06 - 2000: 12 for: 
Financial Overdraft Bills Personal 
Crisis 
Other 1/ 1993: 7 - 1993: 8 [0.9315] 
Mexico 1994: 12 - 1995: 6 [0.9996] 1994: 12 - 1995: 5 [0.9995] 1994: 12 - 1995: 4 [1.0000] 
South-East Asia 1997: 11 - 1997: 11 [0.9869] 
Russia 1998: 9 - 1998: 9 [0.9988] 1998: 9 - 1998: 9 [0.9968] 
. 
Argentina 2/ 2000: 11 - 2000: 12 0.9891 2000: 11 - 2000: 12 0.9976 2000: 11 -_2000: 12 0.9643 
I/ This period does not correspond to any major international financial crisis. 
2/ Market volatility increases substantially as market expectations of exchange rate's collapse arose. 
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Appendix 
Bivariate Linear VAR 
The original form of the system is given by the equations: 
i, = b, o +b12r, +Y>>'I-I+ Yý2r, -, +E1 
r! =b20 + b2l lt +/ 211, -I 
+ 722Y, 
-1 
+ Ert 
where i, is the interbank rate and rr is the respective lending rate. Assuming cero the 
parameter b12 (Choleski decomposition), this system could be identified from the 
following standard form: 
i, = A, o +Al i, _, 
+A12r, 
_, 
+e;, 
rý = 40 + 41lß-1 + A22r1-1 + er, 
The variance-covariance matrix from the standard form system is: 
611 612 
62I (722 
Therefore, the short-term (impact) pass-through is given by the parameter b21 in the 
original form. It could be estimated as: 
612 
b21 = 
611 
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CHAPTER 3 
92 
3 MODELLING INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH 
WITH ENDOGENOUS SWITCHING REGIMES IN 
ARGENTINA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Interest rate pass-through, from money market rates to lending rates, could involve 
nonlinearities of various kinds. The pass-through might change when greater volatility 
and unusual uncertain conditions in the financial markets make banks change their 
expectations of future adjustments in interest rates. Alternatively, regime-shifting 
behaviour in the pass-through could be the result of a nonlinear monetary policy. 
Whether exogenous or endogenous factors explain such a regime-dependent pass- 
through is an open empirical field. Constant transition probabilities (CTP) are usually 
associated to the first possibility, while time-varying transition probabilities (TVTP) 
suggest endogenous switching. Specification tests and data availability are criteria that 
would determine modelling one or another type of regime switching. 
In Argentina, for instance, from June 1993 to December 2000, the interest rate pass- 
through from the interbank rate to rates on overdrafts, bills, and personal loans showed 
a marked regime-switching behaviour. A Markov-switching VAR represents the 
process appropriately, even with just constant transition probabilities. Regime switches 
coincide with the international financial crises that hit Argentina and with the building 
up of the currency board collapse. In general, under turbulent times in the banking 
system, the pass-through accelerated substantially for all lending rates. 
This paper studies the interest rate pass-through for Argentina including the period that 
preceded and followed the collapse of the currency board by the end of 2001. A 
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Markov-switching model with TVTP is postulated and estimated. The objective is to 
seek further evidence of nonlinearities in the interest rate pass-through and to discuss 
the feasible sources of those nonlinearities. The study should provide, thus, a deeper 
understanding of banks' behaviour under highly uncertain scenarios. 
If the interest rate pass-through is regime-dependent, it is then feasible that the 
probabilities of switching regimes were dependent upon some identifiable endogenous 
variables. A sound theoretical background should suggest which particular variables 
contain relevant information to explain TVTP as opposed to CTP. For instance, 
uncovered interest parity (UIP) indicates that interest rate spreads contain enough 
exploitable information about devaluation expectations to which, in turn, transition 
probabilities might be linked through time. Therefore, those spreads could be suitable 
leading indicators for TVTP. Empirical testing would select those variables more 
relevant to fulfil this role and test its validity. 
A Markov-switching VAR improves upon linear models in measuring interest rate pass- 
through by considering two regimes and regime-varying parameters (intercept, 
autoregressive terms, and variance) for Argentina. Nonetheless, considering only 
interest rates in local currency might not be enough to capture banks' optimising 
behaviour in such a dual currency system. Hence, this paper also considers the 
relevance of lending interest rates in the foreign currency (US dollars); of depreciation 
expectations (as measured by interest rate differentials); and of country risk measures. 
Markov switching models have alternatively considered these variables as exogenous 
(MS-VARX) or as information variables in the TVTP. 
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An important discussion is about what the sources of the pass-through nonlinearity are. 
As some empirical papers have already shown for Argentina (as well as for the euro 
area), there could be nonlinearities in devaluation expectations which in turn would 
induce nonlinearities in interest rate differentials (through UIP). This regime switching 
in domestic money market rates (i. e., interbank rate) might also induce nonlinear 
behaviour into lending interest rates (given an industrial organization approach). As a 
result, the interest rate pass-through might reflect this nonlinear pattern too. Regime 
shifts might coincide in time for both relationships (mainly during financial crises). 
Nevertheless, the determinants of regime shifts or of TVTP, do not need to be the same 
for devaluation expectations and for the interest rate pass-through. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Next section reports on the main objectives of this 
study. Section 3 discusses feasible sources for nonlinearities in the interest rate pass- 
through; applies the Markov switching approach to modelling the pass-through; and 
present some empirical evidence for regime shifting behaviour in interest rates. Section 
4 overviews on the economic rationale of a nonlinear pass-through for the empirical 
case under evaluation. The following section reports on the modelling of the regime 
switching pass-through and presents the estimation results. Finally, Section 6 concludes 
and refers to further research agenda. 
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3.2 MEASURING THE PASS-THROUGH: WHAT FOR? 
The objective of modelling the interest rate pass-through is twofold: assessing the 
efficiency of financial and monetary policy transmission, and understanding the banking 
system behaviour. On one hand, having an assessment of the magnitude and speed by 
which movements in the money market rates are transmitted to the market structure of 
interest rates provides an idea of how efficient the transmission mechanism could be. 
On the other hand, understanding the dynamics of the pass-through process would allow 
more accurate forecasting of banks' optimising behaviour so that authorities could 
design less distorting new policies. 
This study focuses on the pass-through for lending interest rates, leaving aside that for 
deposit interest rates. In many Latin American banking systems, financial liberalisation 
and opening to international capital flows during the 1990s induced progressive 
international alignment for most deposit interest rates. This result is far from complete 
in the case of lending rates. Interest rates on loans to prime enterprises, which can 
alternatively access local or foreign capital markets directly, are mostly at, or very close 
to, international levels. In spite of this trend, interest rates on other type of loans are 
very much dispersed and, in many cases, well beyond comparable international levels. ' 
3.2.1 The transmission mechanism 
It is usually assumed (and too often taken for granted) that monetary policy 
management of interest rate is smoothly but completely transmitted to the spectrum of 
market interest rates. Short-run stickiness in interest rates could differ substantially from 
one financial product to another due to different development stages in the banking 
system's segments. Nonetheless, with well-functioning banking systems, the long-term 
Even after adjusting for country risk, devaluation expectations, and other feasible risks. 
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impact of monetary policy actions should be complete. Even if the banking systems 
were not entirely competitive (as it is often the case), 2 monetary policy is considered 
powerful enough to transmit its financial signals to the markets. 
The efficiency in the transmission mechanism is associated with the ability of 
transmitting (passing-through) impulses on a very short-term rate (money market rate) 
to the entire market structure of interest rates (first to short term rates, then to long-term 
rates). The policy objective would certainly be to reach real effects on the short term by 
affecting real interest rates and, then, consumption and investment. To decide upon a 
policy action, an important analysis is to determine the magnitude and lags of the 
expected effects on market interest rates. Moreover, this efficiency would be clearly 
linked to the financial market structure (market imperfections reducing policy 
efficiency) and agents' expectations about future evolution of market interest rates. 
Taylor (1998), for example, studies monetary policy rules for a number of country and 
multi-country models in which the policy variable is the short-term interest rate, and in 
which there are alternative endogenous variables (to target) such as the rate of inflation, 
real output, and the exchange rate. He assesses robustness and efficiency of the 
monetary policy by evaluating how close the achievement of the final objective is. 
Under a similar approach, Krause (2003) argues that monetary authorities follow a 
linear policy rule as a function of aggregate demand and supply shocks (rather than as a 
function of economic variables). He models the dynamics of inflation and output as 
functions of the interest rate (again the policy variable for the central bank). Then, he 
2 Most banking system models consider, indeed, oligopolistic markets. 
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measures macroeconomic performance by using a standard loss function for the 
monetary authorities and defining a single measure of increased stability (as the 
weighted sum of the observed variances of inflation and output). Thus, finally, he 
assesses monetary policy efficiency by looking at how close the actual performance is 
to the performance achievable under optimal policy. 
This discussion about monetary policy efficiency is, nonetheless, well beyond the 
research objective of this study. The subject in this paper is the initial stage of the 
transmission process. Namely, how changes3 in short-term money market rates are 
transmitted to the market structure of interest rates. Everything else given, the larger and 
speedier the effect of money market rates changes on market rates, the more likely the 
policy objectives from monetary authorities are to be met. In setting and evaluating their 
policy actions, central bankers take into consideration the lags and strength by which 
they can effectively affect market interest rates. Even without an independent monetary 
policy, determining the effects from financial conditions on short-term money market 
rates and, therein, into credit market rates is relevant to assess this market dynamics. 
A number of transmission mechanisms might account for monetary policy effects in the 
economy. 4 In the traditional standard interest rate channel, a monetary contraction, for 
instance, leads to an increase on nominal short-term interest rates. Considering some 
sticky prices in the economy and rational expectations on the term structure of interest 
rates, there is going to be (at least at the short term) an increase in the real long-term 
interest rate, which in turn will push down investment and consumption of durable 
goods. Consequently, aggregate demand and output will decrease. This description does 
3 Whether induced by direct policy actions or by changing financial conditions. 
4 The literature on this is quite extensive. For a brief thorough review, see Mishkin (1995). 
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not usually mentioned though that actual investment and consumption decisions are 
based not on just one average interest rate, but rather on segment-specific interest rates. 
The transmission mechanism actually works if the initial impact on short-term interest 
rates is transmitted completely (although not necessarily immediately) to the market 
structure of interest rates (first nominal, then real rates). That is, if interest rates on loans 
to enterprises, consumer spending, mortgages, overdrafts facilities and the like, respond 
to short-term interbank rate changes. Even if there are some other relevant monetary 
transmission channels, like the exchange rate channel, other asset price effects, or the 
credit channel (with all these channels possible enriched by a private sector expectations 
channel), the first link will still be related to the interest rate pass-through. In this study, 
the emphasis is on this initial link of the transmission mechanism, the effects of short- 
term money market rates on short-term market interest rates. 
In the empirical case under consideration here (Argentina), the pass-through is studied 
from the interbank rate (rather than from an official rate) to several lending rates 
because of the presence of the currency board during most of the sample. Under a 
currency board regime for the exchange rate, monetary policy is non-independent. 
Therefore, there is less room for official interest rate management. What will become 
the benchmark for the spectrum of interest rates are the money market rates, which will 
be transmitting short-term financial conditions and banks' expectations on longer-term 
interest rates. Changes in a money market rate are transmitted in the same fashion as 
official rates. 5 Those changes could, for example, respond to pressures on the exchange 
rate market (through UIP) or from normal liquidity constraints. The type of exchange 
5 Actually, the first effect of official interest rate management should be on very short-term money market 
rates. In that sense, this study is picking up the link directly from those money market rates to the rest of 
interest rates. 
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rate regime might increase the probabilities of existence of nonlinear patterns in the 
pass-through, for example, if those nonlinearities come from financial crises stimulus. 
3.2.2 Banking system behaviour 
Comprehension of banks' behaviour and their optimisation procedures enhances 
understanding of the transmission mechanism and, thus, helps designing and 
implementing a particular monetary or financial policy. Empirical research should 
determine whether this behaviour is regime-dependent or independent of financial 
conditions. Nonlinear pass-through features might be entirely due to macroeconomic 
factors or correspond to nonlinear responses from banks to financial market conditions. 
Sander and Kleimeier (2003), for instance, study the pass-through in the euro zone and 
find asymmetries across countries possible due to structural differences such as the 
competitive environment in the banking market and the role of stable monetary regime. 
A crucial link of the transmission mechanism is the way in which banks determine the 
interest rates they charge on their financial products. The opportunity cost of providing 
a short-term loan is the cost of those funds in the (interbank) money market. Therefore, 
banks will consider the interbank rate as a base cost upon which they would add some 
other factors. Banks will include in their loan prices (assuming non-perfect market 
structure) any risk they face (i. e. country risk or devaluation expectations). Thus, for 
example, in the dual-currency banking system in Argentina (herself a small open 
economy), local-currency denominated loans are priced at the corresponding foreign 
rate, plus a measure of country risk, of devaluation expectations, and of any particular 
credit risk involved in the loan. 6 Other than the credit risk, which might be sector- 
6 See Claessens and Glaessner (1998) for an example of decomposing lending rates in Argentina into 
macroeconomic and microeconomic risks. 
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specific, other factors are more generally linked to macroeconomic conditions. Shocks 
on those factors might very well induce a regime switching adjustment to interest rates. 
Accordingly, a nonlinear process should represent the pass though more appropriately. 
Furthermore, microeconomic factors such as market power, demand elasticity, and 
operation costs could also be included in the final interest rate (depending on the market 
structure). Notwithstanding, at this stage, this paper assumes that all those 
microeconomic factors (including credit risks), although important, offer no sudden 
jumps that would justify a regime shifting behaviour in the interest rate pass-through. 
Discussing how banks set their interest rates, Gambacorta (2004) argues that significant 
differences in pass-through among market interest rates are only present in the short 
term (but not in the long term). Besides, that short-term heterogeneity is due to segment 
and market characteristics mainly. He, in particular, finds that interest rate on short-term 
loans of liquid and well-capitalized banks respond less to money market changes. ' 
An important objective in studying the pass-through mechanism is to assess the degree 
of competition (or the lack of it) in the banking system. Sander and Kleimeier (2003), 
for example, argue that usually a less-than-complete pass-through would signal 
imperfect competition in the market. Moreover, if that were also the case for the long- 
term pass-through, it could even reflect credit rationing. Similarly, since integration 
seems to be a sufficient (although not a necessary) condition for pass-through 
convergence, pass-through heterogeneity would reveal the degree of financial 
integration among credit markets (or the structural differences between them). Indeed, 
' Gambacorta studies this evidence through a panel data approach for Italian banks. 
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they find in their research that financial integration in euro countries is still an ongoing 
process, with the clear exemption of lending to enterprises. This latter result is quite 
similar to those found in several Latin American banking systems, in which interest 
rates in loans other than to prime enterprises remain largely above international levels 
and are quite different between countries and market segments. 8 
A bank's decision to adjust its interest rates, responding to changes on official rates or 
on its opportunity cost of funding, would generally be associated to whether it perceives 
the change as permanent or temporary. It would particularly be linked to further 
expectations of base rate changes (an initial shock could be reverted soon afterwards). 
As Hofmann and Mizen (2004) point out, when banks face adjustment costs on their 
rates, they might accumulate in a single rate change an expected sequence of minor 
official rate changes. Similarly, banks will try to anticipate turning points in the setting 
of official rates. In trying to anticipate monetary policy actions on interest rates, banks 
display a forward-looking behaviour. Therefore, how banks adjust their expectations 
will be crucial in determining any feasible nonlinearity in their interest rates. 
In well developed and diversify financial systems, market expectations on future short- 
term interest rates might be inferred from money market rates (through implied forward 
rates). 9 Although, as Brooke, Cooper, and Scholtes (2002) argue, heterogeneity in credit 
specifications for money market instruments should place care in interpreting 
expectations inferred from those instruments. 10 A detailed assessment of those 
expectations might provide a helpful beforehand evaluation of what likely response 
8 Despite the fact that these economies opened their capital accounts and introduced financial 
liberalisation during most of the 1990s. 
9 Using the rational expectations hypothesis for the term structure of interest rates. 
10 These authors discuss the Bank of England's approach to inferring market expectations on interest rates 
from a number of money market rates. 
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market participants will show to a given policy action. Abrupt changes in those 
expectations, again, might induce a nonlinear behaviour from banks when adjusting 
their interest rates to money market rate changes. 
Since banks in Argentina have the choice of operating in local currency or in foreign 
currency (US dollar-denominated loans), it is feasible the existence of an independent 
pass-through for interest rates in dollars if the market segments in which the bank 
operates are separated for each currency. Although this study has not estimated directly 
the pass-through for dollar-denominated interest rates, the relevance of these 
instruments is assessed as exogenous variables in the nonlinear models or as leading 
indicators in the TVTP. 
This feature of the banking system might enlarge the probability of a regime change in 
the local interest rate pass-through (especially under devaluation pressures). In 
particular, in a dual currency banking system, the local interest rate denominated in the 
foreign currency will be approximately equal (assuming similar credit risk) to the 
foreign rate plus the country risk. Hence, the spread between the domestic rates in local 
and foreign currency could approximate devaluation expectations. Alternatively, the 
spread between the domestic interbank rate and the corresponding foreign rate might 
represent country risk and devaluation expectations together. " 
" This is a particular important empirical issue, since most relevant measures of country risk for 
emerging markets are available only since 1998 (although indices are available from 1994). See 
Cunningham (1999) for a discussion on emerging market spread indices. 
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3.3 PASS-THROUGH NONLINEARITIES 
The possibility that interest rate pass-through is regime-dependent is mostly important, 
from the economic point of view, because regime changes in financial market 
conditions would reasonably affect banks' behaviour. If that is the case, then monetary 
or financial transmission might as well be a nonlinear process. From an econometric 
perspective, as Filardo (1998) suggests, it is important because analysing regime 
switching demands inferring from the data when regime changes take place. 
Most studies of interest rate pass-through have limited themselves to linear 
relationships, although an already large empirical literature discusses nonlinearities in 
short-term money market rates. A few studies, though, have indeed pointed out the 
nonlinearity feature in the pass-through process: Hofmann and Mizen (2004), and 
Sander and Kleimeier (2003) for the euro area; and Iregui, Milas, and Otero (2001) for a 
sample of Latin American countries. 
3.3.1 Where do they come from? 
If there were indeed a regime-dependent banks' behaviour, it would be relevant to 
discuss where the nonlinearity in that behaviour comes from. What make banks change 
their response to financial condition shocks would surely be associated to a nonlinearity 
of their expectations on future market stances or a nonlinearity of their response to those 
expectations. Then, feasible sources for that regime-switching behaviour are nonlinear 
monetary policy, financial crises, real business cycles, or asymmetric adjustment costs. 
The interest rate pass-through in the case of Argentina, for instance, showed empirically 
a regime-switching behaviour in the period June 1993 to December 2000. It showed an 
increase in the pass-through for three lending rates for those occasions in which the 
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banking system was hit, to different degrees, by three major international crises 
(Mexico 1994, South East Asia 1997, and Russia 1998) and by a highly domestic- 
generated uncertain period (that finally lead to the collapse of the currency board). 12 
3.3.1.1 Nonlinear monetary policy 
Nonlinearities in interest rates could be the result of a nonlinear behaviour from 
monetary policy authorities. Under normal circumstances in the money market, 
monetary authorities could concentrate themselves in interest rate smoothing (so that the 
interest rate path is consistent with a random walk, unit root behaviour). Nevertheless, 
under highly volatile situations (shocks) policymakers might change into a more 
infl ation-fighting response (a higher degree of mean reversion). Ang and Bekaert (2002) 
I 
argue in this direction especially for the case of the US Fed interest rate management 
(over a sample from 1972 to 1996). They use a Markov switching bivariate VAR with 
TVTP to capture this nonlinear behaviour in the short-term rate. The spread between the 
short-term and long-term rate contains useful information about expected inflation and, 
thus, reflects feasible changes in regime. 
Erlandsson (2002) also argues that nonlinearities in short-term interest rates could be 
the result of nonlinear monetary policy actions that aim at, for example, defending a 
fixed exchange rate regime. He focuses on the dynamics of the money market 
(interbank) rate rather than on interest rates on bonds. His regime-switching model, 
including ARCH effects, improves on fitting and forecasting the data for Swedish 
interest rates. As in Ang and Bekaert (2002), interest rate spreads include important 
information on the evolution of short-term rates, reflecting market expectations. 
12 Under similar considerations, Hofmann and Mizen (2004) find evidence of nonlinear behaviour in the 
adjustment of retail rates to official rates in England. They use a nonlinear error correction model. 
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The interest rate pass-through measures the response from (lending or deposit) market 
interest rates to shocks on money market rates or on official rates (transmitted through 
money market rates). Therefore, if those money market rates are subject to regime 
shifting because of monetary policy actions, then the interest rate pass-through should 
also show a nonlinear pattern. 
3.3.1.2 Financial crises and uncovered interest parity 
Several previous studies have discussed nonlinear relationships between exchange rates 
and interest rates. Most notably, Dahlquist and Gray (2000) linked nonlinear behaviour 
in interest rates (differentials) to exchange rate realignment expectations through UIP. 
Not only exchange rate movements and/or international reserves adjustments (especially 
if there is official intervention) but also interest rate differentials adjustments reflect 
pressures on the foreign exchange market. For this reason, changes in the money market 
rates would respond not only to domestic monetary policy but also to external factors 
exacerbating devaluation expectations (such as an international financial crisis that 
spills over the domestic financial system). 
If the domestic money market rate moves nonlinearly because UIP, then the response of 
lending rates to those changes might as well be nonlinear. Namely, the pass-through 
might also be a nonlinear process. Although some authors have previously pointed out 
the presence of nonlinearities in the interest rate pass-through (mostly in the form of 
asymmetries in the response), 13 not many have emphasized this link through UIP. 
The basic formulation for the UIP is: 
13 See, for instance, Bondt (2002) and Scholnick (1996). 
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(l + i; )(1 + O, )5; +, (l+i, )= 
S, 
(3.1) 
This relationship equals the proceedings from a time investment in the local currency at 
an interest rate it (left hand side of the equation) with the yield of an investment, over 
the same period of time, on the foreign currency at an interest rate i*t, adjusted by 
country risk cpt (right hand side). To make amounts equivalent, this investment is first 
transformed into foreign currency at the exchange rate St and, at maturity, transformed 
back into local currency with the yet unknown (expected) exchange rate St+i. 
The following expanded form represents empirically the UIP relationship: 14 
i, =i; +O, +E(Os, )+y (3.2) 
where E(Ast) represents the expected change in the exchange rate (devaluations 
expectations) and y is a term included to represent any remaining risk premium. 
Therefore, this UIP formulation suggests that if there is a regime switching behaviour in 
devaluation expectations, then the process that governs short-term interest rates should 
also be nonlinear. This paper suggests that this behaviour in money market rates is also 
transmitted to the interest rate pass-through. 
Nonlinear behaviour in interest rate (differentials) has also been studied through links to 
currency crises and speculative attacks, assuming implicitly that UIP holds. In 
particular, Martinez (2002) argues that speculative attacks apart from causing large 
depreciations could alternatively induce sharp falls of reserves or increases in interest 
rate differentials if authorities try defend the currency. Hence, under currency pressures, 
those variables will show high volatility in contrast to a more stable behaviour under 
14 Taking logarithms in both sides of the equation and using the approximation log (1+ij = i,. 
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normal circumstances. Again, interest rate spreads (between local and foreign rates, 
rather than between short and long term rates) will reflect market (devaluation) 
expectations that might signal changes in the transition probabilities between regimes. 
Interestingly, however, not only a direct speculative attack to a currency might generate 
nonlinear behaviour in domestic money market rates (in turn transmitted to other 
lending rates). International financial crises hitting by contagion a domestic economy 
might have the same effects in short term interest rates. In particular, major international 
financial crises during the 1990s (Mexico 1994, South East Asia 1997, and Russia 
1998) translated into high degree of uncertainty in many emerging markets. Besides, 
those crises' effects were evident not only on financial prices but on quantity variables 
as well (such as the shortage of short-term international capital inflows). In some cases, 
those pressures induced also banking crises that put further pressures on bank pricing. 
Whether the regime shifting is associated to the currency crisis in itself or to the 
banking crisis that accompany it is an empirical issue. In as far as both kinds of crises 
do not necessarily share causes, but might share similar market response in interest rates 
(a higher volatility), it is important to determine empirically which one is fundamental 
in inducing a nonlinear behaviour in bank price setting. 
Recent studies emphasising nonlinear behaviour in either interest rates or exchange 
rates (under speculative attacks or financial crises) implicitly or explicitly assume UIP 
holds. See, for example, Dahlquist and Gray (2000), Fratzscher (2002), Mandilaras and 
Bird (2003), and Martinez (2002) for the euro zone; Jeanne and Masson (2000) for 
France; Frömmel, MacDonald, and Menkhoff (2002) for US, Japan, UK and Germany; 
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Alvarez-Plata and Schrooten (2003), and Boinet, Napolitano, and Spagnolo (2002) for 
Argentina; and Cerra and Saxena (2002) for Indonesia. Many of them adopt Markov 
switching models to describe the latent variable state, with either CTP or TVTP. I5 
3.3.1.3 Real business cycle 
Other studies have associated nonlinearities of the term structure of interest rates to 
stages in the real business cycle. See for example Ahrens (2002), Hofmann and Mizen 
(2004), Sander and Kleimeier (2003), Clarida, Sarno, Taylor, and Valente (2002). The 
most common link between interest rates and the business cycle is the assumption that 
financial prices contain enough exploitable information on market expectations about 
the future path of the economy (expectations theory of the term structure). 
Ahrens, for instance, points out that monetary policy action could induce changes in 
those expectations, in both short- and long-term rates. Since those actions would 
probably affect the real sector with longer lags than the financial sector, then 
movements in the term structure would give signals about turning points in the business 
cycle. In addition, since inflationary expectations are associated to long-term interest 
rates and recessions are usually linked to low inflation rates, a decrease in the slope of 
the yield curve might be reflecting expectations of a turndown in the economic cycle. 
Indeed, as Clarida, Sarno, Taylor, and Valente (2004) suggest, "business cycle 
expansions and contractions may have statistically and economically important first- 
order effects on expectations of inflation, monetary policy and nominal interest rates ". 16 
15 In modelling exchange rate pressures through a Markov switching model, the dependent variable might 
be a pressure index including the (change of) exchange rate, international reserves, and interest rate 
differentials, or these same variables but into a VAR specification. 
16 These authors also include, in their search for sources of nonlinearity in interest rates, price inflation as 
an objective variable in a Taylor-rule type logit model for the transition probabilities of an MSIH-VECM. 
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Therefore, turning points in the business cycle could be reliably preceded by regime 
shifts in interest rate term spreads. Once again, if money market short-term rates show 
nonlinear behaviour, then the process by which they are transmitted to the market 
structure of interest rates should also contain a nonlinear pattern. A change in the speed 
by which money market rate changes are transmitted into market lending rates might 
then be associated to changes in market expectations about the business cycle. 
3.3.1.4 Adjustment costs 
Banks could react to money market rates changes in a nonlinear fashion if there are non- 
negative adjustment costs. Beyond certain values of the spread to the official rate, the 
lending rate would be adjusted if the cost of doing so were surpassed by the cost (loss) 
of not responding to the change (Hofmann and Mizen (2004)). This nonlinearity could 
be asymmetric in the sense that for a given positive spread between the lending rate and 
the money market rate, it is more likely that a bank will adjust its retail rate if the money 
market rate is expected to fall (and the contrary if the spread is negative). Furthermore, 
the interest rate pass-through would accelerate if the expected differential in the money 
market rate (between its current level and the expected future level) widens and it would 
fall if that differential tightens. 
It is worth noticing here that, changes in money market rates do not need to be nonlinear 
to generate a nonlinear response in interest rate. As far as there are menu costs in the 
adjustment of retail (lending) rates greater than those usually faced by central banks in 
changing their interest rates, then a nonlinear response from banks is likely. Hofmann 
and Mizen do not (explicitly or implicitly) mention any need for money market rate 
changes being nonlinear. Nonetheless, the required increase in the differential might 
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imply unusually large shocks to accelerate the pass-through. This might correspond to a 
regime-shift in money market rates. 
3.3.2 Modelling regime shifting 
Given the nature of the nonlinearities discussed in the pass-through, an appropriate 
modelling is the Markov-switching type of models, in which the probability of being in 
a regime in any one period is conditional on a fixed (probably small) number of 
previous regime occurrences (persistence in states). Alternatively, standard linear 
models generally consider single or multi-equations lag distributed systems to estimate 
the pass-through. Importantly, if the pass-through were subject to regime shifting, linear 
models could underestimate or overestimate it depending on the market uncertainty. 
Using a regime switching model (as oppose to inserting dummy variables) would allow 
for the presence of an arbitrary number of structural breaks for which the timing is 
unknown (Garcia and Perron (1996)). Of course, if the structural break occurs only once 
and at a known date, there is no need to specify a nonlinear model. 
Modelling the pass-through as a nonlinear process, where regime switches imply a time- 
varying pass-through, is consistent with a banking optimisation process that consider 
adjusting expectations at a different speed under normal conditions and in a situation in 
which uncertainty is greater. The seminal model of Hamilton (1994) considers an 
exogenous changing model in which the transition probabilities from one regime to 
another were constant or exogenous to the system (and not explicitly modelled). This 
model proved to be quite useful to represent the real business cycle, for which economic 
behaviour depends on being on an expansion or on a recession. 
Markov switching models have also been applied to financial economics to detect 
nonlinear behaviour in the term structure of interest rates and in exchange rates. See for 
example Gray (1996), Hamilton (1994), Hamilton (1988), Gavin and Hausmann (1996), 
Jeanne and Masson (2000), Mandilaras and Bird (2003), and Martinez (2002). Indeed, 
the time series characteristics of regime-switching models make them suitable to 
accommodate, for instance, unit root regimes and remain covariance stationary (Ang 
and Bekaert (2002)). Thus, these models are appropriate to capture nonlinearities in 
short-term interest rates. Hence, this study advocates that Markov switching models are 
also suitable to capture the nonlinear behaviour in the interest rate pass-through. 
3.3.2.1 Markov switching models 
The initial application of regime switching models to dynamic macroeconomics is the 
constant transition probability (CTP) Markov switching model from Hamilton (1989). 
An appealing extension is the case with time-varying transition probabilities (TVTP), in 
which the feasibility of being in a particular regime varies along with some information 
variables. Most initial applications of Markov switching models referred to the business 
cycle. Financial economics applications are more recent and more oriented to the term 
structure of interest rates or to exchange rates. For a recent survey of contributions in 
Markov switching models, see Hamilton and Raj (2002). This section describes the 
Markov switching model, emphasising its application to the interest rate pass-through. 
The relationship between one (or more) short-term retail interest rate and a short-term 
money market rate, whether in a single equation or a multi-equation system, is subject 
to regime switching if the relationship parameters change according to what state or 
regime the financial system is at in each period t. A general representation of the 
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switching model for the interest rate pass-through would then adopt the following 
nonlinear (standard form) VAR representation: 
m 
y, =v(s, )+A, (s, )y, _j 
+u, 
J=l 
(3.3) 
where the error term ut is assumed a Gaussian innovation process: ut- NID(O, E(st)). 
The time series vector yt contains observed endogenous variables (interest rates) and the 
regime is given by the unobservable variable st. If only two regimes, the state variable 
can take on the values 0 and 1. In this general representation, all the parameters are 
regime-dependent (constant, autoregressive, and variance of errors). The model could 
also include a vector of observed exogenous variables (some other macro or micro 
economic variables) as in: 
mn 
y, =v(S, )+A; (S, )Y, -; 
+I8; (S, )x, 
-; 
+u, (3.4) 
i=t r=1 
where the error term is again a Gaussian innovation process conditional on st. 
The short-term pass-through is the impact response of a lending rate to shocks in the 
contemporary money market rate. Therefore, estimating equations (3.3) or (3.4) will not 
directly provide the pass-through. It needs to be derived from those parameters by 
estimating back the primitive form of the nonlinear VAR system. For that purpose, the 
Choleski decomposition, with the interbank rate first in the ordering, is validly 
applicable since the money market rate is likely to be exogenous to the system. The 
long term pass-through will be determined from there by referring to the sum of the 
autoregressive parameters for the money market rate (from the contemporary to the last 
lag) divided by the factor one minus the sum of the autoregressive parameters in the 
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lending rate. Given the nonlinear VAR system, both the short-term and the long-term 
interest rate pass-through will thus be regime-dependent. 
The vector xt_j of exogenous variables could comprise some other relevant variables 
influencing the level (or first difference) 17 of the retail interest rate. These exogenous 
variables are usually macroeconomic variables explaining market characteristics or 
microeconomic factors governing the bank optimisation process. The empirical 
literature has usually left aside this vector for estimating the pass-through. It has rather 
been used on a second stage to explain the differences in pass-through between different 
retail rates. 18 Nevertheless, this does not need to be the case. Those variables could also 
be used directly to estimate the interest rate pass-through, rather than just explaining 
(once it is estimated) its heterogeneity. Of course, it will be an empirical issue to 
determine which representation is suitable for a given set of interest rates. 
If a regime-switching model is postulated to represent feasible nonlinearities in the data, 
then the change in regimes become itself a random variable (Hamilton (1994)) and, so, 
it needs to be modelled as well. A discrete random variable would describe the finite 
number of possible regimes. For realizations of the data, there would also be a time 
series realization of the regimes prevailing at each possible observation, although this 
variable will not be directly observable. All that can be done is to infer the probability 
that a particular regime has occurred at each observation period. 
17 Depending on the time series properties of the interest rates under study, the system could be 
represented in the level of the variables (the VAR representation) if there is mean-reversion on the rates 
or in differences (in which case it would become a Markov switching VECM) if they contain unit roots. 
18 Frequently, it has been used for panel data estimation or cross-section studies to determine different 
characteristics in the market segments for each retail rate (or differences between countries). 
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For the interest rate pass-through to be a nonlinear process, banks should face different 
states in the financial markets so that they derive different responses to those conditions. 
A major financial market feature is the level of uncertainty prevailing at any particular 
time. Therefore, the regimes or states under consideration would certainly be associated 
to either calm conditions or turbulent times in the market. Moreover, volatility of some 
observable market variables (prices and/or quantities) would certainly reflect those 
regimes. This study emphasises the price variables since they transmit more readily all 
available (or lack of) market information. 
Appropriately, then, a two-regime model could describe efficiently any feasible 
nonlinear behaviour in the pass-through. Alternatively, of course, the model could add a 
third regime for those states in which volatility increases but not as much as under the 
turbulent regime. Estimating more than three regimes would probably represent efforts 
to over fitting the data. Therefore, this research considers models up to only three 
regimes. 19 Again, empirical testing or sound economic rationale, should guide the 
researcher to determine the number of regimes in the system. 
The regime-switching model then needs to describe the laws governing the transition 
from one regime prevailing at any particular time to a regime occurring next period, the 
so-called transition probabilities. Once a regime changes, if there were some degree of 
persistence in the new one, then the transition probability would depend on past values 
of itself (which regime occurred before). A plausible description of such a pattern is to 
assume that the unobserved regime variable follows a Markov chain process. 20 A 
19 Also because with more parameters to estimate, the required amount of data increases considerably. 
20 For a brief, still thorough, introduction to Markov chains, see Hamilton (1994). 
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Markov switching regime assumes that the transition probability at any time t is related 
to the past only through the most recent realization of regime (at time t-1) 
Assuming two possible regimes for the pass-through, the discrete random variable st 
could take the value 0 for the calm regime and the value 1 for the turbulent regime. 
Correspondingly, assuming the probability of s, taking a particular value j depends only 
on the value i it took one period before (a Markov chain process), there would be up to 
four transition probabilities: 
Pr(s1+, =J Is, =l)= p, 1 (3.5) 
alternatively, stating them out explicitly: 
Pr(s, 
+1 =0s, = 
0) = p00 (3.6) 
Pr(s, 
+, =11 s, = 
0) = pol (3.7) 
Pr(s, 
+, = 
01 s, = 1) = p, o (3.8) 
Pr(s, 
+, =1Is, =1)=p 
(3.9) 
As they are, these would be constant transition probabilities. Note that it should 
necessarily be the case that: 
Al 
p; ý =1V i, jE 
{1,2} 
l=l 
(3.10) 
That is, poo + poi = 1, and pi I+ plo =1 (where M is the number of regimes, ie. 2). The 
so-called transition matrix P collects these probabilities to represent the 2-state Markov 
process s1: 
P= Poo Pio (3.11) 
Poi Pl i 
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This matrix assumes that each p; j is less than one, so that although a regime could be 
persistent, it is not absorbent (once the system reaches a regime, it stays there 
indefinitely). 21 The possibility to change into the other regime is always positive. 
Another assumption for the transition matrix is that one of its eigenvalues is 1 and the 
other(s) is inside the unit circle. 22 Therefore, the eigenvector associated to the unit 
eigenvalue will define the vector of unconditional (ergodic) probabilities: 
P(Sl = j) = 
(1Pýý)Poo P, (3.12) 
(1-Poo)/(2-p00 -p11 
The first (second) element of this matrix of ergodic probabilities represents the 
(unconditional) probability that the Markov process will be in regime 0 (1) at any 
period. These two characteristics (assumptions) mean that P represents an irreducible 
ergodic Markov process. 
The exact nature and specification of the pass-through process would definitely be an 
empirical issue, one that requires testing not only for the presence of the nonlinear 
behaviour (and how many regimes are involved) but also for which parameters switch 
between regimes. Furthermore, as it will be discussed below, it will also require 
determining if the transition probabilities are constant or time varying. Thus far, 
equations (3.3) (or (3.4)), (3.5), and (3.10) combined will give the representation of a 
Markov switching VAR with all regime-dependent parameters and with CTP. 
In empirical studies, there has not been a single approach to testing for the existence of 
switching regimes. Some authors do not explicitly mention the issue and rely more on 
2' It would be equivalent to estimate a linear model, in which there is no regime shifting. 
22 Since the columns of P sum one, unity is one of its eigenvalues. 
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interpretation of their models, such as Ahrens (2002), and Mandilaras and Bird (2003). 
Others have focused more on testing a regime-switching model with TVTP against the 
alternative of CTP using a LR test, such as Ang and Bekaert (2002), and Dahlquist and 
Gray (2000). They implicitly assume the existence of regime switching and concentrate 
on describing the type of transition probabilities. 
A major test for the presence of nonlinearities is usually the economic rationale behind 
the model and its data supporting features. It has to be related also to improvement on 
forecasting abilities of the models postulated as regime switching. It is similarly 
important to test about the significance of possible exogenous variables in the Markov 
switching model. See Franses and van Dijk (2000) and Hamilton and Raj (2002). 
Moreover, if the residuals remain non-normally distributed, testing for possible 
remaining ARCH effects is non-negligible (Erlandsson (2002)). 
3.3.2.2 Transition probabilities: constant and time-varying 
If the interest rate pass-through is regime-dependent, then there is no theoretical reason 
for considering the transition probabilities time invariant. 23 On the contrary, it seems 
plausible that the probability of changing regimes is associated to the evolution of some 
informational variables. Those variables should contain enough information as to 
foresee that a change in regime is more likely under certain variable values, acting 
indeed as leading indicators of the unobserved regimes. Actually, the lagged state in a 
Markov switching process would provide information necessary for identification (in 
the estimation) as long as it is uncorrelated with the current error on the main equation. 
2' Detailed discussion of modelling Markov switching with TVTP is found in Diebold, Lee, and 
Weinbach (1994), Filardo (1994), and Filardo (1993). 
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This extra information is obtained by including leading indicators for TVTP and, thus, 
endogenising the Markov regime switching process (Kim, Piger, and Startz (2003)). 
Yet, it is important to be clear about the economic rationale of using TVTP rather than 
CTP. For interest rates, in particular, the probability of switching regimes might depend 
on interest rate spreads. See for example, Ang and Bekaert (2002), Dahlquist and Gray 
(2000), Hofmann and Mizen (2004), and Iregui, Milas, and Otero (2001). Even more, 
the short-term rate and the spread would Granger-cause each other. Since this research 
has emphasised price variables as to contain readily available market information, using 
these spreads as leading indicators of TVTP seems plausible. 
The choice of the informational variables might consider the feasibility of applying the 
Expectations Maximisation (EM) algorithm to the TVTP case. Indeed, this is a non- 
trivial issue to account for. Filardo (1998) shows that conditional exogeneity between 
the leading indicators and the unobserved regimes make the EM algorithm valid to 
estimate the parameters in a Markov switching model with TVTP. 24 
Regime switches in the form of changes in volatility should reflect unusual market 
events, such as a financial crisis or a change in the exchange regime. Variations in 
banks' expectations about the risks more closely associated to those events would 
certainly reflect those unobserved switches. Accordingly, the probability of changing 
regimes would be linked to the evolution of what banks perceive to be their risks. 
24 Feasibility of maximum likelihood estimation of TVTP models derives from the conditions necessary 
to factor the joint likelihood into a concentrated likelihood (one which obviates the need to estimate all 
the parameters in the likelihood function jointly). See a detailed explanation in Filardo (1998). 
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Therefore, the transition probabilities in the Markov process25 would be time- 
dependent, and they could be modelled as a logistic function of the leading indicators: 
A00 _ 
exp(xr-ºßo) (3.13) 
I+ exp(x, _, )60) 
Pý = 
exp(xt-, ß1) (3.14) 
I+ exp(x, _1)6, 
) 
poi _ (1 - Poo) (3.15) 
Pr 0= (1- PIl1) (3.16) 
where xt_1 is the (k x 1) vector containing the leading indicators (interest rate spreads) of 
regime shift, and ßo and P, are the (k x 1) vector of parameters for the TVTP. Whether 
these variables are the same that explain the regime-dependent parameters in the main 
equation of the regime-switching model is an empirical matter. It requires assessment 
based on a sound theoretical rationale. As it can easily be seen, these probabilities are, 
of course, bound to be between 0 and 1. Diebold, Lee, and Weinbach (1994) point out 
that if only the first term of 13o and ß, are allowed to be different from zero, then the 
transition probabilities collapse to the Hamilton's case (constant). 
3.3.3 Empirical evidence of regime shifting 
3.3.3.1 Argentina 
Over the period from June 1993 to December 2000, interest rate pass-through in 
Argentina showed a nonlinear behaviour. 26 The pass-through increased for periods 
associated to higher volatility conditions. In some of those periods, a similar type of 
external cause was present: a currency crisis hitting the system by contagion. In other 
25 Although it will not be a Markov process anymore, since the probability of a regime will depend not 
only on the previous regime but also on some other indicators. See Krolzig (1997). 
26 See Chapter 2 of this thesis for a detailed account of this nonlinear process. 
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periods, there were rather domestic-generated frictions in the banking system that 
caused the pass-through to rise. 
It was only in the case of the Mexican crisis, however, that the regime switching caused 
a major banking crisis (around 25 per cent of banks collapsing as a result). During the 
South East Asian and Russian crises, although the money market rates reacted promptly 
to the crises, the banking system as a whole was in a better shape to absorb the 
externalities. By the end of 2000, when negative expectations about the peg were 
starting to grow, the highly uncertain environment did not lead to major bank failures. 27 
It seems that, whatever the cause for greater uncertainty (whether an external currency 
crisis or a domestic financial crisis), an increase in the pass-through because of regime 
shifting was the likely outcome. 
For lending and deposit interest rates, Iregui, Milas, and Otero (2001) find evidence of 
regime-switching behaviour, where the transition from one regime to the other is 
controlled by the interest rate spread difference (this study surveys on a number of Latin 
American economies, including Argentina). One of the two regimes is associated to 
negative deviations of interest rate spreads relative to an estimate threshold, and the 
other regime is linked to positive deviations. The first one occurs during periods of 
financial liberalisation and the second one during periods of financial inefficiency and 
increasing government intervention. The authors use a STAR-type model to represent 
this nonlinear behaviour in interest rates. 
27 Later on, during 2001 and 2002, although many banks were caught in trouble, official intervention 
prevented them from collapsing. 
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A number of recent studies have explored nonlinearities in devaluation expectations and 
(the term structure of) interest rates in Argentina. Alvarez-Plata and Schrooten (2003) 
use a univariate Markov switching model to show that not only deteriorating 
fundamentals explain the Argentinean crisis but also exogenous shifts in agents' beliefs. 
Similarly, Boinet, Napolitano, and Spagnolo (2002) find that switch across regimes in a 
2-regime Markov switching model corresponds to jumps between different equilibrium 
explained by abrupt shifts in devaluation expectations. 
3.3.3.2 Euro zone 
Sander and Kleimeier (2003) investigate if the pass-through in the Euro zone has 
changed during the period 1993-2002. They report that the pass-through process for 
most retail rates has undergone considerable structural changes in that period (and not 
only due to the introduction of the euro in 1999) and has increased both in size and in 
speed (for lending rates but not for deposit rates). After determining endogenously the 
occurrence of a structural break (rather than imposing it exogenously), they estimate the 
pass-through partitioning the sample in pre-break and post-break periods. The authors 
implicitly assume that the increase in pass-through is permanent due to progressive 
structural convergence after the unification of monetary policy. 28 They also identify the 
occurrence of several previous structural breaks, probably due to regulatory efforts. 
Sander and Kleimeier (2003), in revising empirical literature for the European Union 
(EU), acknowledge that the pass-through might be subject to nonlinear asymmetries, 
although modelling in this fashion has not been common for the EU. Therefore, they 
28 Unsurprisingly they find that different market segments show different breakpoints. Yet, the pass- 
through differences among EU countries are larger that what could be explained by structural differences 
in their financial system. They attribute those further differences to the empirics in the studies: the choice 
of the exogenous money market rate. the length and timing of the sample, and the chosen methodology. 
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suggest incorporating threshold and asymmetric adjustment features in modelling the 
interest rate pass-through. They use alternatively different specifications of a threshold 
autoregressive model, 29 with the retail rate being above or below its equilibrium level. 
Although Sander and Kleimeier do not discuss explicitly reasons why rates would 
deviate from equilibrium beyond certain threshold spreads, they clearly see that the 
pass-through will be at a different speed than when deviations are below that threshold 
deviation. The nonlinear behaviour in the pass-through process is reported to be related 
to asymmetric adjustment of interest rates, advancing from a less-than-complete pass- 
through to a still less-than-complete but larger pass-through. It seems that there is not a 
common form of asymmetry but it is rather dependent on specific patterns and 
circumstances for different rates and market segments. An important conclusion from 
this study is that reduced volatility in money market rates leads to a speedier pass- 
through, as it would have been the case with the adoption of the single currency. 
Hofmann and Mizen (2004) for the UK report similar evidence on nonlinearity based on 
asymmetric adjustment of interest rates (deposit and mortgage rates) to changes in 
money market rates during the period 1985 - 2001.30 The speed of adjustment depends 
on whether the spread between the retail and the base rate is widening or narrowing 
(endogenous drivers) or on some exogenous drivers such as the size of the money 
market rate change. They use a menu-cost argument (from an industrial organization 
approach) to explain this type of adjustment and use a nonlinear error correction model 
to represent the pass-through. The authors conclude that the main driver of interest rate 
29 They consider a zero (introducing asymmetry in the response), a non-zero (response comes beyond 
certain minimum deviation from equilibrium), a band (adjust only when deviations are sufficiently large), 
and momentum (when banks try to smooth out large rate movements) threshold autoregressive model. 
30 They use detailed monthly data on retail rates set by individual UK banks. Other authors that have 
reported nonlinear asymmetric error correction models are Bondt (2002) and Scholnick (1996). 
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pass-through is the expected change in money market rate when the spread between the 
base and retail rates is growing in absolute size. 
A number of studies for the euro zone have also detected nonlinearities in interest rates 
(rather than in the pass-through). Dahlquist and Gray (2000) use a Markov regime- 
switching model for the dynamics of short-term interest rates. They argue that, through 
UIP, the process that generates exchange rates switches between different regimes 
might be the process that generates regime switching in interest rates. 
Martinez (2002) studies speculative episodes for the euro zone. She models exchange 
rates, foreign exchange reserves, and interest rates as time series subject to discrete 
regime shifts. Regime switching coincides with the occurrence of a currency crisis or 
the prevention of it (through official intervention). The probabilities of switching 
between states are allowed to be a function of fundamentals and expectations (Markov 
switching model with TVTP). Although episodes of currency crises inducing these 
nonlinearities are scarce for individual countries, stacking several country data together 
extends data availability. 31 
Mandilaras and Bird (2003) also review regime-switching modelling of foreign 
exchange market pressures under financial crises in the euro area. Contemporaneous 
error correlations among market pressure indexes (comprising exchange rate 
depreciation, change in interest rate differentials, and change in foreign exchange 
reserves) in the EU countries shift between a tranquil regime and a crisis regime. A two- 
regime Markov-switching VAR model captures this nonlinear behaviour. 
31 Ang and Bekaert (2002) argue indeed that "because of the extremely high persistence of short rates, 
using information from other countries is a much more effective way to increase the sample size than 
lengthening the sample itself' (Page 1245). 
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It is worth mentioning here that most empirical studies on EU countries find interest 
rates to be consistent with nonstationary processes. This result is in contrast with 
reported cases of stationarity in interest rates in some Latin American economies. 32 
3.3.3.3 Others 
Some studies for other financial markets have reported evidence of nonlinear behaviour 
in interest rates too. For instance, Dahlquist and Gray (2000) for US; Abiad (2003) for 
the South East Asian countries involved in the 1997 crisis (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Thailand); Fratzscher (2002) for Asian and Latin American countries 
(analysing the contagion effects of the Asian crisis); and Cerra and Saxena (2002) for 
Indonesia. All these studies have applied Markov switching models to represent 
switching behaviour, linking foreign exchange market pressures and interest rates. 
32 Chile and Argentina, for example. See Chapter 2 for a discussion on this issue. 
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3.4 THE BANKING SYSTEM IN ARGENTINA 
After the hyperinflation period at the end of the 1980s and the adoption of the fixed 
exchange rate regime (under a currency board type) the banking system expanded 
considerably during the 1990s. Nevertheless, this was, by no means, a continuous, linear 
process. 33 The response from the Argentinean financial system to the main international 
financial crises during the 1990s was heterogeneous and showed different stances of 
banking evolution and soundness. Thus, for instance, after the Mexican crisis there was 
a large fall in the number of banks and financial institutions in Argentina. Differently 
though, and despite all the uncertainty brought by the collapse of the currency board, 
there was only a minor effect in the number of banks during 2001 and 2002.34 
3.4.1 Evolution of the banking system 
The number of banks decreased considerably during the period of study. 35 The first 
reduction took place after the Mexican crisis, when a large number of banks and other 
financial institutions fall into insolvency, and either went bankrupt or were absorbed 
(See Table 3.1). The system recovered afterwards, with the introduction of further 
regulatory reforms and of improvements in market risk management. Many mergers and 
acquisitions took place, reducing the number of banks, but in a smoother pattern than 
during 1995. Since mid-1998, banks had faced a deep recession that made many of 
them insolvent, though government intervention through financial bailouts avoided 
further reduction in the number of banks. 
i3 The time path of interest rates (discussed below) reflects that nonlinear evolution of the banking 
system. It could also be inferred from the statistics on loan values and the number of financial institutions. 
34 This difference is partly due to large bank bailouts from the government in the aftermath of the 
currency board collapse. 
35 The number of total financial institutions, according to central bank data, was 206 by December 1993. 
By the end of 2003. there were only 96 institutions (of which 76 were banks). 
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De la Torre, Yeyati, and Schumukler (2002) argue that although the financial system 
improved significantly during the 1990s (especially after the Mexican crisis had showed 
the need for a stronger system given the lack of a lender of last resort) it kept important 
hidden weaknesses. Insufficient prudential norms to deal with effects of real exchange 
rate realignments in the non-tradable sector; large exposure to the public sector (and 
thus to a sovereign debt crisis); and not enough liquidity safeguards to face depositor 
runs were factors that proved crucial in worsening the effects of the regime breakdown. 
The other variable that shows the irregular evolution of the financial system is the flow 
of loans to the non-financial private sector (See Table 3.2). By December 1994, the flow 
of loans in local currency to the private sector was 7 386 millions of pesos plus 3 593 
millions of dollars in loans denominated in the foreign currency. Summing up at the 
prevailing one-to-one exchange rate, it totalled 10 979 millions in new loans in a month. 
One year later, after the Mexican crisis hit the Argentinean financial system, the flow of 
loans was 5 515 millions in pesos (a decrease of around 25 per cent) and 3 003 millions 
in dollars (a decrease of 16 per cent). That is, 8 518 millions in new loans in that month, 
22 per cent less than twelve months before. 
In subsequent years, once the impact of the international crisis was absorbed, the level 
of loans to the non-financial private sector recovered, reaching its peak during 1998. 
Nevertheless, after this year, the macroeconomic instability and recession started to 
reduce monthly loan flows. Differently though, the decreased in credit up to December 
2000 was not as deep as in the case of the 1995 slowdown. It continued during 2001 
and, as expectations of abandoning the currency board were mounting, there was a shift 
in the proportion of loans in local currency towards dollar-denominated loans. From 
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representing roughly 65 per cent of the total, loans in pesos went down to represent 35 
per cent in total new loans in December 2001. Once the currency board was officially 
dismantled, the evolution of new credit during 2002 and 2003 was extremely harsh. 
Loans in local currency started to recover slowly from its fall in 2001, but remained 
quite low in respect to previous standards. Loans in foreign currency almost 
disappeared, although it is worth noticing that the central bank prohibited dollar- 
denominated loans not matched by dollar-denominated income from the debtor. 
The dynamics of new credits to the private sector by type of loans and by currency were 
quite heterogeneous during all these years. In local currency, overdraft loans 
represented around 70 percent of the total in pesos at the beginning of the sample, but 
drop to around 60 percent by the end of 2000 (See Table 3.3). Bill loans went up from 
15 percent to around 22 percent in that same period, while personal loans increased 
from 7 to 12 percent. All together, these loans represented more than 90 percent of the 
total in local currency (increased their participation from 91 to 95 percent in those 
years). 
By the end of 2001, overdraft loans rose up to represent 70 percent of new credits in 
local currency but came down to 45 percent and 49 percent in 2002 and 2003. Bill loans 
sharply decreased in those years, to represent only 3 percent at the end of 2003. 
Surprisingly, personal loans gained much importance coming to represent 33 percent of 
total new loans in local currency at the end of 2003. 
Those patterns were quite different for monthly new credits to the private sector in the 
foreign currency. Overdraft credits rose from 5 percent to roughly 15 percent between 
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1993 and 2002, but practically disappeared by 2003. Bill loans drop from 41 percent to 
roughly l percent in that same period. Personal loans kept representing around 2 percent 
of the total new credits. All together, these loans fall down from representing around 48 
percent of the total in foreign currency to around just 4 percent. In this currency, 
mortgage and pledge loans are much more important. 
3.4.2 International currency crises 
The Mexican crisis in 1994, the South East Asian crisis in 1997, and the Russian crisis 
in 1998 hit the Argentinean economy and financial system to different extents. In term 
of interest rate volatility, by far, the largest effects correspond to the Mexican crisis. 
While that in terms of declining capital inflows, the Russian crisis was more damaging 
(and longer lasting). The Brazilian crisis of early 1999 did not have a noticeable effect 
in neither the money market nor the credit market. 
Reflecting the impact of the Mexican crisis, interest rates rose substantially during the 
first half of 1995. In addition, there was a deposit run during the same period (around 20 
percent of total deposits fleet the system), 36 as well as a loss of international reserves in 
the central bank (around 30 percent of liquid reserves). These shocks proved too much 
for some banks. The number of financial institutions decreased from 205 in December 
1994 to 158 in December 1995. The currency board system and the supporting 
regulatory framework deprived the central bank of enough flexibility to face the 
banking system failures (especially in its role of lender of last resort). This experience 
proved crucial for deciding upon the introduction of some specifically-design regulatory 
amendments that gave the central bank back some of its liquidity support mechanisms. 
36 Damill, Salvatore, and Simpson (2003) points out that it was initially a "flight to quality" movement of 
deposits, from small banks to more solvent and bigger banks, and from local-currency to foreign-currency 
denominated deposits. 
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By the time the South East Asian financial crisis started, in the second half of 1997, the 
Argentine banking system had recovered from the Tequila shock. The financial system 
seemed sound, evolving along a growing economy. Besides, the system adhered to 
international-standard banking regulations. The impact on interest rates was rather short 
(compared to the Mexican crisis) both in magnitude and in duration. Yet, it was large 
enough to raise the lending pass-through (see Chapter 2). 
The Russian debt crisis of August 1998 also motivated a considerable increase in 
interest rates, but again, not as large or long as in the Mexican crisis. The biggest 
consequence of the Russian debt's default was the large reversal of international capital 
inflows to emerging markets that followed it. This factor contributed to form negative 
expectations about maintaining the peg in Argentina. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2002) 
argue that the country was indeed extremely vulnerable to a sudden stop in those capital 
inflows. The closeness to international trade, the increasing size of the external debt, the 
large dollarization of both public and private sector, and the potentially large balance 
sheet effect on the financial and non-financial sectors, were all factors that made real 
exchange rate misalignments larger than expected. Besides, the capital inflow reversal 
proved to be a much longer-lived event than, for example, the Mexican crisis. 
3.4.3 Collapse of the currency board 
Given the restrictions in international capital inflows, 37 the appreciation of the US dollar 
against most currencies, and the deterioration of fiscal accounts, De la Torre, Yeyati and 
Schumukler (2002) argue that Argentina fell into a currency-growth-debt trap. It 
eventually led to the events that caused the exchange rate regime breakdown. 
37 De la Torre, Yeyati, and Schumukler (2002) argue (based on Perry and Serven (2002)) that, in the case 
of Argentina, this capital contraction might have not been entirely due to exogenous factors. Endogenous 
domestic factors would be more important in explaining it. 
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Volatility in the short-term money market rate increased substantially since the end of 
2000. In April 2001, the introduction of some amendments in the central bank charter 
removed limits on it as lender of last resort. In addition, the government proposed to 
change the convertibility law to peg the peso to a basket of US dollars and euros (rather 
than just to the US dollar). This undermining of the currency board continued with the 
setting of a preferential exchange rate for trade, which actually implemented a dual 
exchange rate (the so-called convergence factor), involving the dollar and the euro. 
Devaluation expectations were escalating during most of 2001 and economic agents 
started to realize that the government was ready to loosen the shackles of the fixed 
exchange rate regime and devalue (Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2002)). Although the 
government implemented several policies to avoid the collapse, negative expectations 
started to show off in the form of a large decrease in bank deposits and the loss of 
international reserves. 
By the beginning of December 2001, restrictions in the withdrawal of deposits were 
established, the so-called "corralito" (little fence), that brought in practice an end to the 
fixed exchange rate regime. In addition, interbank loans in local currency were 
restricted and only allowed in US dollars. 38 A political turmoil followed these policy 
measures. It ended up with the resignation of the elected President (in power since 
December 1999). On January 2nd 2002, the currency board was officially dismantled 
and a floating exchange rate regime adopted. 
38 That is why the observation on interbank rate in local currency for December 2001 is unavailable. A 
level of the rate is estimated considering the change and level of the corresponding rate in US dollars. 
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An overvalued currency, increasing foreign debt, and mounting fiscal deficits were 
among the direct causes of the currency board collapse. Despite all these, the system 
was not abandoned earlier (even though it might have reduced the negative impacts on 
growth) because of fears of returning to high inflation periods (Feldstein (2002)). 
Argentina suffered a hyperinflation by the end of the 1980s. The adoption of the 
convertibility law (which established the one-to-one peg to the US dollar) helped 
reducing it and brought financial conditions necessary to promote growth. 
The highly uncertain scenario during most of 2001 impinged upon the financial 
markets. Volatility on all interest rates rose substantially, in magnitudes well beyond 
those experimented during the Mexican crisis. Interestingly, the evolution of the 
interbank rate showed large increases one month only to fall down largely the next one 
and up again the following; a pattern that was to be common during 2001 and 2002 (but 
not seen before at those levels). Deposit runs triggered by deterioration in expectations 
about the soundness of the currency board deeply marked the banking crisis. Gabrielli, 
McCandless, and Rouillet (2003) attribute the causes of the runs to bank fundamentals. 
Variables like interest rates, non-performing loans, and exposure to public risk, have all 
significant parameters in a panel data and cross section study to explain those deposit 
runs (real shocks followed by insolvency problems). 
Despite abandoning the fixed exchange rate, uncertainty remained high for a long 
period (most of 2002). This feature has to do with the type of exit chosen and the 
materialization of insolvency problems for the corporate sector and the banking 
industry. As Damill, Salvatore, and Simpson (2003) brief it up, the abandoning of the 
currency board posed a number of problems in the banking system that was to be dealt 
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with. The balance sheet effects of devaluation on businesses; the conversion of dollar- 
denominated liabilities into peso-denominated ones; reprogramming term deposits; 39 
and the asymmetric distribution of the crisis' costs. 
An important action taken by the government in trying to soften the costs of the 
currency board collapse was the asymmetric conversion of bank assets and liabilities 
from dollars to pesos. Corporate debts to banks were converted at the rate of one peso- 
one-dollar, while deposits were converted at the rate of 1.4 pesos per dollar. This caused 
the government to end up paying for large bank capital losses through bond issuing. 
By 2003, the effects of the currency board breakdown in terms of financial uncertainty 
were over. The interbank rate went even further down than its pre-crisis levels, and it 
remained at their lowest level on the entire study sample. 40 Credits to the non-financial 
private sector from financial institution rose up 38 percent between the end of 2002 and 
of 2003. Most lending rates followed the downward trend, although at different paces. 
39 The so-called "corralon" (big fence), by early January 2002, made term deposits unavailable and 
introduced the need for reprogramming them. 
40 According to the Central Bank of Argentina (2004), by the end of 2003, the liquidity ratio of the system 
was at around 24% (8 percentage points higher than required). Bank capital losses were refinanced and 
additional capital was paid in. Banks deposits started to return to the system. 
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3.5 PASS-THROUGH AND ENDOGENOUS REGIME-SWITCHING 
From June 1993 to December 2003, there are two clearly different periods involving the 
evolution of money market rates and lending rates, both in local-currency and foreign- 
currency loans in the Argentinean financial system. The first period runs for most of the 
1990s. The latter period correspond to the breakdown of the currency board and the 
immediate turmoil that followed it (and lasted around two years). In any case, there is a 
need for assessing whether the previous episodes of high-volatility environment, such as 
those of the international financial crises (in particular the Mexican crisis) that hit the 
Argentinean system during the 1990s, remain as a second high-volatility regime (as the 
second chapter of this thesis has shown). 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
The period from January 2001 to December 2003 shows indeed a much higher mean 
and (relative) volatility for all interest rates, roughly keeping the same relative order 
among them than in the previous period (See Table 3.4). Besides, it is worth recalling 
that the volatility in the money market rate more than triples during this period and only 
(roughly) doubles for the other interest rates. The correlation between the lending rates 
and the interbank rate is much higher for the bill and overdraft rates but it is lower 
(becomes even negative) for the personal rate than in the previous period. 
Over the entire sample, the periods of higher volatility are associated to increasing 
uncertainty coming either from an international crisis or from domestic instability. 
Furthermore, although the South East Asian and Russian crises changed somewhat 
interest rates trends, their effects are much less clearer when compared to the effects 
from the collapse of the currency board and from the Mexican crisis (See Figure 3.1). 
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Similar broad trends are present in interest rates for foreign-currency denominated loans 
(See Figure 3.2). After the government officially suspended the currency board, by the 
beginning of 2002, the close link between these rates and the corresponding rates in 
local currency was to some extent broken. 4' Regarding the period 2001: 12 - 2003: 12, 
evolution of interest rates in local and foreign currency is somewhat different though 
(See Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4). The interbank rate in foreign currency is slightly less 
volatile than the one in local currency. Moreover, it is clear that both of them reached at 
the end even lower levels that the pre-collapse standards. Although, after the breakdown 
of the currency board, the interest rates denominated in foreign currency might have lost 
all their informational content. 
It is worth noticing that when comparing each lending rate with the interbank rate in the 
same currency, patterns are similar in both currencies. The most closely linked lending 
rate to the interbank rate is still the rate on bills and, then, the overdraft rate. Although 
the personal rate follows the broad trend of the interbank rate, it seems to evolve very 
much at its own dynamics (See Figure 3.5). Despite that, for all cases, the dynamics of 
the interest rates in local and foreign currency is very much similar, they evolve 
somewhat differently in some periods, especially after 2002 (See Figure 3.6). 
It is surprising that the spreads in local currency between each lending rate and the 
interbank rate become largely negative for some months between mid-2001 and mid- 
2002 (See Figure 3.7). Before that period, for all cases, that spread show a downward 
trend. All the same, during 2003, the spreads grew much larger for several months, 
although it seems to have regained its decreasing trend. 
41 Moreover, the amount of loans in foreign currency diminished considerable, and even disappeared for 
some type of operations. 
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The heterogeneity in bank pricing is more notorious in the dynamics of the spread 
between each rate and its counterpart in the foreign currency. The interbank and bills 
rate show similar levels in both currencies for most of the sample, but notably the 
spread widens during the Mexican crisis and the collapse of the currency board. It 
seems that for these rates, the spread is indeed an indication of country risk and 
devaluation expectations. 
The overdraft rate shows a much volatile spread even before the collapse of the 
currency board and with levels that seem to be beyond reasonable measures of either 
country risk or devaluation expectations. For the personal rate, although the spread was 
at very high levels at the beginning of the sample, it had a clearly decreasing trend. Yet, 
during the collapse of the currency board, it went quite high. Notwithstanding this rise, 
both these spreads showed less volatility than the interbank and bills rate during the 
period that lead to the abandoning the fixed exchange regime (See Figure 3.8). 
3.5.2 Modelling testing 
Assuming that there is indeed enough economic rationale to postulate a nonlinear 
interest rate pass-through, this section conducts a set of test for assessing the 
appropriateness of such a pattern and the compatibility of the data to this kind of 
models. The first type of testing is for the number of regimes. If the tests suggest a 
nonlinear pattern, the next step is to investigate the exact specification of the model. 
Finally, to enrich the representation, the presence of exogenous variables is tested, as 
well as the possibility of TVTP as oppose to the CTP case. 
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3.5.2.1 Number of regimes 
The initial step is to determine if there is indeed need for specifying at least two regimes 
as an alternative to a single-regime (linear) model. Standard specification tests based on 
likelihood ratios are not applicable because of the well-known problem of presence of 
nuisance parameters under the null of linearity. 42 Instead, empirical applications of 
Markov switching models take a number of procedures to search for evidence of 
nonlinearities. There is no widespread consensus upon which method to use for testing 
the suitability of specifying a second regime though. The econometric discussion about 
testing alternative nested models could be found in Hansen (1992), Garcia (1998), 
Garcia and Perron (1996), and others. In this type of testing, the null hypothesis of a 
linear model is confronted against the alternative of a non-linear, Markov switching, 
model. Thus, the restricted version of the nonlinear model is the linear model. 
In his original contribution of Markov switching models to time series macroeconomics, 
Hamilton (1988) spotted the problem of presence of nuisance parameters under the null 
hypothesis. Still, Hansen (1992) treated it in detail. He proposed a standardized 
likelihood ratio test for which he estimated upper bounds. The inapplicability of 
hypothesis testing, such as the likelihood ratio (LR) test, arises because it does not meet 
the standard conditions for testing. The first condition, that the likelihood surface must 
be locally quadratic is usually violated if there are some (nuisance) parameters that are 
unidentified under the null hypothesis. That is the case of the transition probabilities of 
the regime-switching model under the null of linearity; the likelihood function becomes 
flat with respect to the nuisance parameters at the optimum. The second condition, that 
the score must have a positive variance is also violated when the null hypothesis yields 
a local optimum or inflection point (with respect to the nuisance parameters). 
42 See Hansen (1992) for a discussion on this. 
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Hansen (1992) avoids these problems by taking an approach that works directly with the 
likelihood surface as an empirical process of the unknown parameters. He derives a 
bound for the asymptotic distribution of a standardized LR statistics (but not asymptotic 
values). 43 Nonetheless, he recognizes that having only a bound for the statistics can lead 
to under-rejection of a false null (loss in effective power of the test). Therefore, the test 
should only be used when it is feasible that the conventional assumptions are invalid. 
Hansen (1992) also recognizes that his test is highly demanding in computational terms. 
This last characteristic has indeed prevented a much more extended use of the test. 44 A 
recent example of its application is found in Boinet, Napolitano, and Spagnolo (2002), 
who applied the test for a two-state Markov switching model of devaluation 
expectations. Alternatively, Gray (1996) recognizes that he did not adjust the 
distribution for the likelihood ratio test to account for the presence of nuisance 
parameters (the Hansen's test) but relied in the empirical large difference in the log- 
likelihood values he had obtained. Erlandsson (2002) points out that the Hansen's test 
would be hard to apply to a N-state Markov switching model, so he uses instead a 
bootstrapping technique to approximate the distribution of the LR statistic (although this 
method is itself also quite computationally demanding). 
Hamilton (1988) in his application to the term structure of interest rate argues that the 
Lagrange multiplier test is immune to the problem of nuisance parameters under the null 
of linearity. All the same, Hamilton (1989) in his application to business cycle did not 
attempt a formal hypothesis test to support his Markov switching model against the null 
43 Garcia (1998) derives analytically the asymptotic null distribution of the likelihood ratio test for a 
number of two-regime Markov switching models. However, since this distribution is conditional on the 
data and parameters, generic tabulation is not possible (Krolzig (1997)). 
"Gray (1996) points out that the procedure involves optimization over a grid of the nuisance parameters, 
which is computationally demanding unless the model is quite simple or the grid is coarse. 
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of a linear autoregressive model. He favoured his proposed model based on the better 
description it offered of the dataset under study. Later on, Engel and Hamilton (1990) 
offered an alternative solution to sidestep the problem of nuisance parameters by testing 
against a more general null hypothesis that includes them but one that makes regimes 
not persistent. 45 Then, they rely on standard distribution theory and use a Wald test and 
a LR test. Frömmel, MacDonald, and Menkhoff (2002), and Martinez (2002), for 
instance, have used empirically these approximate tests of no switching. 
In this study, the Hansen's standardized LR test is applied, to the interbank rate and to 
each lending rate separately, to search for evidence of nonlinearity. The results (See 
Table 3.5) show that a simple MSI(2)-AR(1) model improves on describing each rate's 
dynamics against the null of a linear AR(1) representation. 46 The null of linearity is 
clearly rejected in all cases. This evidence suggests indeed the presence of two regimes 
in the interest rate dynamics. Although no causality is tested, the data is thus consistent 
so far with the hypothesis that with a regime shifting interbank rate, all the other rates 
also display a nonlinear behaviour. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the 
pass-through would also be nonlinear. 
Therefore, the Hansen test is next applied to a single pass-through equation (See Table 
3.6) to confirm that single rates transmit their nonlinearity into the pass-through 
process. 47 The p-values show a (non-decisive) non-rejection of the null of linearity by 
little margins. It might be the case that the documented low power of the test is unable 
to provide further evidence of two regimes in the pass-through or, of course, that there 
45 That is, the probability of regime st is independent of s, _,. 4" The Laurent and Urbain (2003)'s M@ximize class for OxGauss have been used to run the Hansen's 
Gauss codes. For details on the test, see Hansen (1992) and Hansen (1996). 
a' The number of regimes for each interest rate in the VAR is used here to select the number of regimes 
for the multivariate times series vector (Krolzig (1997)). 
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is no regime-switching behaviour in the pass-through (despite the fact that each rate 
presents two regimes). Further testing is required. 
Alternatively, then, non-nested hypothesis testing could be used to search for evidence 
of neglected nonlinearity. That is, a number of portmanteau-type nonlinearity tests 
could be applied to detect Markov switching dynamics. 48 These tests are constructed 
without a specific nonlinear parametric alternative. Psaradakis and Spagnolo (2002) 
show, that in general, these tests have good power features for rejecting a false null of 
linearity in time series generated by Markov switching models. Nonetheless, results 
from these tests will not provide definitive evidence in favour of Markov switching 
models. That is because a rejection of the null of linearity could be due to a number of 
different features of the data, such as nonlinearities other than Markov regime switching 
or conditional heteroskedasticity. 
Instead, another type of non-nested test is used here to complement, rather than replace, 
the Hansen test. Garcia and Perron (1996) suggest estimating the model with the larger 
number of regimes and run the so-called J-test for non-nested models. It uses a t-test for 
the parameter on the estimated value of the endogenous using the model with the 
highest number of regimes in an equation that also have that value from the alternative 
model to explain the endogenous variable. 49 They also use two other tests that rely on 
giving a range of values to the nuisance parameters under the alternative hypothesis 
(thus avoiding the need for estimating them): the Davies' test and the Gallant's test. 5° 
48 Among them, for instance, RESET-type tests, the Tsay test, the neural network test. See Psaradakis and 
Spagnolo (2002) for a description of these tests. They have used Monte Carlo simulations to examine the 
performance of these tests to detect Markov switching autoregressive models. 
49 They use an equation of the form y, = 
(1- (5) f (ß) + (5gt + U, and apply a t-test on the parameter 
8. Where f (ß) is the estimated endogenous from the restricted model and gt is from the unrestricted model. 
so See Garcia and Perron (1996), and the references therein, for a detailed description of these two tests. 
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Still, on their application to real interest rates and inflation rates, they find contradictory 
results from these three tests, deciding upon two- or three-state switching models. They 
favour the three-state model because the interpretation of it is richer and more appealing 
from an economic perspective. 
Therefore, given the non-decisive results from the Hansen test, the J-test, as described in 
Garcia and Perron (1996), is applied to the single pass-through equation. This time, 
results are decisive and they clearly favoured the existence of two regimes in the pass- 
through process (See Table 3.7). With the evidence provided by the Hansen test and the 
J-test, this paper concludes that there is enough evidence to support a two-regime 
shifting representation for the interest rate pass-through .51 Another relevant testing is, of 
course, the interpretability of the results and how well the model fit (or forecast) the 
data. 
3.5.2.2 Model specification 
It certainly makes sense to start testing for the simplest two-regime model against the 
linear one. However, once a second regime is established, the next step is to compare 
between different alternative two-regime models, in order to determine which 
parameters are regime-dependent. Krolzig (1997) discusses a "bottom-up" approach to 
determine specification relying on standard tests applied to alternative Markov 
switching models (with the same number of regimes under the null). Although he 
discusses the problem testing against linearity, he points out the need for further 
`' The possibility of a third regime is also tested and although the results of the LR test show that it would 
indeed improve fitting, an extra regime has been discarded (See Appendix in Table 16). What the addition 
of the third regime does is to split the magnitude of the effects of any given shock to the financial system, 
rather than differentiating among different episodes of market uncertainty. 
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research on this issue. Clarida, Sarno, Taylor, and Valente (2004), for instance, have 
followed the bottom-up procedure. 
Therefore, following the "bottom-up" strategy from Krolzig (1997), general 
specifications of the MS-VAR are tested sequentially against each other, including a 
MSIH(2)-VAR(1) and a MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) against the initial representation MSI(2)- 
VAR(1). Thus, LR tests are used to determine the appropriate specification between 
alternative models but with the same number of regimes. Table 3.8 shows a summary of 
the relevant results. 
The selected specification is an MSIAH(2)-VAR(1). The two regimes that are thus 
modelled correspond to a calm regime, in which the mean and volatility of interest rates 
is low (or normal), and to an unstable regime, in which both the mean and volatility are 
much larger (possible linked to a crisis period). The regime-dependency of the 
autoregressive parameters is linked to the switching behaviour in the long-term pass- 
through (and not only to the impact multiplier). 
3.5.2.3 Leading indicators and exogenous variables 
The next step is to test whether the selected specification MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) is more 
appropriate with CTP or with TVTP. Similarly then, a LR test is used to select the more 
relevant specification for the transition probabilities. Results from Table 3.8 show that a 
MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) with TVTP is the suitable pass-through representation for all three 
lending rates. 
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The selected specification was also tested against the null hypothesis of a model with 
exogenous variables in the vector autoregression, that is a MSIAH(2)-VARX(1). The 
variables consider as exogenous were different specifications of interest rate spreads 
(see section 3.5.3.3. for details on them). Test results show that none of the postulated 
spreads seems to improve on the models if included in the VAR (Appendix in Table 
3.8), but they are relevant when consider as leading indicators in the TVTP. 
3.5.3 Markov-switching VAR with TVTP 
3.5.3.1 The model 
Following the specification tests from the previous section, the selected model is a 
MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) with TVTP. There are two variables in the system, the lending rate 
and the interbank rate. The interest rates on overdrafts, bills, and personal loans are 
modelled in turns with the interbank rate. The estimation period goes from June 1993 to 
December 2003 (monthly data). 52 Note that the period includes the break of the 
currency board and the aftermath of it. 
The following two equations represent the original VAR: 
i, = aö(s, )+a; (s, )i, _, 
+c4(s, )r, 
_, 
+6(s, )u; (S. 1) 
r =ao(st)+a; (sr)iý-, +az(s, )r, _, +6(s, 
)u1 (5.2) 
where it is the interbank rate and rt corresponds to the lending (overdraft, bills, or 
personal) rate. 53 All the parameters (constant, autoregressive, and error variance) are 
regime-dependent. The regime st can take the values of 0, for the calm regime, and 1, 
`z In order to increase the number of observations under the volatile regime, it is feasible to stack up the 
data from several countries as in Martinez (2002). Although, as Abiad (2003) points out, this is not a 
plausible procedure for emerging markets since the internal economic structure is likely to be quite 
different from one to another country. This factor is particular important for the leading indicators in the 
TVTP case. 
5' Standard tests suggest a very low number of lags for the VAR. Following estimations in the second 
chapter of this thesis, this chapter considers a single lag in the VAR. 
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for the volatile regime. Thus, for each variable in the system, there would be two 
equations, one for each regime. 
The parameters of the structural form should be derived from the estimated parameters 
of this reduced form of the VAR representation. The short-term pass-through shows the 
impact effect of a change in the interbank rate on the lending rate and so, in the 
structural form, it is given by the parameter accompanying the current interbank rate in 
the lending rate equation. The long-term pass-through shows the accumulated effect 
and, therefore, it is estimated considering the interbank rate's current and lagged values 
and the lending rate's lagged values in the lending rate equation. 54 
3.5.3.2 Estimation procedure: the EM algorithm 
The Expectation Maximisation (EM) algorithm is based on a two-step iterative process, 
the expectation step and the maximisation step, aimed at estimating the conditional 
likelihood function. 55 The choice of information variables is a crucial feature of the 
modelling, since conditions for applying the EM algorithm to the case of TVTP should 
be met. See Filardo (1998) for a discussion on the selecting criteria. 
The conditional density describing the observable endogenous variable, yt, is: 56 
f(Y, I s, = j, x,, Y, _,; 
9) =1 -(Y, - v; - A; y, -1 )2 exp 2 (5.3) 27 2 
54 The MSIAH representation of the model is not needed to establish different short-term pass-through, 
since they depend on the covariance matrix and not on the autoregressive parameters. Yet, it is an 
appropriate representation if the long-term pass-through is also regime-dependent. 
ss The FM algorithm for the estimation of the regime-dependent parameters and the TVTP is described 
here following Hamilton (1994) and Diebold, Lee, and Weinbach (1994). 
56 Assuming a first order autoregressive process. 
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for j=0,1. Vector 0 contains all parameters in the model (constant, autoregressive, 
error variance, and transition probabilities) and Yt_1 contains all observable (endogenous 
and exogenous) variables. Equations (5.3) and (3.5) will represent the Markov 
switching model for this time series system. The objective of the EM algorithm is to 
estimate the parameter vector 0 based on all the observable variables Yt. 57 
Since the regime state variable, st, is unobservable, the Markov chain process has to be 
inferred conditional on the observables. This conditional distribution of the regime, 
using the Bayesian condition, 58 generalizes from: 
P(s, = y1; e) = 
P(Y, j s, = J; 
e) 
(5.4) 
.f 
(Y,; e) 
The joint density in the numerator, using again the Bayesian condition, is given by: 
P(Y,, s, =J/x Y-l; 0)=f(Y, /s,, x Y, -1; 
e)P(s, =J/x,, Y_1; 9) (5.5) 
where the first term in the right hand side is the density of yt conditional on the regime 
st, (equation (5.3)) and the second term is the probability that given the observed data, a 
regime j happens. 
The unconditional density of yt, the denominator in equation (5.4), is found out by 
summing up all the possible realizations of the endogenous and the regimes. This is 
equivalent to get a weighted average for the endogenous variable conditional on the 
regime, with the weights being the probability of each regime happening. 
5' Alternatively, the Gibbs-sampling algorithm could approximate the joint and marginal distributions by 
sampling from conditional distributions. It is a Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation method. For a 
description (and examples). see Kim and Nelson (1999). 
58 For which, the probability of occurrence of an event A given an event B is: P(A/B) = P(A(1B)/P(B). 
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Once an initial regime happens as a starting point of the Markovian process, in order to 
forecast the next regime, the algorithm needs an assumption about the parameter vector 
0 (including the transition probabilities). Iteratively then, for each period t, it can be 
inferred what the most likely regime is to have generated the observed data. This is the 
expectations step of the algorithm. The optimal inference and forecast for the regime is 
a result of this filtering process. If the information used for forecasting the regime in 
each period t includes the observables up to that same period, the results are the filtered 
probabilities. A more efficient use of all available information is to base the forecasts in 
the observables for the entire sample set instead (the so-called smoothed probabilities). 
The log-likelihood function for 0 is calculated as a by-product of the expectation step of 
the algorithm as: 
L(B) = log f (y, / x, , 
Y, 
-,; 
B) 
t=I 
(5.6) 
This can then be maximised (the maximisation step) with respect to the parameters. 
Given some separability conditions on the likelihood function, the transition 
probabilities could then be calculated as the number of times the regime j followed the 
regime i divided by the number of times the regime i happened: 
T 
2ý P(s, = J, s, -, =i/Y,; 
0) 
- ! -2 T 
(5.7) 
P(st_, =i/Y; 9) 
r=z 
The other parameters can be estimated from the solution to the weighted OLS 
orthogonality conditions from the likelihood function. That is, from an OLS regression 
in which the regressors are weighted by the probability that they came from regime j. 
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With TVTP, the probabilities are a (logistic) function of some time series acting as 
leading indicators and so they are not constant anymore. For the EM algorithm to be 
applicable to this case, the leading indicators need to be exogenous to the unobserved 
regimes so that first order conditions derived from the log-likelihood still allow separate 
estimation of the probabilities' parameters from the rest of parameters. As Filardo 
(1998) points out, the difficulty that arises from including TVTP is the presence of the 
additional data (the informational variables) in the unconditional likelihood function. It 
implies the need for jointly estimating the parameters in the main equation and the 
transition probabilities. Closed-form solutions to the 2k non-linear first order conditions 
corresponding to the probability parameters will be found by linearly approximating the 
transition probabilities via Taylor expansions around those parameters. 59 
In order to ease the computation of the EM algorithm, this paper applies a Choleski 
transformation to the system in order to estimate the short-term pass-through directly . 
60 
Standard tests support the evidence from the second chapter that the interbank rate is 
exogenous to the system. Therefore, the next equations represent the transformed VAR 
to be estimated: 
if =ao(s, )+a, '(s, )ii_1+a2(s, )r, _, 
+6(s, )u, ' (5.8) 
rI = aö (s) + a;; (s, )i, + a;,, _, (s, 
)i, 
_, + a2 
(s, )r, _, + 6(s, 
)u; r (5.9) 
For the lending rate, the impact pass-through is given by the second parameter in 
equation (5.9) A Matlab code61 is used to implement the EM algorithm that estimates 
59 See Diebold, Lee, and Weinbach (1994) for details. 
60 Following Martinez (2002). 
61 It is based on a code from Martinez (2002). The author is thankful to her for sharing her codes. 
147 
the parameters, including TVTP. The initial values to start iterations depart from the 
linear estimates of the parameters. 62 
3.5.3.3 Informational variables and TVTP 
Considering possible departures from UIP, in equation (3.2), some interest rate spreads 
are included as leading indicators for the TVTP. Those spreads should contain 
information as to whether interest rates are driving apart from expected equilibrium. 
The further away from those expected values, the more likely a regime-shift would 
occur. The selected interest rate spreads are relevant proxies for country risk, 
devaluation risk (expectations), and credit risk. Depending on the choice, these spreads 
would be reflecting different types of risks that banks face in their optimising 
behaviour. Large increases in these risks might highlight a greater chance of changing 
into a higher volatility regime (such as those prevailing in a financial or currency crisis). 
The choice of leading indicators is based on the relationships that are usually considered 
by banks when setting their different interest rates (Claessens and Glaessner (1998)). 
For the money market rate, the two following equations, for foreign and local currency, 
are considered: 
iF =i* +country risk (5.10) 
iL =i* +country risk + devaluation risk (5.11) 
where 'F is the domestic interbank rate in foreign currency (US dollars), iL is the 
domestic interbank rate in local currency (Argentinean pesos), and i* is the foreign 
(Eurodollar) interbank rate. The difference between the two national rates gives a proxy 
for devaluation risk: 
o2 Although in few occasions the algorithm seems to find itself into a singularity (where the log likelihood 
becomes infinite), in most cases the values converges to seemingly local maximums by changing the 
starting values. See Hamilton (1994) for a discussion on this. In addition, several starting values were 
used to check convergence (Krolzig (1997)). 
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iL - iF = devaluation risk 
For the lending rates, two similar equations are considered: 
rF =r* +country risk 
rL =r* +country risk + devaluation risk 
(5.12) 
(5.13) 
(5.14) 
where rF is the domestic lending rate in foreign currency, rL is the domestic lending rate 
in local currency, and r* is the foreign lending rate. This paper assumes implicitly that 
all these three interest rates correspond to loans with similar credit risks. 63 Hence, the 
following interest rate spread is another proxy for devaluation risk: 
rL - rh = devaluation risk (5.15) 
Similarly, the following interest rate spreads could approximate country risk, 
devaluation risk, and credit risk: 
a) Country risk: 
b) Devaluation risk: 
c) Devaluation risk: 
d) Country risk plus devaluation risk: 
e) Credit risk: 
f) Country risk plus devaluation risk plus credit risk 
ZF - i* 
1L - ip 
rL - rF 
1L- i* 
rL-1L 
rL- I 
These spreads are considered alternatively as informational variables for the TVTP. 64 
Thus, having extra information on interest rates on loans denominated in dollars gives 
not only a proxy variable for some of the risks banks face, but also completes the 
63 This will not necessarily be the case, especially if the foreign country has a well-developed financial 
system and the local country is an emerging market. 
6' The spreads enter the estimation with one lag in order to validate conditions of the EM algorithm. 
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information on bank pricing. Since banks have the chance to operate in both currencies, 
the local-currency pass-through also incorporates information on this alternative bank's 
optimising behaviour. It is assumed implicitly that these leading indicators should 
indeed add to interpretability of the regime shifting behaviour. 
The interpretation of the sign and magnitude of the TVTP is as following. Under calm 
conditions in credit markets, an increase in country risk, in devaluation expectations, or 
in credit risk would reflect an increase in the probabilities of switching to a higher 
volatile regime. Thus, the parameters on the leading indicators in (30, from equation 
(3.13), are expected to be negative: the larger the spread, the lower the probability of 
remaining in the calm regime and, correspondingly, the larger chance of going into the 
higher volatility regime. In the case of being already in the unstable regime, the larger 
the spread, the more chances to remain in that state and the lower probability of 
returning to a calm regime, so that the parameters in (31 are expected to be positive. 
By testing whether the model with TVTP is superior to the model with CTP, the joint 
significance of the leading indicators is being assessed. A log LR test should confirm 
that these variables are jointly significant. Although it might turn out that none of the 
parameters in the leading indicators is individually significant. This result could be 
associated to the fact that after the collapse of the currency board, interest rates in 
dollars did not contain any longer useful information on the risks faced by banks. 
3.5.3.4 Main results: economic rationale 
The interest rate pass-through in Argentina, during the period 1993-2000, behaved 
nonlinearly, according to a Markov switching VAR with CTP (see Chapter 2). In high- 
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volatility market conditions, the short-term pass-through increased considerable for all 
lending rates. Moreover, those increases corresponded mainly to the financial crises that 
hit the Argentinean financial market (Mexico, South East Asia, and Russia). 
Estimating a Markov switching VAR with TVTP for a longer period (up to December 
2003) shows somewhat different results. There is definitely a nonlinear behaviour in 
both the short-term and the long-term interest rate pass-through. However, it seems that 
under periods of extreme market volatility and uncertainty, the response of lending rates 
to changes in the interbank rate is less pronounced on impact, but stronger on longer 
terms than under normal conditions. That is, the short-term pass-through decreases in 
the volatile regime (rather than increases), while in the long-term it might be stronger 
than in the calm regime. 
The period preceding the collapse of the exchange regime and the period afterwards 
were much more volatile, for all interest rates, than the periods corresponding to the 
international financial crises (except for the Mexican crisis). The up- and down- 
movements on the interbank rate during 2001 and 2002 were very much larger than the 
changes seen during the financial crises. 65 These patterns on the pass-through could 
suggest the existence of three regimes, rather than just two. A low volatile environment, 
with a normal pass-through; a highly volatile market, with a much higher pass-through; 
and a moderate volatile market, in which the pass-through reduces from the previous 
stage, but remains above the first one. Nevertheless, different specifications of the 
Markov switching VARs, and different sample periods, show clearly the presence of 
65 Abiad (2003) points out that in a nonlinear threshold model the sample-dependent nature of the 
threshold definition could lead to the "disappearing" of a crisis. In this case, the Markov switching model 
is dropping out the South East Asian and Russian crises from the volatile regime due to the much larger 
volatility during the currency board collapse. 
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tranquil periods and highly volatile periods associated to financial crises (either 
domestic or international). The three-regime Markov switching model does not 
contribute to distinguish among those periods, but it seems to be over fitting the data 
(and so it does not add interpretability to the results). 
When the estimation period is up to December 2000, the volatile period for the 
overdraft rate include the three major international financial crises and the last months 
of 2000. Sequentially including twelve additional months in the sample, up to 
December 2001,2002 and 2003, the Mexican crises remain classified in the volatile 
regime. However, the South-East Asian and Russian crises "disappear" from the volatile 
state to be included in the tranquil regime. The model clearly spots the turbulence and 
high uncertainty during most of 2001 and 2002 in the volatile regime (See Table 3.9). 
Similar regime classifications are found for interest rates on bills and personal loans. 
The Mexican crisis remains considered as a highly volatile period along with most of 
2001 and 2002 (See Table 3.10 and Table 3.11). 
An important feature to understand the apparent contradictory behaviour in the pass- 
through (accelerates or contracts under a financial crisis? ) is the time durability of the 
unstable conditions. The financial crises effects on interest rates were short-lived, 
except for the Mexican crisis (lasted several months). By the time the South East Asian 
and the Russian crises hit Argentina, the banking system was much more prepare to face 
the risks involved, due to the Mexican crisis experience (in which many banks 
collapsed). Price setting rapidly absorbed the instability, and the effects were more long- 
lived in terms of quantities rather than prices (the setback of credit, due to constraints in 
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external funds, for example). The pass-through increased substantially on those short- 
lived events, but only for very few months. 
On a different scenario, the abandoning of the currency board proved a large alteration 
of financial conditions that lasted for many months (for most of 2001 and 2002). Banks 
were adjusting their expectations continuously but they remained largely uncertain 
about the outcome of the breakdown. Therefore, in their price setting, banks followed 
interbank rate changes relatively less (although, in magnitudes, those changes were 
much larger than in previous periods). This reduced pass-through seems to be associated 
to the fact that movements in the interbank rate were extremely large in both directions 
(compared to previous periods). In many occasions, for the interbank rate, large 
increases were followed by sharp declines only to rise again abruptly (notice the saw- 
form in the interbank rate evolution, Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.3). Meanwhile, during the 
financial crises, there were initial increases that a few months later mean-reverted. 
It is also worth noticing than money market rate changes could also be followed by non- 
price adjustments in the products offer by banks (a quantity-related feature of the loan, 
for example), which could be alternate with price adjustments. In particular, considering 
the long recession period affecting Argentina before and during the breakdown of the 
currency board, some kind of credit crunch could have affected the financial sector. The 
excessive exposure to currency and term mismatches in their balance sheets might have 
made banks over conservative in taking new risks (Central Bank of Argentina (2004)). 
The Markov switching VARs with TVTP have up to four different sets of leading 
indicators to estimate for each lending rate. The model with one of those sets is 
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presented here. 66 On this model, the informational variables are proxies for credit risk 
and for country risk and devaluation risks (together). 67 A constant is also included to 
allow for the possibility of the representation to collapse to the Hamilton case. The 
graphs of the transition probabilities for each bivariate MS-VAR could be seen in 
Figure 3.9, Figure 3.10, and Figure 3.11. 
A first important feature is that the impact response and the longer effect are quite 
different for each lending rate considered (See Table 3.12). There is no homogenous 
behaviour across lending rates. Banks seem to optimise considering separable market 
segments. Given the time series properties for interest rates in Argentina, the 
transformed VAR representation has only one lag and, correspondingly, the long-term 
pass-through derived from this specification actually refers to quite few periods. 
The short-term pass-through for the overdraft rate is 0.318 under the calm regime, and 
0.244 under the volatile regime (See Table 3.13). These parameters are both significant 
at the usual levels. The long-term pass-through is 0.657 and 1.208, respectively. Note 
that, although the impact pass-through is greater under calm conditions, the longer-term 
effect is considerably higher in the volatile regime. As for the TVTP parameters, 
although they are jointly significant, none of them is individually significant. The signs 
of the parameters are the expected for the calm regime, but not for the volatile regime. 
For the interest rates on bills, the impact pass-through is 0.956 in the low-volatility 
regime and 0.638 in the high-volatility state. In the long-term, this difference remains 
66 Results with the other sets are quantitatively and qualitatively similar. They are available from the 
author upon request. 
67 Since this paper focuses on the pass-through, this paper presents only the results for the second 
equation of the transformed VAR (for the lending rate) in each case. 
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similar, with a larger pass-through for the calm regime than for the volatile state. The 
price setting behaviour in this case shows a near-complete impact effect of money 
market rate changes on the lending rate under normal conditions in the credit market, 
but less so when there is extremely high uncertainty in that market (even in the long- 
term). No individual parameter of the TVTP seems to be significant, (again, they are 
jointly significant) although the signs are as expected. 
Interest rates on personal loans show a much different behaviour from the other two 
rates. They follow changes in the interbank rate moderately in calm conditions, but do 
not follow at all changes under high volatile market conditions. The short-term pass- 
through is 0.472 in the first state68 and practically zero in the second one. The long-term 
effect shown an implausible over reaction, but this is due to the nearly-unity 
autoregressive parameter for this rate. TVTP parameters are jointly significant but not 
individually, and their signs are partly as expected. 
In order to assess how sensitive these results are to the sample size, the model has been 
estimated sequentially for samples up to 2000,2001,2002, and 2003 (See Table 3.14, 
Table 3.15, and Table 3.16). In all three cases, this procedure confirms that the pass- 
through increased when the high volatility regime is short-lived (such as during the 
international financial crises), but it rather decreases when it is a longer lasting state 
(such as during the collapse of the currency board). 
The interest rate that most closely follows the money market rate, the bill rate, is the one 
that shows a more regular pattern for the pass-through under both regimes over all 
68 This pass-through is between 32 and 36 percent from the Markov switching VARs with all the other 
sets of leading indicators. 
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samples. The short-term pass-through for the tranquil regime is between 0.925 and 
1.077, over all the different sample estimations. It indeed shows a very high impact 
effect of the interbank rate on this lending rate. This pass-through accelerates and 
overshoots up to 1.291 for the financial crisis episodes, but diminishes to around 0.64 
during the breakdown of the exchange rate system. The long-term pass-through shows 
overshooting up to 1.882 in the calm regime, but it surprisingly shows a less-than- 
complete effect under the volatile regime. 
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3.6 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Regime switching in the interest rate pass-through has been a feature of the financial 
system in Argentina. A multivariate approach using Markov switching models is 
appropriate to represent this nonlinearity in the pass-through. Furthermore, a number of 
interest rate spreads are associated to the probability of a given regime changing into 
another one, so that their information content on the risks banks face could signal a 
regime shift. Therefore, interest rate spreads are used to represent time-varying 
transition probabilities (as opposed to constant ones). Still, further empirical research 
should indicate if a particular set of spreads or some other alternative variables 
(representing bank risks) are more appropriate for this role. 
The credit market in Argentina is heterogeneous and banks seem to optimise their 
behaviour by market segments. Thus, different degrees of financial development 
impinge upon interest rates behaviour on every type of credit operation. The modern 
private enterprise sectors (towards which bills loans are directed) show a greater degree 
of response to shocks in the financial market conditions (represented by interbank rate 
changes). Their pass-through under normal conditions is stable and is very close to 
being complete on impact. Under uncertain market conditions, the pass-through 
increases if the shocks to the interbank rate are unusually (but not extremely) large and 
short-lived. On the contrary, the pass-through diminishes (in relative terms) if those 
shocks are rather extremely large and more long-lived. However, once a tranquil regime 
is reassumed, the pass-through returns to its normal levels. Those normal levels seem to 
have reached a high degree of efficiency in the transmission mechanism. 
Meanwhile, interest rates on personal loans reveal a much different behaviour in as 
much as its pass-through is rather low. These interest rates seem to reflect a different 
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structure on this market segment, by which banks are less prone to adjust to money 
market conditions, probably because they rather absorb changes in their margins. 
The nonlinearities in the interest rate pass-through in Argentina are associated to 
financial crises, either international or domestically generated, that affect the banking 
system to different degrees and to different variables (prices and/or quantities). They do 
not seem to be particularly associated to the business cycle, whose effects seem to be 
smoother or at least overshadow by the magnitude of the financial crises effects. 
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Figure 3.3 Nominal Interest Rates (pesos) in Argentina: 2001: 12-2003: 12 
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Figure 3.7 Spread between Each Lending Rate and the Interbank Rate 
60 
40 
20 
0 
.ýVl 
Personal 
Overdraft 
Bills 
-20 
40 
994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
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Figure 3.9 Regime Probabilities from MSVAR with TVTP Interbank - Overdraft 
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Figure 3.11 Regime Probabilities from MSVAR with TVTP Interbank - Personal 
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Tables 
Table 3.1 Number of Institutions with/without Operations per Interest Rate 
End of Fixed Interest Rates Variable Interest Rates 
Year Overdraft Bills Personal Bills Personal 
With Without Total With Without Total With Without Total With Without Total With Without Total 
1993 157 49 206 109 97 206 71 135 206 80 126 206 57 149 206 
1994 155 50 205 105 100 205 65 140 205 79 126 205 59 146 205 
1995 114 44 158 70 88 158 40 118 158 50 108 158 36 122 158 
1996 110 37 147 68 79 147 44 103 147 43 104 147 40 107 147 
1997 101 37 138 59 79 138 46 92 138 38 100 138 37 101 138 
1998 87 43 130 50 80 130 47 83 130 33 97 130 32 98 130 
1999 76 41 117 45 72 117 43 74 117 18 99 117 30 87 117 
2000 71 42 113 41 72 113 35 78 113 14 99 113 21 92 113 
2001 56 52 108 12 96 108 21 87 108 6 102 108 13 95 108 
2002 62 37 99 25 74 99 33 66 99 0 
2003 60 36 96 26 70 96 33 63 96 0 
As from January 2002, data on fixed interest rates correspond to fixed and re-negotiable rates together. 
Source: Monetary and Financial Statistics Department - Central Bank of Argentina 
Table 3.2 Loans to the Non-Financial Private Sector in Flows (in Millions) 
End of Peso-denominated loans Dollar-denominated loans 
year Overdraft Bills 1/ Personal 2/ Other Total Overdraft Bills 1/ Personal 2/ Other Total 
1993 5043 1060 504 640 7248 175 1428 66 1776 3445 
1994 5052 1332 533 470 7386 226 1710 43 1614 3593 
1995 3744 978 454 340 5515 366 1209 67 1361 3003 
1996 3949 891 530 423 5792 387 1001 267 1661 3316 
1997 4758 1283 631 576 7248 375 1427 234 1982 4017 
1998 4826 1324 845 422 7417 496 1468 182 1741 3887 
1999 4463 1747 786 401 7397 504 1082 176 1679 3441 
2000 3923 1445 757 341 6467 457 1580 156 1385 3577 
2001 2230 137 744 69 3180 1038 4512 72 692 6315 
2002 1792 89 1480 657 4018 20 1 0 109 130 
2003 2715 182 1807 842 5546 0 2 3 113 117 
I Loans up to 89 days, 
2 Loans up to 180 days. 
Source: Monetary and Financial Statistics Department - Central Bank of Argentina 
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Table 3.3 Loans to the Non-Financial Private Sector in Flows (in Percentage) 
End of Peso-denominated loans Dollar-denominated loans 
year Overdraft Bills 1/ Personal 2/ Other Total Overdraft Bills 1/ Personal 2/ Other Total 
1993 69.6 14.6 7.0 8.8 100.0 5.1 41.4 1.9 51.6 100.0 
1994 68.4 18.0 7.2 6.4 100.0 6.3 47.6 1.2 44.9 100.0 
1995 67.9 17.7 8.2 6.2 100.0 12.2 40.3 2.2 45.3 100.0 
1996 68.2 15.4 9.1 7.3 100.0 11.7 30.2 8.0 50.1 100.0 
1997 65.6 17.7 8.7 7.9 100.0 9.3 35.5 5.8 49.3 100.0 
1998 65.1 17.8 11.4 5.7 100.0 12.8 37.8 4.7 44.8 100.0 
1999 60.3 23.6 10.6 5.4 100.0 14.7 31.4 5.1 48.8 100.0 
2000 60.7 22.4 11.7 5.3 100.0 12.8 44.2 4.3 38.7 100.0 
2001 70.1 4.3 23.4 2.2 100.0 16.4 71.5 1.1 11.0 100.0 
2002 44.6 2.2 36.8 16.3 100.0 15.1 0.6 0.0 84.3 100.0 
2003 49.0 3.3 32.6 15.2 100.0 0.0 1.4 2.2 96.3 100.0 
1 Loans up to 89 days. 
2 Loans up to 180 days. 
Source: Monetary and Financial Statistics Department - Central Bank of Argentina 
Table 3.4 Comparative Statistics of Nominal Interest Rates in Argentina 
Interest rate 1993: 06 - 2000: 12 2001: 01 - 2003: 12 
Mean Std. Dev. s/m Correlation to Mean Std. Dev. s/m Correlation to 
m s Interbank m s Interbank 
Interbank 7.33 2.23 0.30 1.00 23.28 24.89 1.07 1.00 
Bills 14.23 4.57 0.32 0.62 29.04 17.46 0.60 0.91 
Overdraft 32.69 4.74 0.14 0.43 47.95 16.20 0.34 0.64 
Personal 38.5 4.92 0.13 0.02 46.62 13.16 0.28 -0.18 
Table 3.5 Standardized LR Test for MSI(2)-AR(1) against Null of Linearity 
Interest Hansen's p-value 
Rate LR* M=O M=l M=2 M=3 M=4 
Interbank 3.8955 0.0000 0.0010 0.0020 0.0040 0.0040 
Overdraft 4.3930 0.0010 0.0020 0.0040 0.0020 0.0060 
Bills 3.4954 0.0030 0.0060 0.0090 0.0110 0.0190 
Personal 5.6107 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0010 
1/ Implemented for grid 3. See details in Hansen (1992 and 1996). 
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Table 3.6 Standardized LR Test for Markov Switching Intercept Pass-Through 
Pass-Through Hansen's -value 
Equation LR* M=0 M=1 M=2 M=3 M=4 
Overdraft 2.6998 0.0750 0.1140 0.1510 0.1550 0.1530 
Bills 2.3859 0.1360 0.1420 0.1540 0.1590 0.1740 
Personal 2.0557 0.2470 0.2340 0.2690 0.2840 0.2960 
I/ Implemented for grid 3. See details in Hansen (1992 and 1996). 
Table 3.7 J-test for Markov Switching Intercept Pass-Through 
Pass-Through J-test Std. Error t-statistic p-value 
Equation 8 
Overdraft 1.0053 0.1042 9.6513 0.0000 
Bills 1.0487 0.1449 7.2383 0.0000 
Personal 1.0139 0.1593 6.3626 0.0000 
Table 3.8 Specification Selection for Markov Switching VAR 
Pass-Through Overdraft - Interbank Bills - Interbank Personal - Interbank 
Model Log LR Test 1/ Log LR Test 1/ Log LR Test 1/ 
Likelihood Likelihood Likelihood 
With CTP 
MSI(2)-VAR(l) -714.713 -805.199 -693.749 
MSIH(2)-VAR(l) -515.498 398.430 -549.592 511.213 -529.676 328.145 
MSIAH(2)-VAR(l) -515.153 0.689 -540.123 18.938 -522.459 14.435 
With TVTP 
MSIAH(2)-VAR(l) -506.723 16.860 -530.168 19.912 -518.964 6.990 
Appendix 
MSIAH(3)-VAR(l) 2/ -486.037 58.232 -499.572 81.103 -503.309 38.299 
MSIAH(2)-VARX(1) -792.932 -555.558 -813.488 -546.730 -861.935 -678.952 
I/ The test is estimated for each model against the null of the previous selected model. Except in the Appendix, where 
models are tested against the null of MSIAH(2)-VAR(1). 
2/ Although significant, it is not selected for economic interpretation. 
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Table 3.9 MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) Regime Classification for Overdraft Rate 
Regime 2: Estimation periods 
Events 1993: 06 - 2000: 12 1993: 06 - 2001: 12 1993: 06 - 2002: 12 1993: 06 - 2003: 12 
Other 1/ 1993: 7 - 1993: 8 
Mexico 1994: 12 - 1995: 6 1994: 12 - 1995: 3 1994: 12 - 1995: 3 1994: 12 - 1995: 4 
South-East Asia 1997: 11 - 1997: 11 
Russia 1998: 9 - 1998: 9 
Argentina: 2000: 11 - 2000: 12 2000: 11 - 2000: 12 2000: 11 - 2001: 3 2000: 12 - 2001: 5 
2001: 3 - 2001: 3 
2001: 7 - 2001: 7 2001: 7 - 2002: 12 2001: 7 - 2002: 5 
2001: 10 - 2001: 12 
2002: 7 - 2003: 3 
2003: 7 - 2003: 9 
Table 3.10 MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) Regime Classification for Bills Rate 
Regime 2: Estimation periods 
Events 1993: 06 - 2000: 12 1993: 06 - 2001: 12 1993: 06 - 2002: 12 1993: 06 - 2003: 12 
Other 1/ 1993: 7 - 1993: 10 1993: 8 - 1993: 8 
Mexico: 1994: 12 - 1995: 5 1994: 12 - 1995: 5 1994: 12 - 1995: 5 1994: 12 - 1995: 1 
1995: 3 - 1995: 5 
South-East Asia 
Russia 1998: 9 - 1998: 9 1998: 9 - 1998: 9 
Argentina: 2000: 11 - 2000: 12 2000: 11 - 2000: 12 
2001: 3 - 2001: 4 2001: 3 - 2001: 4 2001: 3 - 2001: 4 
2001: 7 - 2001: 12 2001: 7 - 2001: 12 2001: 7 - 2001: 12 
2002: 3 - 2002: 11 2002: 3 - 2002: 11 
2003: 3 - 2003: 3 
1/ This period does not correspond to any major international financial crisis. 
Table 3.11 MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) Regime Classification for Personal Rate 
Regime 2: Estimation periods 
Events 1993: 06 - 2000: 12 1993: 06 - 2001: 12 1993: 06 - 2002: 12 1993: 06 - 2003: 12 
Other 1/ 
Mexico 1994: 12 - 1995: 4 1994: 12 - 1995: 4 1994: 12 - 1995: 4 
South-East Asia 
Russia 
Argentina: 2000: 11 - 2000: 12 2000: 11 - 2001: 3 2000: 12 - 2001: 3 
2000: 12 - 2001: 12 2001: 7 - 2001: 11 2001: 7 - 2001: 11 
2002: 1 - 2002: 9 2002: 1 - 2002: 9 
2002: 11 - 2002: 11 2002: 11 - 2002: 11 
2003: 8 - 2003: 10 
1/ This period does not correspond to any major international financial crisis. 
168 
Table 3.12 Interest Rate Pass-Through in Argentina 
Short-term Long-term 
Regime 0 Regime I Regime 0 Regime 1 
Overdraft 0.318 0.244 0.657 1.208 
Bills 0.956 0.638 1.882 0.575 
Personal 0.472 0.001 9.870 -0.084 
Table 3.13 MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) with TVTP in Argentina: 1993: 06 - 2003: 12 
Overdraft t-stat Bills t-stat Personal t-stat 
Regime 
Intercept 3.292 3.71 -0.098 -0.18 -1.294 -1.04 
Interbank 0.318 2.74 0.956 8.75 0.472 2.49 
Interbank(-1) -0.233 -2.29 -0.851 -9.11 -0.144 -0.78 
Lending(-1) 0.870 47.36 0.944 25.52 0.967 45.27 
S. E. 0.748 6.76 1.080 7.71 1.571 7.36 
Regime 
Intercept 2.583 0.90 19.613 3.42 -3.425 -1.01 
Interbank 0.244 6.20 0.638 6.93 0.001 0.03 
Interbank(-1) -0.112 -3.02 -0.022 -0.11 0.009 0.28 
Lending(-1) 0.891 13.61 -0.071 -0.27 1.119 12.75 
S. E. 3.864 3.46 6.338 1.71 2.330 3.51 
TVTP 
Regime 0 
Constant 7.323 2.75 4.139 2.88 -0.618 -0.04 
InterLending (-1) -0.068 -0.86 -0.123 -1.11 0.226 0.55 
InterlocalUS (-1) -0.981 -1.69 -0.173 -1.55 -0.932 -0.92 
Regime 1 
Constant 6.329 2.65 -7.786 -1.20 9.847 0.93 
InterLending (-1) -0.145 -2.16 0.458 1.30 -0.312 -0.76 
InterlocalUS -1) 0.003 0.04 0.318 1.16 -0.074 -0.29 
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Table 3.14 Overdraft Rate Pass-Through: MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) with TVTP 
MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) with TVTP 
Variables Up to 2003 Up to 2002 Up to 2001 Up to 2000 
Parameter t-stat Parameter t-stat Parameter t-stat Parameter t-stat 
Regime 0 
Intercept 3.292 3.71 4.360 4.17 1.178 1.81 0.409 0.48 
Interbank 0.318 2.74 0.150 1.03 0.178 2.19 0.235 3.03 
Interbank(-1) -0.233 -2.29 -0.155 -1.40 -0.052 -0.83 -0.053 -0.65 
Overdraft(-1) 0.870 47.36 0.857 35.65 0.927 59.56 0.939 51.66 
S. E. 0.748 6.76 0.874 5.26 0.595 5.94 0.537 5.21 
Re ig me I 
Intercept 2.583 0.90 6.279 2.27 8.633 0.91 4.906 0.24 
Interbank 0.244 6.20 0.223 5.69 0.172 0.90 0.691 1.01 
Interbank(-1) -0.112 -3.02 -0.032 -0.58 -0.170 -1.50 -0.022 -0.01 
Overdraft(-1) 0.891 13.61 0.792 10.18 0.804 2.44 0.724 0.82 
S. E. 3.864 3.46 3.316 2.82 2.516 1.33 1.541 0.25 
TVTP 
Regime 0 
Constant 7.323 2.75 4.379 0.54 2.971 0.69 6.401 0.62 
InterOver (-1) -0.068 -0.86 0.078 0.28 0.036 0.22 -0.094 -0.22 
InterlocalUS (-1) -0.981 -1.69 -1.156 -1.70 -0.784 -1.57 -0.772 -0.76 
Regime I 
Constant 6.329 2.65 3.501 1.41 3.551 0.60 -1.817 -0.19 
InterOver (-1) -0.145 -2.16 -0.072 -1.01 -0.172 -0.75 0.029 0.08 
InterlocalUS (-1) 0.003 0.04 -0.022 -0.55 0.049 0.23 0.124 0.23 
Long Term 
Pass-Through 
Regime 0 0.657 -0.036 1.716 3.006 
Regime 1 1.208 0.920 0.012 2.420 
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Table 3.15 Bills Rate Pass-Through: MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) with TVTP 
Variables Up to 2003 Up to 2002 Up to 2001 Up to 2000 
Parameter t-stat Parameter t-stat Parameter t-stat Parameter t-stat 
Regime 0 
Intercept -0.098 -0.18 0.024 0.04 0.114 0.11 0.665 0.91 
Interbank 0.956 8.75 0.925 7.54 1.077 6.02 0.941 7.16 
Interbank(-1) -0.851 -9.11 -0.827 -8.01 -0.892 -9.28 -0.244 -1.26 
Bills(-1) 0.944 25.52 0.939 21.80 0.884 22.81 0.490 6.15 
S. E. 1.080 7.71 1.075 7.14 1.006 6.73 0.570 2.32 
Regime 
Intercept 19.613 3.42 18.808 3.16 15.403 1.42 -4.014 -1.58 
Interbank 0.638 6.93 0.657 6.31 0.772 3.79 1.291 6.24 
Interbank(-1) -0.022 -0.11 0.036 0.17 -0.244 -0.35 -0.512 -3.01 
Bills(-1) -0.071 -0.27 -0.140 -0.53 0.028 0.03 0.926 8.06 
S. E. 6.338 1.71 6.593 1.61 4.854 1.11 1.257 2.81 
TVTP 
Regime 0 
Constant 4.139 2.88 3.531 2.01 4.578 1.71 2.618 0.78 
InterBill (-1) -0.123 -1.11 -0.061 -0.36 -0.016 -0.05 0.162 0.44 
InterlocalUS (-1) -0.173 -1.55 -0.132 -0.98 -0.843 -1.38 -0.993 -0.77 
Regime I 
Constant -7.786 -1.20 -17.750 -0.65 0.586 0.15 -3.131 -0.48 
InterBill (-1) 0.458 1.30 1.167 0.73 -0.158 -0.38 0.809 0.70 
InterlocalUS (-1) 0.318 1.16 0.750 0.61 0.073 0.36 -0.930 -0.72 
Long-Term 
Pass-Through 
Regime 0 1.882 1.609 1.590 1.364 
Reime 1 0.575 0.607 0.543 10.572 
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Table 3.16 Personal Rate Pass-Through: MSIAH(2)-VAR(l) with TVTP 
Variables Up to 2003 
Parameter t-stat 
Up to 2002 
Parameter t-stat 
Up to 2001 
Parameter t-stat 
Up to 2000* 
Parameter t-stat 
Regime 0 
Intercept -1.294 -1.04 1.520 1.02 2.613 1.66 2.327 1.30 
Interbank 0.472 2.49 -0.251 -1.61 -0.005 -0.04 -0.025 -0.15 
Interbank(-1) -0.144 -0.78 0.129 1.11 -0.074 -0.42 -0.028 -0.13 
Personal(-1) 0.967 45.27 0.977 34.05 0.940 34.19 0.942 31.45 
S. E. 1.571 7.36 1.179 6.03 1.087 6.69 1.184 6.53 
Regime I 
Intercept -3.425 -1.01 -1.109 -0.25 -9.002 -0.71 -22.158 -0.15 
Interbank 0.001 0.03 -0.007 -0.13 -0.005 -0.10 0.343 0.24 
Interbank(-1) 0.009 0.28 0.031 0.83 -0.031 -0.26 -0.139 -0.10 
Personal(-1) 1.119 12.75 1.057 9.73 1.297 3.35 1.537 0.42 
S. E. 2.330 3.51 2.310 2.55 0.965 0.49 0.142 0.09 
TVTP 
Regime 0 
Constant -0.618 -0.04 -1.015 -0.25 -2.048 -0.15 n. a n. a 
InterPers(-1) 0.226 0.55 0.173 1.14 0.195 0.43 n. a n. a 
InterlocalUS (-1) -0.932 -0.92 -0.262 -1.54 -0.110 -0.14 n. a n. a 
Regime 1 
Constant 9.847 0.93 4.561 1.14 7.304 0.54 n. a n. a 
InterPers(-1) -0.312 -0.76 -0.098 -0.95 -0.169 -0.55 n. a n. a 
InterlocalUS (-1) -0.074 -0.29 -0.073 -0.81 -0.155 -0.26 n. a n. a 
Long Term 
Pass-Through 
Regime 0 9.870 -5.233 -1.318 -0.899 
Reime 1 -0.084 -0.427 0.122 -0.379 I* It corresponds to a model with different leading indicators for the TVTP. The original did not converge in estimation 
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CHAPTER 4 
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4 REGIME SWITCHING IN INTEREST RATE PASS- 
THROUGH AND DYNAMIC BANK MODELLING 
WITH RISKS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Interest rates reflect banks' features on market structure, operating costs, and risk 
management as well as characteristics from loan demand and deposit supply. These 
microeconomic factors explain differences both in interest rates (lending and deposit) 
and in the corresponding interest rate pass-through (from money market rates to retail 
rates). ' Banks consider these structural factors in the market segments in which they 
operate but set their interest rates based on the information contents of the short-term 
money market (interbank) rate they take as reference. 
In particular, when a nonlinear pass-through is considered, the regime-switching 
behaviour might not be linked necessarily to those factors but to the money market rate 
instead. Hence, if the interest rate pass-through were indeed regime-switching then 
exploring where this nonlinearity comes from and how it affects banking optimisation is 
a relevant aspect of the transmission mechanism analysis. This paper addresses this 
discussion from a theoretical perspective (though it conducts an empirical application 
too). The objective is to build a theoretical model of dynamic bank optimisation that 
provides rationale to a regime-switching behaviour in the interest rate pass-through. 
Two main sources of nonlinearity in the interest rate pass-through are considered in this 
paper. The first one operates through a nonlinear money market rate. A regime- 
switching behaviour in the interbank rate will induce a nonlinear pattern in the pass- 
' The average level of those rates in aggregate markets will, of course, be more associated to 
macroeconomic factors, such as the interbank rate itself. 
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through by prompting regime switches in the risk premiums considered in bank 
optimisation. The data generating process for the interbank rate could be nonlinear if 
there is a regime-switching behaviour in monetary policy (interest rate smoothing vs. 
inflation fighting), in devaluation expectations (financial crises affecting agents' belief 
through uncovered interest parity), or in the term structure of interest rate (associated to 
business cycle phases). The second mechanism operates through asymmetric adjustment 
costs, which could induce a nonlinear pass-through even if the interbank rate is a linear 
stochastic process. The latter mechanism has been studied somewhere else, 2 so it is only 
briefly discussed here as an extension to the main model. 
This research tries to answer two main questions. On one hand, it tries to analyse what 
kind of nonlinearity the pass-through displays. The goal is to derive a theoretical model 
of bank optimisation that could accommodate both a (Markov) switching regime 
process in the interbank rate and a nonlinear interest rate pass-through. The model 
should clarify the transmission mechanism by which a regime shifting nature of the 
interbank rate is connected to a regime switching behaviour in the pass-through. On the 
other hand, this paper discusses why the interest rate pass-through is quite 
heterogeneous by market segments despite feasibly sharing the same initial impulse (the 
nonlinearity in the interbank rate). 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple static model of 
banking optimisation, which has been used often as theoretical support for deriving a 
linear interest rate pass-through. In Section 3, resorting to a nonlinear specification of 
the interbank rate and to dynamic modelling incorporates the basis for a regime- 
2 Hofmann and Mizen (2004), for instance, discuss an application of asymmetric adjustment costs to show 
a nonlinear behaviour in the transmission of money market shocks to retail rates in UK. 
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switching pass-through. Theoretical derivation of an actual nonlinear pass-through is 
presented in Section 4. This section discusses important extensions to the basic dynamic 
model, such as the inclusion of risks and product differentiation. Empirical applications 
to French and German data are reported in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
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4.2 LINEAR PASS-THROUGH: STATIC MODEL 
Along with a standard Monti-Klein-type static model of banking optimisation, it is 
assumed here that banks mainly provide two kinds of financial securities to the private 
sector: deposits (supplied by households) and loans (demanded by firms). 3 Banks obtain 
revenues by providing those securities, and incur management and operating costs. 
Additionally, banks get income (expense) from participating in the short-term money 
market. Crucially, the money market short-term rate is the banks' opportunity cost of 
funding and thus, it is the reference rate upon which banks will form their expectations 
in a dynamic context. Yet, market expectations on the interbank rate do not play any 
role in this static model. Banks' managers are assumed risk neutral. 4 
Empirically, in order to estimate accurately the pass-through for different retail rates, a 
correlation analysis might be conducted to determine what interbank rate is the closest 
related to a particular retail rate. 5 However, whether an individual bank takes different 
money market rates as opportunity cost or refers to only one is arguably. In any case, 
short-term interest rates and the interbank rate should relate to each other through a 
suitable term structure. In theoretical models, this distinction is unnecessary and the 
money market rate that is taken as reference is the relevant one for bank optimisation. 
3 Freixas and Rochet (1997) review most of this section's behavioural descriptions. 
a Hence, the optimisation function would be linear in profits. Though the assumption is important for the 
maximising function, it is not for the understanding of the firm. See Santomero (1984) for a discussion of 
risk-neutrality and risk-averse behaviour in bank optimisation. As King (1986) argues, risk neutrality 
seems an obvious assumption since bank managers have a full range of possibilities for portfolio 
diversification. 
5 Bondt (2002), for example, studies correlation between retails rates and money market rates both in 
levels and in first differences. He alternatively includes short-term interbank rates up to 12 months and 
government bond yields at different long-term maturities. 
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A symmetric Cournot oligopoly is assumed as market structure. 6 7 Therefore, since 
there are many banks competing in the market subject to each other's actions, demand 
for loans and supply of deposits for each bank are not perfectly elastic. 
Correspondingly, interest rates depend not only on the level of loans and deposits a 
bank provides but also on the levels of these securities the other banks issue. Bank 
capital is given and exogenous. 8 Neither credit risk nor other risks are considered. The 
same intermediation technology is available to all banks. 
4.2.1 Optimisation proces 
The profit function an individual bank optimises is of the type: 
n' (L,. , D, 
) = rL L; + rM - rJ, D; -C (L, , D; 
) (2.1) 
where rL =f (L; +j Lj and rD =f (D; +ID, ') are functions (rather than just values) 
of the amount of loans (deposits) the individual bank offers and the amount all the other 
banks offer optimally. Also, 7E are bank profits, i is the i-th bank in the market; rL is the 
interest rate on loans (as a function, it is the inverse loan demand), L; is the volume of 
loans for the individual bank, and L`j represent optimal loans from the other j banks 
in the market. Likewise, rD is the interest rate on deposits (as a function, it is the inverse 
deposit supply), D; is the volume of deposits for the individual bank, and I D. - stands 
for optimal deposits from the rest of banks in the market. Finally, r is the short-term 
money market rate; M represents net interbank funds supply by the bank; and C (L,, D; 
6 Although original contributions by Klein (1971) and Monti (1972) did not focus on oligopoly in the 
banking industry, their models are readily applicable to this case. 
The symmetric feature guarantees that marginal costs are equalized and that the industry cost of 
production is optimised. For details on alternative general oligopoly models see Tirole (1988). 
8 Although capital constraint could be explicitly modelled, it is assumed that banks hold no more that the 
institutionally, required amount of equity capital. This is assumed a given amount and it is not explicitly 
included in the model. 
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represents the (management and operating) cost function. All these functions are 
continuously differentiable up to any order. 
Banks maximise profits subject to their balance sheet constraint: R+L=D, where R 
represents reserve funds, made up of cash reserves (as a proportion a from deposits) and 
interbank funds. Notice here that the subscript i has been obviated. This constraint could 
be incorporated directly in the profit function by representing the net interbank funds as 
M= (1- a) D-L. Thus, the profit function turns into: 
z(L1, D; ) =[ri -r]L, +[r(1-a)-rv]D, -C(L1, D, ) 
The first order conditions (FOC) are: 9 
(r 
-Y)-ac/aL 
YL 
1 
neL(r; 
(2.2) 
(2.3) 
r(1-a)-rr, -aC/aD 
_1 
rD neJ) ( rl, 
(2.4) 
where n is the number of banks in the market (considered as a market power indicator), 
EL (rL) is the elasticity of loan demand and ED (r*) is the elasticity of deposit supply. 
The amount of loans and deposits offered are such that the financial margin inversely 
depends both on price elasticity and on the market structure. If the cost function is 
separable, the maximisation problem is also separable by markets (credits and deposits). 
Each interest rate is independent of the value the other one takes. 1° The Cournot 
equilibrium implies that the optimal amount of loans (deposits) an individual bank 
9 See, for derivation details, Freixas and Rochet (1997). 
10 If credit risk (probability of default) is considered, it introduces a relationship between loans and 
deposits (even if the function cost is separable). See Freixas and Rochet (1997). 
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issues is equal to the total market loans (deposits) divided by the number of banks: 
L; =L *In and D; ' D* In. 
4.2.2 Interest rate pass-through 
From these generic FOC, it is usually derived the relationship between the lending 
(deposit) rate and the interbank rate. " Assuming a (linear) cost function of the type 
C (L,, D, ) = OLL; + ODD, , the lending and deposit rates could be represented as: 
ri =11 r+ 
11 
OL (2.5) 
1- 1- 
nEL neL 
D- (2.6) rr+Oo 
1+ 1 1+ 
1 
nEr) nEv 
If constant elasticities were assumed, it could be shown that both pass-through, for the 
lending and the deposit rates, are linear. Importantly, microeconomic factors such as 
demand and supply elasticities (£L and ED, respectively) and market structure (n) 
determine the pass-through. Since the model is static, there is no distinction between 
short-term and long-term pass-through. 
This theoretical framework justifies the empirical approach of estimating the pass- 
through in an equation containing both the lending (deposit) rate and the interbank rate, 
and assuming, implicitly or explicitly, constant costs in either equation (2.5) or (2.6). 
The time series properties of the variables are considered by including current and 
lagged values of the lending (deposit) rate and the interbank rate either in levels or first- 
Manzano and Galmes (1996) discuss about the type of these relationships base on the loan demand and 
deposit supply functions. 
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differences (and either in a single equation or a system). Once a measure of the pass- 
through is obtained, the nature of the loan demand and the deposit supply functions are 
evaluated along with the cost function properties, so that these microeconomic variables 
explain differences in pass-through among market segments or countries (often in a 
panel data approach). 
A crucial feature of these models is that the short-term money market rate is taken as 
exogenous to the system. Furthermore, even if the interbank rate is determined 
endogenously in a general equilibrium approach, 12 it is yet represented linearly. The 
generally accepted stylised fact for the interest rate pass-through is that it is sluggish in 
the short term, but complete in the long term. 
4.2.3 Observations and caveats 
The intuition behind the model is clear. In the banking industry, if the market structure 
were competitive, interest rates are set at levels where intermediation margins equal 
marginal costs for banks. More realistically, if the market structure were not perfectly 
competitive, those financial margins (net of costs) would depend inversely on the 
market structure and demand (supply) characteristics. Thus, differences in the interest 
rates banks charge for alternative market segments might be due to differences in 
demand characteristics (one segment demand being more elastic than other), in market 
structure (competition might be scarcer in some segments), or in management costs 
(differences between a modern-firm sector and a micro-enterprise segment). This simple 
model should be readily extended to include heterogeneity in both credit and deposit 
products. If the bank provides, for example, two different types of loans, and the 
12 As in Bolton and Freixas (2004). 
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demand for them and their costs are separable, then the optimisation process will reflect 
two subsidiary pricing problems. 13 
Despite the fact that this type of model is highly useful on displaying important bank 
patterns, it is confronted with some rigidity once the dynamic nature of the banking 
system is considered. Most strategic decisions and market expectations are time 
sensitive and, thus, no static model could capture accurately interest rate adjustments 
that accommodate those factors. Paisley (1994), for instance, in a study for the United 
Kingdom, recognizes the possibility of banks smoothing interest rate changes due to 
switching costs or asymmetric information cost. 14 Nevertheless, although results from 
the empirical error correction approach show some degree of smoothing rates, the study 
fails to report nonlinearities because of the static theoretical model assumed. 
Furthermore, a static microeconomic model of banking, Green (1998) argues, will fail 
to distinguish between market-related interest rates and posted rates in the common 
two-tier pricing system banks operate. While banks try to adjust their posted rates 
following changes in their market rates (to avoid interest rate risks), the static modelling 
does not capture the difference between these rates. Hence, the interest rate management 
function is missing in the static approach. 
Recent research has included some kind of nonlinearity into the bank optimisation 
process by considering asymmetric bank behaviour as a response to shocks in the 
13 Therefore, the FOC will be similar to the single-type loan case. 
14 Following a Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argument by which, with high nominal interest rates, banks 
might avoid passing through entirely a change in a wholesale rate to its retail rates because of fears of 
attracting high-risk new borrowers. 
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interbank rate in a more dynamic approach. 15 That is, there is a need to represent an 
intertemporal bank optimisation to capture the presence of adjustment costs that might 
be asymmetric. Indeed, the pass-through might be different depending on whether the 
money market rate increases or decreases or, alternatively, the spread between the retail 
rate and the interbank rate widens or shortens. Those asymmetries are most generally 
associated to some kind of menu cost rationale. 16 
Notwithstanding that research, it is rather scarce the literature that associates feasible 
nonlinearities in the pass-through to regime switching behaviour in the interbank rate 
itself. Introducing dynamics into the bank's optimisation process could indeed account 
for other forms of nonlinearities. In particular, the presence of a regime switching 
behaviour in the pass-through could be exposed theoretically once dynamics is 
appropriately introduced in the model and the presence of credit and other risks is 
accounted for. Conversely, lineal modelling of the pass-through under the presence of 
switching regimes in the interbank rate could induce over- or under-statement of interest 
rates' responses to financial shocks. 
15 See, for instance, Hofmann and Mizen (2004) for the UK; Frost and Bowden (1999) for New Zealand; 
and Neumark and Sharpe (1992) for the US. Green (1998) suggests asymmetric adjustment in banks' 
posted rates as a response to changes in market-related rates (directly determined by the bank, but at 
market levels). 
16 Toolsema and Schoonbeek (1999) warn that introducing asymmetries in the cost functions of the banks 
or in their way of conduct (i. e. Stackelber representation of a leader and a follower) may imply 
counterintuitive effects on the individual bank's interest rates from shocks to the interbank rate. 
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4.3 NONLINEAR INTEREST RATES: DYNAMIC MODEL 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a theoretical rationale for a regime-switching 
behaviour in the interest rate pass-through. This goal derives initially from the need to 
explain empirical results for the case of Argentina. Empirical evidence presented in the 
previous chapters show that the interest rate pass-through for Argentina has been 
subject to regime shifting. One main source of that nonlinear behaviour has been the 
presence of nonlinearities in the shot-term money market rate associated to financial 
crisis events. Market measures (interest rate spreads) of the risks banks face signalled 
those regime shifts alongside variations in market uncertainty. Pricing variables, rather 
than non-pricing quantity-related variables, have been assumed to reflect promptly how 
banks expectations responded to those shifting market conditions. Accordingly, a 
nonlinear econometric approach was followed to capture such a regime-switching 
pattern in the pass-through in Argentina. In order to make the analysis complete, those 
feasible nonlinearities in the interest rate pass-through should then need to be 
considered within the theoretical framework of the banking optimisation process. 
In order to study the possibility of regime shifting in interest rate pass-through, this 
section introduces dynamics into the bank modelling. That is, each bank optimises its 
management subject to an ever-changing environment. There are, of course, a number 
of situations and market characteristics that make necessary to represent this behaviour 
as a (discrete- or continuous-time) dynamic optimisation problem. Bank contracts are 
usually design to last many periods, and the very essential nature of the business, 
providing liquidity and intermediating funds, are better understood in a dynamic set up. 
Dia (2004) argues, for example, that the long-term relationship established between a 
bank and its clients imposes indeed a need for a dynamic representation. Furthermore, 
Von Thadden (2000) discusses liquidity provision as a dynamic phenomenon. 
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Designing deposit contracts turns into an incentive-contracting problem when the 
possibility of repeated investment and ongoing uncertainty give way to arbitrage 
behaviour from depositors with potentially destabilizing effects to the bank. 
In departing from the static model, an initial approach would be to consider all variables 
as times series and redefine correspondingly the optimisation problem. Regarding the 
dynamic representation, it is crucially important to define a state variable that includes 
at least an extra period. Most standard dynamic bank models do so by introducing 
(quadratic) adjustment costs in addition to the management and operating (linear or 
quadratic) costs. '? Other models introduce dynamics by explicitly modelling the 
components on the asset and security sides of the balance sheet as time processes (either 
on expected value of the variables or through lags). 18 Some others include a dynamic 
constraint, which relate both sides of the balance sheets through time. 19 Most of these 
models consider the interbank rate exogenous to the system and either do not explicitly 
mention its dynamic properties or refer to it as a linear function (possible a random- 
walk-type generating process). 
For this research, the first approach is adopted and so the dynamic model considers a 
discrete-time infinite-horizon optimisation problem with quadratic adjustment costs. It 
keeps the exogeneity of the interbank rate as an operating feature, but assumes a broader 
description of its data generating process. The model represents an (Cournot) oligopoly 
market structure for the banking industry. Nonetheless, since the focus of this paper is 
on the interest rate pass-through, the analysis focuses on interest rates rather than on the 
amount of loans and deposits (the actual control variables). 
" Cosimano (1988) and Elyasiani, Kopechy, and van Hoose (1995). 
'g Van den Heuvel (2002), for instance. 
19 In particular, Dia (2004). 
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4.3.1 Optimisation constraints 
The bank's main activities are still providing liquidity and intermediating funds to and 
between its clients. Thus, on the asset part of the balance sheet, the bank can either 
invest in loans or in the money market after holding aside compulsory reserves (if 
any). 20 In general, of course, banks could also invest in other securities such as 
(corporate or government) bonds in order to diversify their portfolio. All the same, 
given their main intermediation function, it is assumed that the interbank funds banks 
hold incorporate such asset-management options. On the liabilities end, the bank holds 
deposits and capital (which is now explicitly introduced). The bank lending activity is 
constrained by capital adequacy regulations and it is assumed that it will hold exactly 
the amount of capital that satisfies this condition . 
21 Again, generally, banks could also 
issue non-deposit debt but, for simplicity, it has been restricted to deposits. Besides, 
considering capital as net worth (rather than just equity-based), it might also include 
subordinate debt. 22 
Consequently, the following constraints apply to the bank optimisation process: 
Balance sheet constraint L, + M, + R, = D, + K, (3.1) 
Bank reserves constraint R, = aD, (3.2) 
Capital adequacy constraint K, = bL, (3.3) 
where K, is the bank's capital, and b is the capital requirement factor. For simplicity, as 
in Schneider (2001), net interbank positions and bank loans are one-period. 
20 Either as cash in its balance sheet or deposits in the central bank. 
21 As in Bolton and Freixas (2004). In general, the condition is K1 ? bL, , with the amount of 
loans being 
a risk-weighted measure which, in strict sense, would be different to the variable L, in the rest of the 
optimisation problem. Here, for simplicity, all risk categories are weighted similarly. 
22 See Van den Heuvel (2002) for a discussion focused on the bank capital channel of monetary policy 
based on the capital requirements of the Basle Accord. 
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No particular functions or constraints are assumed for the demand of loans or supply of 
deposits. Still, it is assumed that both variables are homogenous in the sense that there is 
only one type of loans (demanded by firms with real investment opportunities) and one 
type of deposits (supplied by households). 23 Since the bank operates in a market 
structure in which it determines its optimal amount of loans and deposits by considering 
his own and other banks' choices, the demand for loans the bank faces is downward 
sloping and its supply of deposits is upward sloping. 
4.3.2 The money market rate 
The time series properties of the money market rate impinge on lending and deposit 
rates to determine the nature of their relationship. 24 The interest rate pass-through is not 
only affected by structural microeconomic factors but also essentially by expectations 
on (and recent history of) the interbank rate. Since no exact form of loan demand and 
deposit supply are known a priori, the pass-through relationship derived from generic 
FOC has been usually assumed linear. Moreover, what has been importantly assumed 
linear is the interbank rate itself (by far the usual assumption in the empirical literature). 
It is not surprising then that a linear pass-through is obtained. Alternatively, some 
studies have introduced nonlinearity in the form of asymmetric adjustment costs to 
shocks, but still keeping linearity in the money market rate. 25 Still, there is increasing 
evidence in the literature that both short- and long-term interest rates (from the yield 
curve) are characterized by stochastic regime switching processes. 26 
`' Dia (2004) makes the corporate sector to keep deposits in banks as a compensating balance to its loans, 
such as that a dynamic relationship between deposits and loans is introduced. 
24 A proxy for this interest rate could also be found in a bank's rate structure. Mester (1993) argues, for 
example, that prime rates play the role of a base rate in the domestic loan rate structure, with a competing 
bank following closely a change in the prime rate of a relevant bank. 
25 Hofmann and Mizen (2004) assume, for example, a random walk for the base rate. 
26 See, among others, Ang and Bekaert (2002); Bansal and Zhou (2002); Dahlquist and Gray (2000); 
Driffill, Kenc, and Sola (2003); Erlandsson (2002); Evans (1998), Garcia and Perron (1996); Gray (1996); 
and Hamilton (1988). 
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Economic processes such as the business cycle or economic policies such as central 
monetary decisions have indeed feasible regime switching effects on interest rates. In 
fact, the influential seminal paper by Hamilton (1988) suggests a regime shifting 
behaviour in the term structure of interest rates, for US data, because of the effects from 
the monetary experiment of October 1979.27 Switches in regime are occasional, discrete 
changes in the parameters governing the stochastic behaviour of the interest rates in the 
yield curve (both, as univariate processes and as bivariate relationships between short- 
and long-term rates). Including those shifts in a yield curve model may, for example, 
render validity to the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates 
(which a linear model often fails to do). 
Hamilton refers to three potential sources of nonlinearity in the stochastic behaviour of 
interest rates from the yield curve: nonlinearity in the utility function; nonlinearity 
coming from Jensen's inequality (when comparing yields from different terms); and 
optimal forecasts of future short-term rates being a nonlinear (rather than linear) 
function of past short rates. He focuses on the last source and shows indeed that for the 
period when the conduct of monetary policy changed, 28 short-term interest rates were 
much higher and more volatile than in any other period in the sample. 
An empirical application by Gray (1996) of a generalized regime-switching model (that 
includes GARCH in the specification) nests standard interest rate models as special 
cases and allows time-varying regime-dependent parameters. The flexibility provided 
by a regime-switching model allows, for instance, a particular interest rate to have 
different speeds of mean reversion to different long-run means and at different variances 
27 This paper pioneered the methodology of regime-switching modelling of financial time series. 
28 From October 1979 to October 1982, the Fed switched from targeting short-term interest rates to 
targeting non-borrowed reserves. 
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during a given sample period. Gray shows that his model improves over the linear 
equivalent in terms of data fit and out-of-sample forecasting of short-term interest rates. 
Nonlinearity in short-term interest rates is usually justified, when included in theoretical 
models, as being flexible enough to replicate empirical stylised facts for interest rates 
(namely mean-reversion and leptokurtosis) that are not sufficiently accounted for by a 
linear approach (even after including conditional heteroskedasticity). Gray (1996) 
argues that if the probabilities of regime shifting are linked to the interest rate level, then 
shifts from one regime to another may drive the empirically observed mean reversion 
and conditional heteroskedasticity in the short-term rate. Actually, he finds that US 
short term interest rates follow a random walk during low-volatility periods and a mean- 
reversion process during occasional periods of high rates and high volatility. 29 Besides, 
effects from individual shocks are greater on impact during highly volatile periods but 
are longer lasting during calm periods. This substantially different economic behaviour 
across regimes for short term interest rates could only be modelled by introducing 
regime switching (often with time-varying transition probabilities). 
Along the general concept of adaptability of agents to an ever-changing environment, 
Dahlquist and Gray (2000) argue that it is feasible that the economic and political 
mechanism behind the data generating process for interest rates may indeed be time- 
varying. That implies that both the parameters of an interest rate model and the structure 
of the model itself may change with the economic and political environment affecting 
the financial markets. In particular, agents' expectations on exchange rate arrangements 
(in the euro area, for example) provide ground for interest rate differentials to reflect 
29 See also Dahlquist and Gray (2000) for the case of Germany. 
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credibility shocks (working through the interest rate parity relationship). Thus, they 
argue, in modelling interest rate changes, a measure of realignment expectations is 
captured. The volatility, the level, and the speed-of-adjustment are all higher when the 
financial markets increase their expectation of realignment. 30 Clearly then, the 
stochastic behaviour governing the data generating process for short-term interest rates 
is dependent on these expectations (regimes) and the monetary policy response they 
originate, so that modelling it through a linear approach would end up inappropriate. 
One of such lineal models is the standard affine-type Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) model 
of the term structure of interest rates. The CIR model is an intertemporal general 
equilibrium asset-pricing model in which expectations, risk aversion, investment 
opportunities, and consumption preferences are all considered in determining bond 
prices. The differential equation that describes the interest rate dynamics is thus 
consistent with maximising behaviour and rational expectations: 31 
dr = a(9-r)dt+6 rdz (3.4) 
where a is the mean reversion parameter that indicates the adjustment speed; 8 is the 
implied long-term mean for the interbank rate; a is the variance (serves as a scale 
factor) of unexpected interest rate changes; and z is a Wiener process. Notice that the 
volatility of the interbank rate is parameterised as a function of its (square root) levels 
and so it does produce conditional heteroskedasticity. 
32 33 
30 For Germany, though, the standard deviation of interest rate changes is comparatively (to other weak 
currency countries) not very large. Empirically, it might be the case that those switches in regime are 
frequent but short-lived and so appropriate frequency data is needed to infer the shifting dates. 
31 See details of the underlying equilibrium model and the continuous-time version model of the term 
structure in Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985). 
32 The limiting distribution of r, is N(9, o /2(x), so that the larger value of a the tighter the stochastic 
p3rocess is bound to its long-term mean. See James and Webber (2000), Chapter 3, for details. 
The square root on the interbank rate ensures that the rate do not go negative. 
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Regarding the CIR model, Bansal and Zhou (2002) point out that much of its poor 
empirical performance (at lest for US data) is due to the fact that it does not consider the 
possibility of discrete changes in regime. 34 Therefore, they argue, a regime switching 
representation of the interbank rate could account for empirical violations of the 
expectations hypothesis, observed conditional volatility, and conditional correlation 
across yields in the term structure of interest rates. Indeed, for US data, they find regime 
shifts closely associated to business cycle phases. Similarly, Erlandsson (2002) shows 
that, even when accounting for conditional heteroskedasticity, a standard univariate 
model (CIR-type) does not describe well Swedish interest rate data. Hence, he resorts to 
a regime switching specification to fit the data and improve in the forecasting ability of 
the model. The relevance of extending the model by introducing a regime-switching 
mechanism is then obvious in economic and empirical terms. 
This research's goal is to explore the consequences for the pass-through of including a 
regime shifting interbank rate in the banking optimisation process. For that, this paper 
considers a discrete-time version of the CIR model for the interbank rate (still 
exogenous to the bank) and extends it to accommodate regime-switching behaviour. 
That is, the model incorporates a Markov switching representation into a standard mean 
reverting square root process. 35 The money market rate is assumed to follow a 
stochastic process switching between two regimes (0 and 1). A Markov chain with fixed 
transition probabilities governs the unobservable regime variable (the discrete states are 
34 Evans (1998) argues, though, that by including regime switching, the evidence against the expectations 
hypothesis is considerably weakened but it is not entirely eliminated. Therefore, he combines it with a 
general equilibrium bond pricing model which generates time-varying risk premia. Both regime- 
switching and time-varying risk premia might explain the nonlinear behaviour in the term structure of 
interest rates. 
35 Different discrete-time versions of the model, including switching regimes, could be seen in Ang and 
Bekaert (2002), Bansal and Zhou (2002), Dahlquist and Gray (2000), Gray (1996), and Erlandsson 
(2002). For a continuous-time version. see Driffill, Kenc, and Sola (2003) and Elliott, Hunter, and 
Jamieson (2000). 
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independent of the interbank rate, for simplicity). 36 It is assumed also that participants in 
the financial market know the actual regime the economy is at. 37 
Then, the following stochastic difference equation represents the interbank rate as a 
regime-switching mean-reverting square root process: 
r, +, - r, =a 
(st+1) [0(SI+l) 
1r ut+I (3.5) 
where u, +, -N 
(0,1) is a white noise distributed normal conditionally on r1 and s, +1, and 
parameters a, 6, and ß are all subject to regime switching between the two regimes 
given by the unobserved variables,. 
Driffill, Kenc, and Sola (2003) discuss that it is important to specify correctly the 
switching regime to fully benefit from the nonlinear representation; otherwise it may 
not represent an improvement over linear models, even if there are clear indications of 
switching behaviour in the data. 38 For the term structure, a model should not only have a 
good fit to the short-term data but also to the longer maturity rates (through forecasted 
short rates used for pricing bonds). In the case of the pass-through, having all 
parameters regime-dependent does not only mean that the short-term pass-through mean 
and volatility are subject to regime switching, but also the long-term pass-through. That 
is, the long-term effect of a shock in the interbank rate could also be regime-dependent 
and, thus, not necessarily be one hundred percent for all rates. 
36 There is no theoretical rationale for this to be the case. Transition probabilities might be time-varying. 
Ang and Bekaert (2002) and Dahlquist and Gray (2000), for instance, find that interest rate spreads signal 
regime shifts. 
37 The researcher does not though. Hamilton (1988) actually assumes, working with bond yields, that 
bond traders recognize the chance of getting regime shifts and incorporate that possibility into their 
forecasts of interest rate evolution. Although they do not directly observe the current regime they are at, 
they form inference about it based on observation of some relevant variables. 
38 As they argue, a model that allows all the parameters to switch has typically a very flat likelihood. 
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Through the link to an interbank rate determined in an affine-type model, lending rates 
are consistent with other interest rates in the yield curve and, thus, are consistent with 
pricing interest rate derivatives. 39 Furthermore, an empirical analysis of interest rate 
series through Markov switching models should suggest a particular modelling of the 
pass-through derived from an industrial organization model and should point out 
feasible sources for the nonlinearity. This research follows this approach. The 
nonlinearity of the short-term money market rate could come (although not exclusively) 
from any of these directions: a nonlinear monetary policy, regime-switching devaluation 
expectations in the international capital markets (working through uncovered interest 
parity and, probably associated to financial crises), or the business cycle phases. 40 
In the case of Argentina, for example, econometric testing for nonlinearities in the 
money market rates showed indeed the presence of regime switching in the interbank 
rate associated to several financial crisis episodes. This empirical evidence justifies 
further the need to introduce a suitable representation of a nonlinear interbank rate in the 
optimisation process for banks. It needs to be a representation general enough as to 
collapse to the linear case if market uncertainty does not induce any regime switching in 
the interbank rate. 
4.3.3 Cost functions 
Banks face a number of costs to perform their intermediary activities. In fact, an 
important feature of the banking business is the interest rate risk (cost) that arises 
because of the maturity mismatch between liabilities and assets. If changes in interest 
39 Although, in this case, being a single factor model, it might only be suitable to price simple derivatives. 
See James and Webber (2000) for an extensive coverage of interest rate modelling. 
40 Gray (1996) cites, for example, oil crises, stock crises, and even wars as changes in the economic 
environment that coincide with higher volatility in US interest rates. 
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rate costs are ahead of interest rate revenues, banks need to decide whether to take an 
adjustment that leave profits unchanged based on the expectations they have on the 
nature of the shock (whether temporary or permanent). Thus, apart from the operating 
and management costs on the variables they control (quantities of loans and deposits), 
banks take into account the costs involved in adjusting their operations (on those 
variables) to sudden changes in the variables they do not control (market interest rates). 
Actually, Hofmann and Mizen (2004) base their results on asymmetries and 
nonlinearities in the interest rate pass-through on this type of adjustment costs. They 
argue that banks could reduce costs by smoothing official interest rates through 
forward-looking expectations on the future path of those rates. Although this might 
indeed be a source of regime-switching behaviour in the pass-through, it is assumed 
here that these adjustment costs are symmetric and non-dependent on the regime the 
economy is at. That is, although the cost function is quadratic in the adjustment of the 
quantity-related variable, the parameters that govern that function are constant. 
First then, the cost of servicing deposits and loans41 are assumed linear in the quantity 
and the corresponding cost function is separable in the arguments: 
C(L,, D1)=ALL, +ADD, (3.6) 
with aC / aL, >0, a2C / aL2 = 0, aC / aD, >0, and a2C / aD, = 0. The coefficients XL and 
4D are the time-invariant parameters for operating costs on loans and deposits. 
42 
41 Here it is assumed for simplicity that there are not operating costs on the interbank funds. The existence 
of such costs introduces a link between the two sides of the balance sheet that might render 
loans and 
deposits depending on each other. See, for example, Elyasiani, Kopechy, and van Hoose (1995) for a 
discussion on the conditions under which cost separability is plausible. 
42 With time-varying coefficients, no closed-form solutions could be found. See Dia (2004). 
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Secondly, the adjustment costs are assumed quadratic for changes in the level of loans 
and deposits. This feature reflects increasing marginal intertemporal adjustment costs 
and that an expansion on the level of operations requires eventually investment 
expenditures to adjust the scale operations of the bank. 43 These costs are also separable. 
The complete cost function is then given by: 
C(L,, D, ý=ALL, + . DDD+ 
L (LT-L, 
-, 
)2+ 2° (D,. -D, -, 
)2 (3.7) 
with YL and 7D the time-invariant parameters for the scale-adjustment part of the cost 
function. There are, of course, costs associated to the asymmetry of information in the 
banking system in terms of liquidity and credit risks. Dia (2004), for example, includes 
a quadratic function for credit risk (rather than modelling it as affecting directly the rate 
of return on loans) to bring a dynamic constraint in the optimisation process. At this 
stage, for simplicity, it is assumed that there are neither default nor liquidity costs. 44 
4.3.4 Optimisation process 
Banks maximise the expected value at time t of their profit function n at time t+j by 
deciding on their level of loans and of deposits subject to the balance sheet restriction, 
the bank reserves restriction, and the capital requirement restriction. 45 The expected 
profits are thus optimised over an infinite time horizon. The bank's management is 
assumed risk-neutral. Notice here that the optimisation process does not include 
expanding capital beyond the capital adequacy constraint. 46 The optimisation problem 
43 Elyasiani, Kopechy, and van Hoose (1995). 
as In the case of the credit risk, they can either be modelled as part of the costs or as diminishing the 
return on loans with a probability. The second approach is considered in the next section. In actual 
banking practice, it usually takes the form of a risk premium. 
as For an analysis of alternative bank's objective functions, see the seminal paper by Monti (1972). For a 
thorough survey on bank modelling, see Santomero (1984). 
40 Implicitly, it is assumed that all profits are paid out as dividends as in Dia (2004). 
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will be solved for generic forms of the loan demand and deposit supply. 47 Thus, the 
general optimisation problem for an individual bank is: 
V, = Max E, Y, 6 jT, J {LL+j. D; 
+, 
}jý 
j=0 
(3.8) 
where 8E (0,1) is a suitable discount factor that represents the temporal preferences 
from the bank (for instance, a function of equity return as opportunity cost) and E, is the 
expectations operator. The superscript i stands for the individual bank choices, but they 
are next obviated. Including all restrictions directly into it, the profit function becomes: 
ýcr+j =ýr, + -(1-b) rl+j]L, +j +[(1-a)1'! +j -Y+j]D, +j 
YL 
ALLS+j -2 
(L"; 
-L, +; -l)z 
(3.9) 
Y2 ADD,., -2 (Dr+j -Dr+1 1 
Expanding the objective function to include the profit function the problem is given by: 
[Y+; 
-(1-b)Y+; 
]L, 
+; +[(1-a)Y+; -Y+ý1 
D, 
+; -ALLr+; 
V -MaxE 
-ý 
(Lr+; 
- Ll+; -I 
)2 
- ADD, +; - 
(21- (D1+; 
- D, +; -1)2 (3.10) 
22 
+, 8E, 
(-LL ) (Ll+j+l 
- 
L, 
+j 
+ _LD 
) (D, 
+j+l - 
D,, j 22 
Notice that most assumptions taken on the microeconomics aspects of the optimisation 
problem are standard in the dynamic modelling of the banking industry. This model 
integrates them all into a simplify framework. 
Optimising the expected value of profits with respect to the amount of loans and 
deposits, the FOC are obtained: 
a' Given particular specification for these functions, the Euler (difference) equation could be solved 
accordingly. Still, since the focus of this research is on price variables readily observable in the market, 
no a priori microeconomic knowledge on these functions is assumed. 
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(3.11) 
(3.12) 
where references to individual choices on loans and deposits have already been replaced 
by the Cournot equilibrium condition that f, = L` /n and D, * = D' / n. 
Since there are not cross terms relating loans to deposits or vice versa, this system of 
difference equations could be solved for each interest rate independently. Thus, the 
Euler equations for loans and deposits are: 
ß11 arr+ j ErLr+; =1+ß Er L, +, +l+l+/3E'Lr+j -1+YL(1+ß)EraL L, +; 
r+j 
n ný +7L(l+ß)`E1Y+'-(1-b)E, Y+1]-rL(l L 
ý3 1I ar° 
E1D, 
+; -1 
+ E, D, +; 1+ß 1+, ß y (1+ 8) aD, +; 
nv +Yv(1+/3ý`yv(l+)6) 
(3.13) 
(3.14) 
The expected optimal values of loans (deposits) depend on the one-period ahead value 
of loans (deposits), the lagged value of them, and the spread between the lending 
(deposit) rate and the interbank rate. Since this research is focused on the interest rate 
pass-through though, these equations are rather represented in terms of the lending and 
deposit rates: 
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These equations are valid for all j>0, so that without loss of generality they could be 
stated as: 
rL=(1-b)Y, +AL+YLOL; _YLßEL L; +I-1EIarL 
L* (3.17) 
nnn aL, 
D= (1 _ a) Y_ 2D _ 
YD Lý + 
YDß E, AD, 
+ý 
1 
E, 
Dr D 
y, ` D* (3.18) 
nnn aD, 
Considering equations (3.17) and (3.18), rearranging and replacing terms, the interest 
rates on loans and deposits are determined as: 
nEL (1-b) ne + r' = r, + ýL 
nCL-1 nEL-1 
v_ nEv 
(1- a)_ nED 
r` 
nEv+l 
r 
nEv+lý°+ 
YLEL [AL; 
-ßE, L, +11 
(3.19) 
neL 1L 
YDED 
nED +1 
[ßE, AD; 
ý, -AD, 
] (3.20) 
where CL and ED are the loan demand and deposit supply elasticities, respectively. 
Additionally, considering the stochastic (regime-switching) process for the interbank 
rate, there will be a system of three difference equations form by expressions (3.19), 
(3.20), and the following: 
r, +, - r, = Gr 
(sr+I) [e (st+I) - r, 
1+6 (s, ) Jr, ur+l (3.21) 
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4.3.5 Nonlinear interest rates and the pass-through 
The crucial feature in describing the stochastic process for the lending (deposit) rate is 
transmitted by the stochastic process the interbank rate follows. Banks will recognize 
the presence of regime shifts in the interbank rate and will incorporate that information 
into their forecast of the rate evolution. 48 Thus, if the money market rate follows a 
regime-switching pattern, then the bank will endogenise it into its forecasts, and the 
lending (deposit) rate will similarly show a regime-switching behaviour. Importantly, 
the regime-switching behaviour in the lending (deposit) rate will be closely correlated to 
the shifting in regimes for the interbank rate. Of course, the description for the money 
market rate process is general enough as to incorporate linearity as an especial case. 
That is the case, for example, of Argentina. The Hansen test for the null of linearity is 
clearly rejected for the interbank rate and, sequentially, for a set of lending rates. Given 
the empirical exogeneity of the interbank rate to this set of interest rates (banks consider 
it as their opportunity cost of funds) and the nonlinearity associated to the financial 
crises, there is a feasible synchronization in the switching of regimes in all these rates. 
Since no particular form for the loan demand (deposit supply) is assumed, the solution 
for the lending (deposit) rate in equation (3.19) [(3.20)] is given in terms of the current 
and expected change in the amount of loans (deposits). Implicitly though, those 
quantities involve reference to lagged, current, and expected levels of the interbank rate 
and of the lending (deposit) rate. Thus, bank will fully incorporate their expectations of 
future changes in market rates in their current rates unless, of course, they have already 
reached their steady state equilibrium and no further changes are expected. 
48 See Hamilton (1988). Banks might not know exactly when a regime shift will occur, but they will form 
inferences about those shifts based on some relevant variables (both, expected and past values of them). 
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The lending pass-through is the factor that connects directly the interest rate on loans to 
the interbank rate. The value of it that corresponds to the steady-state equilibrium is the 
long-term interest rate pass-through. As derived from equation (3.19), it is a function of 
microeconomic factors: the loan demand elasticity, the credit market structure, and the 
capital adequacy parameter. This pass-through could be stated as: 
l_irps, -nee(1-b) 
nEL-1 
(3.22) 
The short-term (or impact) interest rate pass-through for loans is the adjustment factor 
on the current interbank rate that considers expected changes in the scale of the bank's 
operations. In order to derive an expression for it, an actual form for the loan demand is 
needed. Hence, demand for loans is assumed to depend negatively on the interest rate 
for loans and positively on the money market interest rate (opportunity cost). Although 
it is clear that it depends also on the level of income, this will not be explicitly 
modelled, since it is a variable beyond the bank's control. Thus, the loan demand can be 
represented by the linear function: 49 
Lý =a, ' +aLr, `+a; r, (3.23) 
such as that 
Ar = GZ'[ ArL + ar Ai"t (3.24) 
and 
LL (3.25) 
where the intercept ay is an income-determined parameter, aL is the (negative) semi- 
elasticity with respect to the lending rate, and a, is the (positive) semi-elasticity with 
49 Theoretically, this assumption simplifies the treatment for the pass-through. Besides, empirical research 
shows support for a linear representation for loan demand. See, for example, Calza, Gartner, and Sousa 
(2001) for a loan demand study in the euro area. 
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respect to the interbank rate. Equations (3.24) and (3.25) could be introduced in 
equation (3.19) to replace the last term in brackets there. 50 It is explicit then that the 
current lending rate does not depend only on current levels of the interbank rate, but 
also on past and expected levels of the interbank rate and the lending rate itself. 
Rearranging terms 51 the impact pass-through for the lending rate is: 
s_irps; - 
nEL (1-b)+(l+ 0)ELyLa; 3.26 
(neL -1) -(1+ß)eLyLaL 
) 
Notice the similarity between equation (3.22) and (3.26). Although the latter looks more 
complex, the main difference between them is the inclusion of the discount factor 
(because of the reference to expected future values of the rates), the adjustment cost 
parameter (which is not present, of course, in the steady state pass-through), and the 
semi-elasticity terms from the loan demand. 52 
In the case of deposits, the steady-state long-term pass-through is a function of similar 
microeconomic factors: the deposit supply elasticity, the market structure for the deposit 
market, and the reserve management parameter. This deposit pass-through could be 
derived directly from equation (3.20) as: 
nED (1-a) D1_ irps, _ 
nED +1 
(3.27) 
For the short-term pass-through, a linear function for the deposit supply is assumed of 
the following type: 
so This is not entirely correct because the term in brackets involves optimum amount of loans, rather than 
just the quantity demanded. Still, it is assumed that supply-related factors would not change importantly 
the final expression. 
51 See detailed procedure in the Appendix. 
52 Elasticity and semi-elasticity terms are, of course, related but the linear demand function is consistent 
with different elasticity , alues (not one in particular is assumed) so that both terms are kept separated. 
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D, = a° + ar, ° + a°rý (3.28) 
where ay is the income-related intercept, aD is the (positive) semi-elasticity with 
respect to the deposit interest rate, and a° is the (negative) semi-elasticity with respect 
to the money market rate (negative because of the opportunity cost as return for 
depositors). The respective changes could then be represented as: 
OD, = aDLsJ + a°Or, 
and 
ODD+, = aDOr°, + a"Or, +, 
(3.29) 
(3.30) 
Incorporating equations (3.29) and (3.30) into equation (3.20) to replace the last term in 
brackets, it is clear that the deposit rate also depends on the lagged and expected values 
of the interbank rate and of itself. The resulting short-term pass-through is: 
s_irps1) = 
neo(1-a)-(1+fß)e r,, (3.31) 
(ner, +1) +(1+ 8)e1, Ynav 
Once again, notice out the similarity of the pass-through for the long and short-term. 
The latter include additionally the terms for discounting, the adjustment cost parameter, 
and the semi-elasticity terms from the deposit supply function. 
The interest rate pass-through, either for loans or deposits, would be nonlinear if any of 
the microeconomic factors that explain it switched between regimes. However, thus far, 
it seems that no single factor displays such a stochastic behaviour; they do not jump 
between regimes neither in the short-term nor the long-term. 53 Recall that it has been 
53 Barnea, Kim, and Kliger (2003) find evidence of regime switching oligopolistic behaviour in Israel by 
decomposing mark-up pricing evolution into the oligopolistic-conduct part and its fundamentals (from a 
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assumed that the adjustment costs parameters are constant so that they cannot induce 
any feasible nonlinearity in the pass-through. 
The market structure refers mainly to the number of institutions at any given moment in 
the credit or deposit market and, although it might evolve in time, it does not happen as 
a sudden change like in a Markov switching process. Similarly, there is no obvious 
rationale as to why the demand- or the supply-elasticity would switch between regimes. 
Therefore, the nonlinear interbank rate induces a nonlinear lending or deposit interest 
rate, but does not obviously affect the adjustment factor from the bank. The next section 
deals with some other factors and parameters that might indeed explain the presence of 
a regime-switching behaviour in the pass-through as well. 
Cournot equilibrium). They differentiate a cooperative equilibrium from a non-cooperative one, but both 
ultimately depend on shocks to the fundamentals (mostly macroeconomic factors). Similarly, Hutchison 
(1995), using a dynamic general equilibrium model, focuses on a set of forces, essentially 
macroeconomic, that together with monopoly power explain interest rate (spreads) behaviour. He does 
not, however, focus on nonlinearities in the adjustment. 
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4.4 NONLINEAR PASS-THROUGH: DYNAMIC MODEL WITH RISKS 
In the banking business, there are many risks due to financial market uncertainties and 
to information asymmetry between banks and their clients. This section expands the 
dynamic model to assess the impact of some of these risks in the interest rate 
determination and in the pass-through. Specifically, credit risk (asset-side of the balance 
sheet) and liquidity risk (liability-side) are next considered in the bank's optimisation. 
Once again, in the case of Argentina, for example, including measures of different risks 
(devaluation risk, country risk, and credit risk) improved the nonlinear modelling of the 
interest rate pass-through. Banks definitely reflect their market expectations in these 
measures of risks. Any likely presence of nonlinearities in the money market rates seem 
to be captured as well by these risks. 
4.4.1 Introducing credit and liquidity risks 
sa Credit risk is associated to the probability of default in a credit operation. 
Microeconomic and macroeconomic factors alike influence the magnitude of this risk. 
Among the former are the existing collateral, the information gathering process by the 
bank, and bankruptcy regulations. From the economy as a whole, the level of interest 
rates and the position in the business cycle could also affect borrowers' probability of 
default. Loan returns are random due to this type of risk. Besides, the management of 
this risk matters not only to individual-bank risk managers but to financial regulators 
and policy makers alike. As Herring (1999) points out, low-frequency, high-severity 
events associated to credit risks are likely the most serious threat to financial stability. 
54 Borrowers might be unable or unwilling to fulfil repayment under the initial terms of the loan contract. 
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The main difference with the initial dynamic model is, then, that under the presence of 
credit risk banks adjust their expected interest rate income accordingly. This might 
usually take the form of banks demanding an extra margin (risk premium) to cover them 
against credit risk. Otherwise, it would be preferable for them to invest somewhere else 
without taking such a risk. In practice, this risk premium is often defined as the 
difference between the risky-loan return and the free-risk return with equal maturity. 
For the empirical case presented in the previous chapter, in which lending pass-through 
was studied, credit risk (and devaluation and country risks) was approximated by 
interest rate spreads. 
With credit risk, the financial margin banks obtain must also include the risk premium 
that prices that risk. Even if all other loan characteristics are the same, a bank will 
charge a higher interest rate to a group of borrowers if probabilities of default are higher 
on this group. 55 Thus, a wide diversified interest rate structure is partly due to 
differences in risk among groups of borrowers (which might give place to market 
segmentation). 56 It is worth noting, that separability of the credit and deposit markets 
might break down once credit risk is included. 57 Empirically, however, it is still valid to 
assume both markets as being independent of each other. For the following derivation 
on the dynamic model, it is assumed that this separability holds even with credit risk. 
ss Using credit risk analysis, Herring (1999) argues, risk managers could compare returns on capital 
allocated to each market segment and track in which ones they are earning the highest risk-adjusted 
returns for the shareholders. 
56 See next section. 
57 See, for example, Freixas and Rochet (1997) and Altman, Resti, and Sironi (2004) for details on this. A 
Merton-approach, by which the probability of default depends on the value of the firm, is considered to 
link assets and liabilities. Even without risks, there is a link between loans and deposits if, for example, 
banks ask their borrowers to keep a given fraction of the loan as deposits in the banks. Yet, it has been 
implicitly assumed here that this connection is rather weak. 
205 
Another important risk banks face is the liquidity risk, which could actually be 
originated in either side of the balance sheet. When borrowers want to cash on their 
deposits at a higher rate than on average expected by the bank, the bank needs to 
finance the outflow of funds by incurring in higher than expected cost (the contractual 
interest rate) on those deposits. This produces indeed a risk for the bank that needs to be 
taken into consideration when it optimises its operations. Another source for this 
liquidity risk is any unexpected credit commitment that the bank needs to cover by 
cashing up on other liquid assets. Still, important as it might be this source, it is 
assumed for the following derivation that the only source for liquidity risk is the 
liability-based risk. 
These two types of risks (credit and liquidity) are particularly relevant because of the 
asymmetric-information feature in the banking business. Given that a bank does not 
know exactly the probabilities of success of the project its client is borrowing the funds 
for, it will not precisely know what the chances of repayment are. Neither will it know 
whether the depositor will claim his or her asset in the bank sooner than agreed. 
Importantly, both risks will be exacerbated if unstable conditions in the financial 
markets increase the uncertainty of the payoffs to the bank's borrowers and creditors. 
Not surprisingly, a bank will try to capture any sudden change in the risks involve in its 
operations by following a price indicator that actually displays such switches in 
uncertainty. A relevant interbank rate from the short-term money market fulfils such a 
role. Sudden changes on that rate, associated to regimes shifts in financial conditions, 
will be displayed as a nonlinear stochastic behaviour on it (most probably in its mean, 
its adjustment speed, and its volatility). For the bank to take into consideration credit 
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and liquidity risks, it needs to charge risk premiums that also evolve according to 
money market conditions. Therefore, if the money market rate that reflects those 
financial conditions follows a regime-switching stochastic behaviour, then the risk 
premiums a bank charges will also display a nonlinear pattern that is closely correlated 
to the interbank rate process. 
Hence, with credit and liquidity risks, two interest rates (different to those already 
presented in the initial dynamic model) should be considered in the bank's optimisation 
problem. First, the base lending rate that compensates the bank for their costs of 
providing its services to the borrower. Second, the effective cost of keeping deposits 
from its clients. Both rates will influence the bank's expected profits, but in order to 
introduce them in the bank's profit function, some new definitions are needed first. 
The effective rate charged by the bank on a credit operation is the one that includes a 
credit risk premium and the probability of repayment. 58 This effective rate is assumed 
equivalent to the expected rate of return on that operation: 59 
rL = (1-P) ý1+0) rr (4.1) 
where p stands for the estimated probability of default (so that 1- p is the probability of 
repayment), 0 is the risk premium charged on the loan (as a proportion of the base 
rate), and r, ` is the base lending rate. The left-hand side of equation (4.1) is the effective 
58 Another element present in the credit risk is the recovery rate. Nevertheless, it is not explicitly included 
here because there is still ongoing debate about whether it depends exclusively on microeconomic factors 
or on systemic (macroeconomic) features and, therefore, whether it is independent of the probability of 
repayment or negatively correlated. See Altman, Resti, and Sironi (2004) for an updated review on 
empirical and theoretical literature on default recovery rates. 
59 The formula would include a few more terms if, for example, the bank charge any origination fee to the 
borrower, imposes a compensating balance requirement on the loan (that traduces as an noninterest- 
hearing deposit in the bank), or needs to keep legal reserves on its deposits. Implicitly, all these terms are 
assumed negligible or nonexistent. See, for example, Saunders (2000) for details on practical credit risk 
management. 
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rate and the right-hand side is the expected return on the loan (the contractual rate of 
return times the probability of repayment). 
The rate that enters the optimisation process is the base rate for loans, which could be 
directly derived from equation (4.1): 
1L 
(1+0) ý1-pýY (4.2) 
The credit risk premium is defined here as a regime-switching function of the base rate 
for loans: 
C -O(S, )rL+E, (4.3) 
where e! is a white noise distributed Normal(0,1) and conditional on rlL and s,. The risk 
premium parameter 0(s1) is subject to regime switching between the same two regimes 
than for the interbank rate (given by the unobserved variable st): a calm regime and a 
volatile regime. 
The probability of repayment (1-p) follows a Stiglitz-Weiss pattern, by which it 
increases with the effective lending rate up to a certain threshold level of it. Beyond that 
level, the probability of repayment starts decreasing because the higher interest rate 
attracts lower-quality clients. Therefore, since the risk premium increases the effective 
lending rate charged by the bank, when it switches to a volatile regime, the probability 
of repayment eventually falls. 
The effective cost (rate) on deposits (for the bank) includes the risk premium or extra 
cost the bank expects to face because of liquidity risk and it is given by: 
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r, d = (1 + i) r, ° (4.4) 
where 11 is the liquidity risk premium and it is defined as a proportion of the contractual 
interest rate on deposits r, ° (the rate received by depositors). The right-hand side of 
equation (4.4) is the actual expected cost of deposits for the bank. 
The liquidity risk premium is similarly defined as a regime-switching function of the 
contractual deposit rate: 
ND =? 1(s, ) rID + (4.5) 
where 4, - N(0,1) (conditionally on r, ° and s, ) is a white noise. The risk premium 
parameter rl(s, ) is subject to switches between the same two regimes than in the case of 
the interbank rate and of the credit risk premium (given by the unobserved variable st). 
Those two regimes, once again, correspond to the calm and unstable regimes in the 
financial markets. 
With the lending and deposit rates from equations (4.2) and (4.4), respectively, the 
profit function could then be redefined as: 60 
r+ý -(1-b)r+; Ll+; +[(1-a)r, +j -(1+Y+ý; 
] D, 
+; (l+ý)(1-p) 
(4.6) 
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where, for simplification, the risk premium for credit risk is stated as 0, rather than 
0(s, ), and the risk premium for liquidity risk is given by it, rather than rl(s, ), to 
represent the regime-switching behaviour in both premiums. 
60 This is considering everything else as given in the initial dynamic model. 
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Introducing the profit function in the objective function, the optimisation problem is 
then given by: 
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4.4.2 Regime-switching pass-through 
Following a similar procedure as in the base dynamic model (optimising with respect to 
quantities and then deriving optimum interest rates) the lending and deposit rates are: 
rL - 
nee (1-b)(1+O1)(1-p) nEc (1+01 (1-p) 
' nEL-1 
r+ 
n6L L 
(1+01)(1-P)YL'eL 
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Recall from equation (3.21) that the interbank rate follows a (Markov) regime-switching 
process and, thus, both lending and deposit rates follow a nonlinear process too. 
Alternatively, this time, the equilibrium pass-through for the lending rate includes the 
credit risk parameter and the one for the deposit rate includes the liquidity risk factor. 
Then, it will be argued that with the presence of credit and liquidity risk, the interest rate 
pass-through also switches between regimes in either case. Moreover, the fact that the 
stochastic process for each risk premium is correlated with the regime-switching 
interbank rate, suggests that the timing for the switches in regime are relatively 
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synchronized . 
61 Although not directly, Pesaran et al. (2003), for instance, model the 
loss distribution of the credit portfolio with explicit conditioning on macroeconomic 
factors. Thus, they conclude, default probabilities are driven primarily by how firms are 
tied to business cycles, both at domestic and foreign levels. As it has been discussed in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis, the business cycle might induce regime-switching behaviour in 
the money market rates, so that both the interbank rate and credit risk might indeed 
share the nonlinear behaviour, with regime shifts being synchronized. 
The long term and short term pass-through for the lending rate are given respectively by 
the following expressions: 
l_irpsc _ 
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From equation (4.10) and equation (4.11), when the interbank rate switches to, let's say, 
the volatile regime, unstable financial conditions make the credit risk premium 
parameter jumps to a volatile regime too. Therefore, the pass-through rises and suffers 
also a shift in regime. This raise might even be reinforced if the probability of 
repayment also increases with higher interest rates (before the threshold value of it). 
Alternatively, with unsettle market conditions and enough higher interest rates, the 
probability of repayment decreases (the probability of default rises) to an extent that the 
pass-through might eventually diminish. 
61 There might be circumstances in which those risk premiums could switch in regime without the 
interbank rate having change similarly. For example, risk premiums shifting in regime could be due to 
some microeconomic factors that do not affect the interbank rate. 
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Therefore, when credit risk premium is considered, 62 the nonlinearity of the interbank 
rate will not only induce a regime-switching behaviour in the lending rate but also a 
nonlinear pattern in the pass-through. With a volatile environment in the financial 
markets, the lending pass-through might either increase or decrease depending on the 
level and magnitude of the change with respect to the asymmetric nature of the banking 
system (the well documented adverse selection problem). All the microeconomic factors 
that determine the pass-through do not produce this behaviour (not even the 
microeconomic elements present in the credit risk premium). The nonlinear pattern in 
the interest rate pass-through is solely related to the regime-switching process in the 
money market rate. 
The interest rate pass-through for the deposit rate is given by the following equations 
for the long and short term, respectively: 
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In this case, the shift in regime for the interbank rate rises the liquidity premium (rl) 
considered by the bank because there is an increase in the probability of depositors 
walking (in extreme cases, running) away from the bank. This nonlinear behaviour for 
the parameter of liquidity risk will cause the deposit rate pass-through to shift in regime 
and actually fall. Conversely, the pass-through might rather increase if reserves (the 
62 Actually, the risk premium considered here does not need to be connected exclusively to credit risk. 
Part of the premium might be also associated to other types of risk such as devaluation risk or country risk 
(as it was the case with the interest rate spreads considered for Argentina in the previous chapter). As long 
as the premium switches in regime as a response to regime shifts in the interbank rate (systemic-risk 
type), the effect over the pass-through would be similar. 
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fraction a of deposits) held by the bank fall enough because of the liquidity 
management from the bank. 
Therefore, a regime shifting behaviour in the interbank rate causes the pass-through for 
deposit rates to also switch between regimes when liquidity risk is considered. With an 
unstable financial scenario, the risk premium considered by the bank is higher and, thus, 
the pass-through would decrease (or increase) and actually switch in regime. Once 
again, no microeconomic factor in the determination of the pass-through will induce this 
nonlinear behaviour. It is entirely due to the switching in regimes in the financial 
markets (at a macroeconomic level). 63 
4.4.3 Product differentiation 
The dynamic model has been designed so far to represent the behaviour of a bank 
offering just one type of loans and taking only one type of deposits (although to 
possibly different type of clients). In a more realistic set up of the banking industry, 
there will be heterogeneous market segments that banks will attempt to serve. In order 
to pursue their profit-maximising objective banks divide markets in different segments 
and specialise on particular groups of borrowers (or depositors) as to enhance 
efficiency. The bank's optimisation will now have to consider revenues not only from 
one type of loans (deposits) but from two or more of them. 
One could immediately argue that at the margin the profit from each operation should 
be equal across market segments. This is not necessarily the case though. The very same 
characteristics that make market segments different (demand elasticity, market 
63 On a quality-related feature of the lending market, Bangia et al. (2002) also suggest that underlying 
macroeconomic volatility is a crucial link in stress testing credit portfolios. Furthermore, regime expected 
changes in the credit quality of debtors are subject to regime switching associated to the business cycle. 
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structure, operating costs, risk premiums) will prevent this from happening. The actual 
margin would be particular to the market segment the bank is at and, thus, the bank will 
need to take into account its features in order to care for the general profit-maximising 
objective. 64 
If borrowers were homogeneous (similar demand elasticity, for example) and there were 
only one type of loans, then the interest rate would be the same for all loans. However, 
in practice, a particular bank charges loan interest rates according to the borrower's 
price elasticity and all the other micro and macroeconomic features. In doing so, the 
bank follows an optimal behaviour, taking advantage of market structure to extract 
positive financial margins according to demand characteristics. The more heterogeneous 
the demand, the more diversified interest rate structure the market will have. 
Here, it is assumed that the type of deposits taken by the banks are all similar, but that 
there are two types of market credit segments that the bank provide with loans. Banks 
will thus differentiate interest rates reflecting their optimisation process according to 
each segment characteristics. Some banks will serve both segments; some other will 
specialize in one or the other. Both market segments are completely separable (so that 
optimisation is independent). One such segment will have lower demand elasticity (for 
example, because borrowers have fewer alternative financing sources), higher marginal 
costs (due to less credit background of the clients), and a less number of banks (i. e., lack 
of adequate banking technology). Likewise, the credit risk premium is assumed higher 
for this segment because of the riskier nature of loans and the corresponding probability 
64 Heffernan (1997), using an (linear) error correction model of selected British retail rates, shows the 
heterogeneity in the response to official rates shocks from banks and banking products. There are variable 
lags and varying magnitudes in that response from different products inside an individual bank and even 
for the same product among different banks. 
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of default is also greater. 65 Risk premiums in both segments are still correlated with the 
regime-switching interbank rate. 
The corresponding long-term pass-through for the lending rate in both segments is then 
given by the expressions: 
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where it is assumed that nj > n2, ELI > EL2, o, ' < 012, and p, < P2. Similarly, for the 
impact pass-through, two expressions could be stated from equation (4.11). It is further 
assumed for them that 7, < rL. All other parameters in the long and short-term pass- 
through are assumed equal for both segments. 
With these features, of course, neither the interest rate nor the pass-through is the same 
for both segments. The following table summarizes the effects on the second segment's 
(long- and short-term) pass-through of changes in each parameter as if departing from 
the initial values in the first credit segment. Any change in each row, assumes 
everything else given. 
65 In practice, for retail interest rates, for example, the risk premium a bank charges for its different credit 
operations are usually similar. It would be more likely that the premium differs for each segment if one 
belongs to the retail market and the other to a wholesale market. See Allen, DeLong, and Saunders (2003) 
for discussion of these and other issues in credit risk modelling. 
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Segment 1 Vs. Segment 2 Change in Change in irps 
(irpsl) (irps2) parameter 1_irps s_irps 
n> > n2 <0 >0 >0 
ELI > EL2 <0 >0 >0 
of 
< 
< 012 >0 >0 >0 
P1 < P2 >0 <0 <0 
4 < n >0 - <0 
The lending pass-through is negatively related to the competitiveness in the market 
structure and to the demand elasticity. Thus, the second segment will display a larger 
pass-through for both the long- and short-term. The pass-through depends positively on 
the risk premium, so that it is also larger in the second segment. Conversely, the larger 
probability of default in this segment will cause the pass-through to decrease. This 
effect might even be strong enough as to offset the effect of changes in the other 
parameters, so that the pass-through might fall overall in this second segment. 
66 The 
increase in the adjustment cost parameter makes the pass-through fall in the short-term 
(the long-term pass-through, of course, is not affected by this parameter). It is worth 
mentioning that, in all cases, the short-term pass-through is less than the long-term 
equilibrium pass-through. 67 
Furthermore, considering these segments' characteristics, the lending rate in the second 
segment will be greater than the one in the first segment. Note out that the spread 
66 This effect might explain the apparent conflict between theory and empirics in the measure of the pass- 
through. It is usually derived a larger pass-through when the second segment's characteristics are present. 
Yet, empirically, it is often found that the opposite (larger pass-through for the first-segment). 
67 This feature is, of course, consistent with the short-term stickiness in the pass-through. 
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between these rates will not only be given by the differences in the pass-through but 
also be due to the marginal costs and the adjustment parts (see equation (3.19)). 
4.4.4 Other nonlinearities 
Some theoretical and empirical research has focused on the asymmetric and nonlinear 
nature of adjustment costs as the main source of a nonlinear interest rate pass-through. 
Many of them are based on the presence of positive trend inflation, as discussed in Ball 
and Mankiw (1994). 68 On a general corporate setting (not specifically for banks), a 
firm's relative prices decline automatically between adjustments if there is positive 
inflation. Therefore, considering a menu-cost rationale for adjusting prices, positive 
shocks are more likely to produce larger price adjustments than negative shocks to 
optimum relative prices (in which inflation erodes the price). Dell'Ariccia and Garibaldi 
(1998) also present a menu-cost type of argument for asymmetries in banking response 
to money market shocks but for the amount of lending, rather than for interest rates. As 
long as lending opportunities are found at a different speed than recalling existing loans, 
banks will respond asymmetrically to changes in the money market rate. 
In order to see how nonlinear adjustment costs might indeed induce a nonlinear interest 
rate pass-through, let's refer to equations (4.11) and (4.13). There it could be seen that 
the pass-through, for loans and deposits alike, is indeed regime-switching if the 
parameter for cost adjustment were actually nonlinear. It might be the case that the 
adjustment is asymmetric, so that the parameter is one with expected positive changes 
in the bank's operations and another one when those changes are negative. 
68 See Footnote 15 for empirical references. Also, see Hannan and Berger (1991) for a discussion on price 
rigidity in the banking industry and the asymmetry in the adjustment for deposit rates. Similarly, Lim 
(2001) finds evidence of asymmetry in the short-term adjustment (but not in the long-run). Mester (1993) 
also uses a menu-cost argument to account for asymmetric adjustment in prime rates. 
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Alternatively, parameters might be regime switching if the adjustment takes place at 
different speeds and intensities. In either case, the resulting pass-through will be 
nonlinear. All the same, these mechanisms will only explain a nonlinear behaviour in 
the short-term pass-through, but not in the long term. Although there is widespread 
empirical support for short-run stickiness in the pass-through, it is usually assumed that 
in the long-run the pass-through is complete. Therefore, if there were any evidence of 
nonlinearity, this should be kept to the short run. This a-priori conclusion is not entirely 
correct since, from the model presented here, the pass-through could also be regime- 
switching in the long run. 
Although the presence of regime-switching adjustment costs is a feasible explanation 
for a nonlinear pass-through, the argument is not stressed here because even if the 
adjustment costs switch between regimes there would not be a direct link to the regime 
shifting behaviour in the money market rate. It will not explain either the possibility of 
the pass-through decreasing or increasing when there is a switch to the volatile regime. 
The resulting effect will be exclusively in one direction or the other. 
Another source for nonlinearity in the pass through is the existence of smooth transition 
of shocks to the money market rate. However, this is not further developed here because 
it rather represents an alternative modelling approach to the Markov regime switching 
and not an extra mechanism of regime shifting in the pass through. 69 Furthermore, the 
rationale to selecte the Markov switching model in the case of Argentina was the 
association to episodes of financial crises, in which the transition between regimes was 
reasonably expected to be sudden (rather than smooth). 
69 See Iregui, Milas, and Otero (2001) for an empirical application of a smooth transition autoregressive 
(STAR) methodology for the pass-through in selected Latin American markets. 
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4.5 NONLINEAR PASS-THROUGH: EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
Empirical studies have shown for some European countries that short-term money 
market rates follow regime-switching stochastic processes. If that is the case, it is 
postulated here (on the grounds of the above theoretical framework) that the interest rate 
pass-through, for lending and deposit rates alike, should also follow a regime-switching 
pattern. Moreover, regime shifts in the pass-through should occur on those dates on 
which the interbank rate switches regimes. Previous empirical applications for 
Argentina have indeed shown that is the case when shocks are caused by financial 
crises. 70 For the Argentinean case, a Markov switching VAR model captures this 
feature. Here, it is explored the cases of France and Germany, two of the biggest 
European financial systems, both with long enough detailed time series on interest rates. 
4.5.1 Data analysis 
Nominal interest rates on short-term loans to enterprises and time deposits are selected 
for France and Germany. Interest rates correspond to new business. Data on these rates 
is taken from the European Central Bank (national retail interest rates). 71 The 
representative money market rate is the 1-day lending rate on day-to-day money. The 
source for this interbank rate is the IMF's national statistics for France and Datastream 
for Germany. For France, lending rates correspond to discount, overdrafts, and other 
short-term loans while the deposit rate is the EURIBOR (3-month). 72 In this case, the 
data sample covers the period from April 1984 up to June 2003. For Germany, lending 
interest rates correspond to wholesale current account credits (floating rates) and deposit 
rates to 3-month time deposits. The sample runs from November 1984 up to June 2003. 
70 See previous chapters of this thesis for studies on the link between interest rate pass-through and 
financial crises in Argentina. 
'1 The bank has stop producing statistics on these rates and has replaced them with the MFI (monetary 
financial institutions) interest rate statistics. For description of the data see the Methodological notes on 
National Retail Interest Rates from the European Central Bank. 
72 PIBOR after January 1999. 
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Preliminary standard unit root test (Augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillips-Perron) show 
that all these interest rates are integrated of order one. Cointegration tests, nevertheless, 
show no sign of long term equilibrium relationship among them. In order to get a more 
precise evaluation of their time series properties, further unit root tests are conducted on 
these rates. The Ng-Perron test and the modified Dickey Fuller test (DF-GLS) are used. 
The first one is very robust to the presence of additive outliers, both in terms of size and 
of power; and the second one detrends series before running the test regression. 
Although not conclusive, results from these tests show for both countries some evidence 
that their interest rates are rather stationary time series. 73 
Therefore, along with most Vasicek-type models for interest rates, it is concluded here 
(and assumed) that these time series are stationary. Hence, VAR models (rather than 
VECM) are estimated. Since the goal here is to establish the presence of nonlinearities 
in these interest rates and their pass-through, it should be enough to use variable levels 
instead of first-differences. A precise measure of interest rate pass-through for both 
financial systems would probably require defining appropriate dynamics for the short- 
and long-term. 
The paths followed by the two sets of interest rates could be seen in Figure 4.1 for 
France and in Figure 4.2 for Germany. 74 Standard structural break tests75 for the 
implementation of a single-currency in the euro area have been implemented. There is 
73 See Table 4.1 for France and Table 4.2 for Germany. 
74 It is worth mentioning that the level of the lending rate in Germany is significantly higher than in 
France, despite the fact that it broadly corresponds to the same type of loans and the data comes from the 
same statistic source. However, the rates in Germany are for domestic non-banks clients only. 
75 Considering that the testing date is the beginning of 2002, not enough remaining observation points are 
left as to conduct a point-break Chow test. Therefore, a Chow forecast test is used. 
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no evidence that this arrangement changed significantly the single-equation pass- 
through neither for the lending rate nor for the deposit rate. 
4.5.2 Markov switching modelling 
It is probably difficult to detect visually if there is any sign of nonlinearity in either the 
interbank rate or the pass-through relationship between that rate and the lending and 
deposit rates in any of these two countries. A formal testing of the presence of 
nonlinearities is needed. Therefore, the Hansen test is implemented for all individual 
rates independently and for the corresponding pass-through relationships. 
In the case of France, the null of linearity could not be rejected at usual levels on 
individual rates. Ignoring this evidence, the test is conducted on both pass-through 
processes. As it is expected, neither the lending nor the deposit pass-through shows any 
sign of nonlinearity. Furthermore, for the sake of experimenting, various specifications 
of Markov switching VARs are estimated, but none of them produce interpretable or 
relevant results. In consequence, given that there is no evidence of nonlinearity in the 
interbank rate, the corresponding pass-through relationships do not show any sign of 
regime-switching behaviour either. 76 At least, not one related to the money market rate. 
On the contrary, for the German case, results from the test show clearly the presence of 
nonlinearities in the interbank rate, the lending rate, and the deposit rate individually. 
" 
Testing the null of linearity on a single-equation pass-through for the lending rate 
provides no evidence of nonlinearity when just one lag is used in the structure. Standard 
76 See Table 4.3 for details on these tests for France. 
" An empirical approximation of the CIR model assumed for the interbank rate is to consider a general 
Markov switching AR model. 
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specification tests suggest though that two lags should be considered in both linear and 
nonlinear specifications of the pass-through for the lending rate. Once those two lags are 
included, the Hansen test shows emphatically the presence of nonlinearities in the pass- 
through. In order to further assess this result for the lending rate, the J-Test from Garcia 
and Perron (1996) is conducted. This test confirms the presence of nonlinearity in the 
pass-through for the lending rate. For the deposit rate, even with one lag, the Hansen 
test provides strong evidence of nonlinearities in the pass-through. 78 
Therefore, for Germany, given the nonlinearity of the interbank rate, the pass-through 
for both the lending and deposit rates is also nonlinear. Correspondingly, a selection 
procedure for the appropriate Markov switching VAR (MS-VAR) representation of the 
pass-through is required. Following the "bottom-up" procedure, a MSIH(2)-VAR(2) 
model with time-varying transition probabilities (TVTP) is selected for the lending rate 
and a MSIAH(2)-VAR(2) model with constant transition probabilities (CTP) for the 
deposit rate. 79 Yet, for completeness, CTP and TVTP are considered in both cases 
(although only the latter results are shown here). For the TVTP, interest rates spreads 
are used as the regime-shifting indicators. 80 The spread between the German interbank 
rate vis-ä-vis a similar US money market rate is considered as representing devaluation 
expectations81 and the spread between the lending (deposit) rate and the interbank rate 
are taken as to represent credit risk. Regime switching is defined in terms of volatility 
conditions in the banking system. Thus, regime 0 corresponds to a tranquil scenario, 
while that regime 1 is consistent with a volatile environment. 
78 See Table 4.4 for details on these tests for Germany. 
79 See Table 4.5 for these results. 
80 In order to homogenise the treatment with TVTP, a MSIAH(2)-VAR(2) is estimated for both lending 
and deposit rate. 
81 Country risk is assumed negligible for Germany. 
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For the calm regime, the lending pass-through on impact is 33.9 percent (compared to a 
27.7 percent from the linear VAR estimation). In volatile conditions, this pass-through 
reduces to 13.6 percent. 82 There is a similar probability of being in any regime (large 
number of regime shifts in the sample). There are indeed sudden stochastic switches in 
volatility, but their frequency do seem to rule out correspondence to just one particular 
type of economic or financial phenomena (financial crises, business cycle or the like). 83 
From the total number of times the lending pass-through switches regime, 93 percent of 
those occasions correspond to periods in which the interbank rate (individually) is also 
classified into the volatile regime. 84 Likewise, in 73 percent of the times the interbank 
rate switches regime, it induces a regime shift in the lending pass-through. 
The short-term pass-through for deposits is 46.6 percent in the calm regime, compared 
to 38.6 percent if estimated in a linear VAR. This pass-through falls to 35.7 percent if 
there is a shift to the volatile regime. Once again, the probability of being in any one 
regime is similar (although slightly biased towards the volatile regime). 85 In 85.5 
percent of times the pass-through is classified in the volatile regime, it corresponds also 
to similar classification for the individual interbank rate. The interbank rate induces a 
shift in regime for the pass-through in 75 percent of times in which it is itself classified 
in the volatile regime. 86 Furthermore, the interbank rate transmits its nonlinearity in 63 
percent of times towards both lending and deposit rates simultaneously. 
82 See Table 4.6. 
83 See the transition probabilities for the lending pass-through in Figure 4.3. 
84 Details for this are in Table 4.9. 
85 See Table 4.7 for details on the pass-through and Figure 4.4 for the transition probabilities. 
86 It is worth mentioning that the pass-through for interest rates on deposits seem to be higher (both in 
calm and volatile conditions) than for rates on loans. 
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Considering these results, it is concluded here that the presence of nonlinearities in the 
German interbank rate induces indeed a regime-shifting behaviour in the pass-through 
for the lending and deposit interest rates alike. Moreover, the timing of switching in the 
regimes is essentially similar when comparing the interbank rate and the pass-through 
for both lending and deposit rates. For France no such pattern is found either in the 
interbank rate or in the lending and deposit pass-through. 
An additional interest rate is considered to explore further the nonlinearities of the pass- 
through in Germany. A 5-year mortgage rate on new business for domestic customers is 
used to estimate the corresponding pass-through. Interestingly, in this case, when the 
Markov switching model is estimated, the pass-through increases (rather than decreases) 
from 9.5 percent in the calm regime to 24.3 percent in the volatile regime, while that a 
linear estimation points out to a 16.5 percent. 87 The synchronization of the timing of 
regime switching is even stronger for this rate, since 91.3 percent of the cases in which 
it is classified as being in the volatile regime correspond to the same stance for the 
money market rate (with a similar percentage for the times in which the interbank rate 
induces the shift into the mortgage rate). This result makes clear the possibility that the 
pass-through for lending rates can either increase or decrease when financial conditions 
in the credit market become unstable. 
a' Estimation results for the mortgage rate are in Table 4.8. 
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4.6 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This paper has shown in the context of a dynamic bank optimisation model how a 
nonlinear, regime-switching, money market rate induces a nonlinear behaviour in 
lending and deposit rates and in their pass-through. It has been argued that the pass- 
through process is consistent with a nonlinear behaviour even if there are no 
asymmetries or nonlinearities in the adjustment costs from shocks to the interbank rate. 
Regime switching behaviour in the interbank rate causes both lending and deposit rates 
to shift regimes at similar dates. More importantly, risk premiums for credit risk and 
liquidity risk (charged on banks' rates) display also a nonlinear pattern which is 
correlated to the interbank rate shifting pattern. With an initial shift to unstable financial 
conditions in the money market, the risk premiums switch to the same volatile regime 
inducing, as a result, a regime-switch in the pass-through (for lending and deposit rates 
alike). The direction of the change in the pass-through is not unique. In both cases, it 
could either increase or decrease with the volatile regime. 
Considering the credit risk premium for lending rates, the pass-through in unstable 
conditions could either rise or fall. The direction of the switch will be determined 
crucially by the change in the probability of loan repayment. A Stiglitz-Weiss-type 
adverse selection mechanism in it makes either movement possible. Similarly, for the 
deposit rate, when a liquidity risk premium is considered, a change to the volatile 
regime in the interbank rate will cause a positive or negative shift in the pass-through. 
In this case, the liquidity crisis management (through bank reserves) plays an important 
role to determine the direction of the change. 
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Possible extensions to this research are both theoretical and empirical. First, introducing 
two currencies for bank operations should enhance understanding of dollarised financial 
system (such as in some emerging markets). Besides, bank technology and capital 
accumulation could be treated endogenously to introduce a more general approach in 
the dynamics of the model. An important assessment to make is whether financial 
integration and convergence in regulation could also induce nonlinearities in the pass- 
through process. Secondly, at the empirical level, alternative nonlinear models of the 
interbank rate should be studied for a richer characterization of the dynamics. Some 
GARCH effects would be worth evaluating. Finally, availability of high frequency data 
provides a natural extension for model empirical evaluation. 
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Figure 4.3 Transition Probabilities for German Lending Pass-Through 
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Figure 4.4 Transition Probabilities for German Deposit Pass-Through 
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Tables 
Table 4.1 Unit Root Tests for French Interest Rates 
Null Hypothesis of a Unit Root: 1984: 04 - 2003: 06 
Tests 1/ Interbank Lending Deposit 
Standard tests 
ADF -1.996 -1.968 -2.255 
PP -2.482 -2.387 -2.403 
Robust tests 
DF-GLS -1.786 -1.911 -2.255 
. 
Ng-Perron (Mza -11.364 -43.089 * -15.781 *** 
1/ With constant and trend 
* Rejection at 1%, " rejection at 5%, rejection at 10% 
Table 4.2 Unit Root Tests for German Interest Rates 
Null Hypothesis of a Unit Root: 1984: 11 - 2003: 06 
Tests 1/ Interbank Lending Deposit 
Standard tests 
ADF -1.446 -1.991 -1.068 
PP -1.041 -1.417 -1.016 
Robust tests 
DF-GLS -1.365 -1.965 ** -0.903 
Ng-Perron (Mza) -15.854 * -16.542 * -12.608 ** 
1/ With constant 
Rejection at 5%, ** Rejection at 1% 
230 
Table 4.3 Hansen LR Statistics for French Interest Rate Pass-Through 
Interest rate/ Hansen's p-value 
Pass-Through LR* I/ M=O M=I M=2 M=3 M=4 
MSI(2)-AR(1) 
Interbank 2.6900 0.0690 0.0830 0.0820 0.0890 0.1080 
Lending 1.2544 0.6490 0.6660 0.6270 0.6430 0.6450 
Deposit 1.5492 0.5410 0.5980 0.6080 0.5990 0.5870 
Single pass-throug h equation 
Lending 1.6101 0.4580 0.4720 0.4520 0.4690 0.4720 
Deposit 1.8774 0.4360 0.4250 0.3950 0.4050 0.3710 
1/ Null of linearity, test implemented for grid 3. See details in Hansen (1992 and 1996). 
Table 4.4 Hansen LR Statistics for German Interest Rate Pass-Through 
Interest rate/ Hansen's -value 
Pass-Through LR* I/ M=O M=I M=2 M=3 M=4 
MSI(2)-AR(1) 
Interbank 4.0444 0.0020 0.0050 0.0090 0.0110 0.0130 
Lending 5.8733 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Deposit 7.3922 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Single pass-throug h equation 
Lending 1.9524 0.4290 0.4030 0.4070 0.3910 0.4280 
Lending 2/ 114.5240 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Deposit 4.4940 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 
I/ Null of linearity, test implemented for grid 3. See details in Hansen (1992 and 1996). 
2/ Considering up to two lags. 
Memo: 
J-test for a Markov switching intercept pass-through 
Pass-Through 
E uation 
J-test 
S 
Std. Error t-statistic p-value 
Lending 1.0436 0.1466 7.1185 0.0000 
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Table 4.5 Specification Selection for MS-VAR on German Interest Rates 
Pass-Through Lending - Interbank Deposit - Interbank 
Model Log LR Test 1/ Log LR Test 1/ 
Likelihood Likelihood 
Linear VAR(2) 237.685 289.736 
With CTP 
MSI(2)-VAR(2) 257.553 39.737 302.021 24.569 
MSIH(2)-VAR(2) 295.977 76.847 356.183 108.323 
MSIAH(2)-VAR(2) 293.023 -5.908 373.262 34.159 
MSIH(3)-VAR(2) 2/ 315.240 38.526 394.099 41.673 
With TVTP 
MSIH(2)-VAR(2) 315.288 38.624 368.047 -10.431 
1/ The test is estimated for each model against the null of the previous selected model. 
2/ Although statistically significant, it is not selected for economic interpretation. 
Table 4.6 Lending Interest Rate Pass-Through for Germany: 1984: 11-2003: 06 
Variables Linear VAR MSIAH 2)-VAR 2 with MP 
Interbank Lending Interbank t-stat Lending t-stat 
Regime 0 
Intercept 0.317 0.020 1.093 2.99 -0.253 -1.34 
Interbank 0.277 0.339 4.07 
Interbank(-1) 1.159 -0.049 1.412 7.65 -0.128 -1.00 
Interbank(-2) -0.127 -0.216 -0.288 -1.43 -0.150 -1.63 
Lending(-1) -0.007 1.093 0.194 0.56 0.799 4.75 
Lending(-2) -0.050 -0.102 -0.379 -1.08 0.210 1.25 
S. E. 0.207 0.099 0.133 4.02 0.070 3.59 
Regime 1 
Intercept 0.263 2.50 0.078 1.45 
Interbank 0.136 3.41 
Interbank(-1) 1.019 16.01 0.065 0.99 
Interbank(-2) 0.038 0.59 -0.177 -4.07 
Lending(-1) -0.110 -0.80 1.064 14.18 
Lending(-2) 0.037 0.29 -0.090 -1.26 
S. E. 0.200 8.98 0.081 9.72 
MP Regime 0 Regime 1 
Constant 0.899 0.73 -33.177 -0.64 
Spread Lendlnter -1 0.497 1.03 8.303 0.68 
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Table 4.7 Deposit Interest Rate Pass-Through for Germany: 1984: 11-2003: 06 
Variables Linear VAR MSIAH 2 -VAR 2 with MP 
Interbank Deposit Interbank t-stat Deposit t-stat 
Regime 0 
Intercept 0.013 0.002 -0.056 -2.07 -0.005 -0.36 Interbank 0.386 0.466 7.15 
Interbank(-1) 0.861 -0.066 0.593 7.33 -0.247 -3.75 Interbank(-2) -0.168 -0.204 0.022 0.30 -0.090 -2.36 Deposit(-1) 0.642 1.077 0.787 7.70 0.997 14.41 
Deposit(-2) -0.288 -0.214 -0.321 -3.33 -0.146 -2.67 S. E. 0.199 0.082 0.071 4.95 0.037 4.82 
Regime 1 
Intercept 0.089 0.85 0.008 0.24 
Interbank 0.357 7.39 
Interbank(-1) 0.922 5.69 -0.011 -0.13 
Interbank(-2) -0.235 -1.00 -0.245 -3.91 
Deposit(-1) 0.654 2.25 1.164 9.42 
Deposit(-2) -0.312 -1.10 -0.286 -2.41 
S. E. 0.269 7.07 0.105 5.27 
MP Regime 0 Regime 1 
Constant 0.440 0.45 2.063 2.58 
Spread InterDepo (-1) 0.377 0.35 -1.568 -1.78 
Table 4.8 Mortgage Interest Rate Pass-Through for Germany: 1984: 11-2003: 06 
Variables Linear VAR MSIAH(2)-VAR(2) with TVTP 
Interbank Mort gage Interbank t-stat Mortgage t-stat 
Regime 0 
Intercept -0.226 0.137 -0.335 -2.72 0.008 0.10 
Interbank 0.165 0.095 0.93 
Interbank(-1) 1.118 -0.079 0.576 5.68 0.129 1.61 
Interbank(-2) -0.159 -0.066 0.391 4.22 -0.181 -2.72 
Mortgage(-1) 0.214 1.455 0.182 1.34 1.368 19.92 
Mortgage(-2) -0.155 -0.490 -0.113 -0.81 -0.407 -5.74 
S. E. 0.205 0.154 0.131 4.38 0.068 3.37 
Regime 1 
Intercept -0.157 -0.76 0.294 2.28 
Interbank 0.243 2.67 
Interbank(-1) 1.499 12.60 -0.288 -1.59 
Interbank(-2) -0.546 -4.64 0.060 0.51 
Mortgage(-1) 0.218 1.61 1.442 11.44 
Mortgage(-2) -0.161 -1.18 -0.493 -3.93 
S. E. 0.201 8.57 0.174 8.79 
MP Regime 0 Regime 1 
Constant 0.620 0.67 0.264 0.34 
Spread Mortlnter (1) -0.043 -0.09 0.425 1.12 
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Table 4.9 Nonlinear Pass-Through Induced by Interbank Rate in Germany 
Markov Switchinq VAR (Regime 1= high volatility) 
Interest rates No. times in No. times in Times that Times 
Regime 1 Regime 1 with follow Interbank 
Interbank Interbank induced shifts 
(percentage) (percentage) 
Interbank 126 
Pass-Through 
Lending 99 92 92.9 73.0 
Deposit 110 94 85.5 74.6 
Lending & Deposit 79 62.7 
Memo: 
Mortgage 126 115 91.3 91.3 
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Appendix 
Replacing expressions (3.24) and (3.25) into equation (3.19) to expand out the term in 
brackets: 
nee (1-b) nee Yý =r+ AL 
nSL-1 nEL-1 
+ 
ELK [aL(rL_rLl)+aL(r_r 
,, , -1"E, 
{aL(rýL+l-rL)+a, (r+ý-rnEL 
1 
Rearranging terms inside the last term in brackets: 
n-FL (1-b) neL 
r, = r, + AL 
nEL -1 nEL -1 
+ 
eL/L [a(1+ß)r, L+a1+/3)_a(. 1+f3Er1, )_ar+f3Er)] 
ne, 1 
Collecting everything on the left for the lending rate: 
rL _ 
eL/L 
+, g)Q, 'LrL=neL(l-b) Y+ 
ELYL 
(1+ß)a, r, + 
neL AL 
neL -1 neL -1 neL -1 neL -1 
_ 
ELYL [ctL (i' 
+ßE, i 1)+a; 
(r, 
-. 
+ßEýr, 
+, 
)] 
nEL 1 1-1 
1_ ELYL (l+ß)aL YL = 
nEL (1-b) 
+ -CL 
YL 
(l+, ß)ar Y+ 
fEL 2L 
nEL -1 nEL -1 nEL -1 nEL -1 
_ 
ýLYL [aLVI 
+YE, rI)+aý +ýE1i+ý 
)] 
nEL 1 
Finally, expressing everything in terms of the lending rate: 
rý= 
nCL (1- b) + (l +, ß) eL Yc ar r+ 
nEL AL 
(net -1)-(1+)6)ELYrac 
(neL -1)-(1+iß)eLYcac 
ELYL [a1 (' +ßE, r, 
)+a(r+ßE, 1+ýý1 
ýneý -1ý-ý1+ß)EJYcac 
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A similar procedure is followed to get the corresponding pass-through for deposit rates 
and for both pass-through in the model with risks. 
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CHAPTER 5 
237 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has assessed interest rate pass-through both empirically and theoretically. At 
the first level, a series of econometric models including single and multi-equation 
systems, bivariate and multivariate specifications, and linear and non-linear approaches 
were specified and estimated. The first empirical part studied the case of Argentina. 
Econometric results suggested regime switching stochastic behaviour in the pass- 
through. If volatile conditions last long enough, the pass-through decreases. If they are 
rather short-lived, the pass-through might increase instead. On the theoretical part, a 
dynamic bank model with risks displayed such nonlinearities if there is a regime 
switching stochastic process in the risks premiums that are linked to regime shifts in the 
interbank rate. Overall, it is the macroeconomic factors, rather than the microeconomic 
elements, that explain the regime switching process in the interest rate pass-through. 
Preliminary time series analysis indicates that interest rates in Argentina are consistent 
with stationary stochastic processes. Therefore, econometric models should include in 
this case levels of the variables to estimate the pass-through. In general, though, 
whether to use an autoregressive distributed lag model in levels or an error correction 
model (either in a single equation or in a multi-equation system) depends on the time 
series properties of the interest rates and on the sample of the study. 
For this initial empirical application, single equation systems show quite a remarkable 
heterogeneous structure of the pass-through for bank lending rates, with rates on higher 
credit-risk loans responding stickier to the interbank rate. Simple calculations of the 
long-term pass-through (which include lagged interbank and lagged bank rate 
238 
parameters) produce quite implausible high values (well above the complete pass- 
through effect). Furthermore, the resulting model remains incongruent and does not 
capture precisely the occurrence of extreme events, even if dummy variables account 
for them. 
Multivariate linear VAR models reveal the dynamics among interest rates more 
appropriately than single equations by considering possible interactions between market 
segments. For Argentina, however, this multi-equation approach clearly shows that only 
its own past values and those from the interbank rate affect each bank lending rate. The 
interbank rate is indeed weakly exogenous to the system and banks seem to optimise 
their operations by credit segments. Therefore, bivariate linear VAR models capture 
better the significant differences in pass-through between lending rates. Besides, their 
results are more interpretable. Yet, estimated first-order linear VAR models are still not 
congruent, apparently due to the presence of several financial crises affecting interest 
rates' evolution. Even if dummy variables are included, residuals remain autocorrelated, 
heteroskedastic, and not normally distributed. Pursuing a more parsimonious 
representation does not necessarily improve on these features, but comes at the cost of 
reducing degrees of freedom. 
Impulse responses from the linear VAR representation show some degree of stickiness 
in the short-run, although the immediate effect is relatively high. Still, simple 
calculations of the long-term effect are implausible high. Thus, it seems that neither 
single-equation modelling, nor multi-equation systems capture efficiently the dynamic 
relationships among lending rates and the money market rate. Several episodes of 
financial crises alter the pass-through, affecting the speed and degree of response to 
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shocks in the interbank rate. Discarding information over those periods (for example, by 
including dummy variables) reduces the ability of the models to explain the whole 
process over the study sample. 
Regime switching in the interest rate pass-through has been a feature of the financial 
system in Argentina. Markov switching models are then more suitable to represent the 
pass-through in this empirical case. Bivariate MSIAH(2)-VAR(l) models greatly 
improve upon modelling the responses from bank lending rates to the interbank rate. In 
normal times, the stickiness in the short-run is higher for those rates on loans with 
higher credit risk. With short-lived volatile financial conditions, the pass-through tends 
to increase considerably for all rates. 
Allowing parameters of the VAR model to be regime-dependent efficiently determines 
the periods in which regime switch occurs. The MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) identifies correctly 
periods of financial distress, associated to financial crises (either international or 
domestic) for lending rates. Furthermore, the Markov switching representation provides 
more congruent models than with linear approaches. 
All the same, it seems that although Markov switching models improve upon linear 
models in measuring the pass-through and revealing its dynamics, considering only 
interest rates in local currency might not be enough to capture rates' behaviour. The 
information contents (on the risks banks face) of a number of interest rate spreads could 
signal regime shifts. Therefore, these interest rate spreads are used to represent time- 
varying transition probabilities (as opposed to constant ones). 
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The nonlinearities in the interest rate pass-through in Argentina are associated to 
financial crises, either international or domestically generated, that affect the banking 
system to different degrees and to different variables (prices and/or quantities). They do 
not seem to be particularly associated to the business cycle, whose effects seem to be 
smoother or at least overshadowed by the magnitude of the financial crises effects. 
In the context of a dynamic bank optimisation model, this research has shown how a 
nonlinear, regime-switching, money market rate induces a nonlinear behaviour in 
lending and deposit rates and in their pass-through. It is argued that the pass-through 
process is consistent with a nonlinear behaviour even if there are no asymmetries or 
nonlinearities in the adjustment costs from shocks to the interbank rate. Noticeably, 
both short-term and long-term pass-through could be regime switching. The long-term 
pass-through parameter seems more complex to estimate than the simple calculation 
usually applied in empirical studies (considering lags from the lending or deposit rate 
and from the interbank rate). 
The interbank rate stochastic properties are relevant to determine those for the pass- 
through. Indeed, regime switching behaviour in the interbank rate might cause both 
lending and deposit rates to shift regimes at similar dates. Even more important, risk 
premiums for credit risk and liquidity risk (charged on banks' rates) display also a 
nonlinear pattern, which is correlated to the regime-switching pattern of the interbank 
rate. With an initial shift to unstable financial conditions in the money market, the risk 
premiums switch to the same volatile regime inducing, as a result, a regime-switch in 
the pass-through (for lending and deposit rates alike). 
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The direction of the change in the pass-through is not unique. In both cases, it could 
either increase or decrease with the volatile regime. For instance, considering the credit 
risk premium for lending rates, the pass-through in unstable conditions could either rise 
or fall. The change in the probability of loan repayment will determine crucially the 
direction of the switch. A Stiglitz-Weiss-type adverse selection mechanism in it makes 
either movement possible. Similarly, for the deposit rate, when a liquidity risk premium 
is considered, a change to the volatile regime in the interbank rate will cause a positive 
or negative shift in the pass-through. In this case, the liquidity crisis management, 
through bank reserves, plays an important role to determine the direction of the change. 
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